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  1. Not necessarily- @ellitor can correct me on this, but I believe Tathan will have to sit out a year (undergraduate transfer) whereas Hurts can play immediately (grad transfer). Not out of the realm of possibility that both end up at the U. Source on Martell's eligibility
  2. E, I've been watching some of his high school tapes. Does he remind you of Andy Dalton? Both in size and play style His footwork is pretty darn good and he does a good job of climbing into the pocket. Also shows that he can run when needed and steps up into pressure. Most of his film at OU is garbage time, but from what I've seen I don't see a huge difference in us being interested in Kendall vs Stidham. Yes, Stidham had a bigger body of work, but they are both pass-first QBs that played in Big 12 "air-raid" systems. Kendall (OU) vs Stidham (Baylor) - Year prior to transferring: Kendall: 12/17, 122 yds, 70.6%, 1 TD, 0 INT, 1 sack. 7 rushes, 21 yds, 3.0 avg. Stidham: 75/109, 1,265 yds, 68.8%, 12 TD, 2 INT, 9 sacks. 36 rushes, 70 yds, 1.9 avg. To me, if Kendall wants to come I'd be more than happy to have him. Let the competition shake out between Nix, Gatewood, and Kendall. Willis can switch positions or transfer, but it's pretty clear that he isn't the future of this offense.
  3. When I was re-watching some of the film from this year, I found a play in the middle of the Arkansas game that not only showed some of our weaknesses as an offense, but contained within it a variety of errors that would plague Auburn all year long. Even though the play was a Touchdown, I would still classify it as a failure of execution on the Offenses' part. Situation: 2nd and goal from the 4 yard line, up by 10, 58 seconds left in the first half Offensive Personnel: 11 personnel with the TE (Canella) lined up as a WR on the boundary Defensive Personnel: Showing a 2-3-6 look with a safety cheating down towards the LOS. Pre-snap: Based on the alignment of the Defense and prior tendencies, my guess here would be that Arkansas will run either a man or zone blitz. At first glance, it looks like this might be zone (boundary corners are peeking inside), however man is the more common coverage in short-yardage situations. Defensive playcall: Arkansas does in fact run a man-blitz and they bring 6 defenders. In this case, they will play straight man on the WRs and leave the safety over the top in Cover 1. Both outside LBs will start in a 2-technique and will rush hard upfield to force the tackles to kick out. Meanwhile, the MLB and SS will come on a blitz while the two DTs will run a middle stunt to try and confuse the OL. This playcall is predicated on the coverage doing enough to give the blitzers time to get to the QB, which is often one way to compensate for not getting good pressure from your front 4. Offensive Playcall: The best way to attack Cover 1 is to attack the deep boundary, as it leaves the coverage personnel on an island. Auburn comes out with its bigger receivers (Sal Canella 6'5", Darius Slayton 6'2") lined up on the outside against Arkansas' best cover corners, but manage to sneak Seth Williams (6'3") in the slot. Keep in mind that to this point in the season, Williams had only 4 catches on the season and 0 TDs. Despite that, this play is designed specifically to get Williams open. On the right side of the offense, Williams and Canella will run what I think of as a play on the "Smash" concept, which will try to take advantage of the boundary corner. Williams will run a corner route while Canella will run an "In" route. Stidham's read here is whether or not the boundary stays with Canella- if he does, then the corner route will be wide open. If he doesn't, Canella should be able to "big-body" the inside defenders and complete the pass. This concept does not work if the single-high safety recognizes it, and since the safety is following Stidham's eyes the whole way, it means that Stidham will have to "look off" the safety. This means that once the ball is snapped, Stidham will look in the opposite direction of where he actually intends to go, which will (hopefully) pull the safety safely away from the play. If neither the corner nor the in-route are there, Stidham can then work towards the weak side where he has an out-route and a post route. Notice that both of these routes include a slight hesitation move- this is to ensure that the break in the route is delayed to make the timing work better since they are the "secondary" route concept. One more thing to notice: Based on the Offensive and Defensive playcalls, Auburn has enough blockers to pick up every blitzer: Post Snap: After the ball is snapped, Arkansas' playcall becomes more clear. Notice that Stidham immediately identifies the safety blitz as he looks off the safety. Also notice the intentional route delay to the bottom side of the formation- While Williams is giving his inside head-fake and about to break on the Corner route, Ryan Davis is still behind the line of scrimmage. Ultimately, this play breaks down due to poor execution by 3 people: LT Wanogho, RB Whitlow, and QB Stidham. The red circle above shows where things started to go awry- the OLB runs an inside spin move, and Wanogho is caught off-balance. His momentum carries him too far backwards, he is unable to stay upright, and OLB#10 becomes a free blitzer to the inside. Finally, notice that the FS is watching where Stidham is looking- exactly what Auburn wants if Stidham is to pull him away from the play side. First the good: Stidham successfully pulled the safety to the backside of the play. Williams ran a damn good route and has the CB playing catch up. And Davis, despite having run a hesitation move, is in perfect position for his out-route at the goalline. Now the bad: This is where things go wrong fro RB Whitlow and QB Stidham. If Stidham were to keep his eyes downfield and make the throw rather than seeing the rush coming at him, he would have an easy TD to Williams who has at least a 2 step advantage on his man. Instead, he sees the rush, gets uncomfortable, and starts to run. His footwork prior to this wasn't bad, however he's now undone all of that work and is nowhere near ready to step into the throw and deliver an accurate ball. It's not marked in the picture, but notice where Boobee has positioned himself- he is now on the opposite side of Horton as the blitzing MLB, and is unable to pick him up in pass protection. Even if LT Wanogho had blocked the OLB there would still have been a free rusher. Pass Blocking Close Up: 4 "wins", 2 "losses". Improvisation Even though I think he ran before he needed to, Stidham did at least do a good job of scrambling. He avoided the rush, tucked the ball, and decided to call his own number. Even though he scored, and I can't emphasize this enough, STIDHAM IS NOT THE HERO OF THIS PLAY. That honor belongs to none other than Ryan Freakin' Davis. Stidham may have done a good job avoiding the rush, but 5'9" 185 lb Ryan Davis took on 2 defenders at the same time and handled both of them. These weren't small defenders either- #9 (Santos Ramirez, the corner covering Davis) and the safety who comes to clean up (#2, Kamren Curl) are over 6'2" and 200 lbs, yet Davis not only makes the block, but drives them 2 yards back and allows Stidham to get into the endzone nearly untouched. Play Gif, 50% Speed Verdict: This play had some good (Ryan Davis, Seth Williams, OL minus LT), some bad (Stidham), and some ugly (LT Wanogho, RB Whitlow). The playcall was a good one, and if Stidham had made the throw to Williams I would have graded this a higher, but without the throw neither the playcall nor the excellent route running made a difference. If Stidham wants to make it in the NFL, he will have to learn how to keep his eyes down field and make these kinds of plays. Grade: C-
  4. That's the primary read, yes. Depending on how complicated we made this for the offense, it might also have been an RPO, but I think this was a called PA fake. Primary read is the safety- if he bites on the Wheel route, look at the Post. If he doesn't bite, hit the wheel route at 5 yard depth (you can see Davis turn to look for the ball here) with the ball placed towards the boundary where only Davis can get it. Secondary read is the corner covering the Post- If he tries to undercut the Post route, Stidham can either 1) see if Davis has a step on the Safety and give him a shot down field or 2) check down to the hitch on the other side of the field. Tertiary read is the corner on the hitch route. If he's got tight coverage, tuck it and run.
  5. Agreed, corner messed this one up as well. My guess is that he was told to not let the receiver get outside since they were running a Cover 1, but in doing so he opens up the window for the post. Agreed again, however that would have triggered option #3 for Jarrett, which is the hitch route on the back-side of the play. Since that corner also played a bail technique and was caught looking inside, the CB had no idea the receiver broke off his route and Slayton ended up being open by 5+ yards by the time the ball was thrown. Looking at the play, the first time we see the deep safety is him running downhill at Williams after he has already made the catch (Safety is at the 50, a 25 yard drop at least). It appears that UW was very concerned about our downfield passing game and was attempting to play this one more conservatively by trying to give us the underneath routes and hoping we'd be content to dink and dunk our way down the field. That's fair. I graded him lighter because he was carrying out a play fake and did put himself in position, he just reached and didn't make a good block. He made the right read and picked up his man correctly, just made one move too far inside.
  6. People seemed to enjoy the Purdue play breakdown I did, so I thought I'd give it another go. This time, I'm taking a look at a play from the Washington game that won't show up on any highlight reels, but does show some clever play design and good execution all around. Situation: 1st Quarter, 2:24 left. 2nd & 7 from our own 26 yard line. Pre-Snap Auburn is in "11" personnel here, with 1 H-Back (Chandler Cox) and 1 RB (Boobee Whitlow). Washington comes out in a 3-3-5 alignment that is shifted towards the short side of the field. A couple of things to notice from the defensive alignment right off the bat: Ryan Davis (slot receiver, Short side of the field) appears to be covered by an OLB, which would provide a mismatch.... ... if that OLB wasn't cheating inside, indicating he's coming on a blitz A safety is shadowed over Davis, further indicating a blitz from the right. The Nickel Back (#4, Wide side of the field) is in somewhat of a "no man's land". Corners are giving a medium cushion All of the defenders are looking inside There are several indicators here of Zone coverage, but more on this in a second. Offensively, Auburn will run what's known as a "Post-Wheel Concept" to the short side of the field, and it will look like this: The play is designed to attack the right side of the field, and specifically is designed to isolate the Safety covering Davis. Safeties generally are not as good in 1-on-1 coverage as Corners, so Gus/Chip will attempt to exploit that coverage to their advantage. Let's start with the first thing the defense would see- the run fake. Just like the PA play in my last post, Auburn pulls the back-side guard here to show a Trap blocking scheme, such as the one in the play below: Because linebackers will often watch the OL to determine where the play is going, this pull is designed to make them stop and wait rather than immediately drop into coverage. The fake itself is particularly clever, because it also takes advantage of the LBs reading Stidham. Hang with me here for a second- Stidham will be reading the play-side Safety, but the playside End is located directly in that line of sight. During the play fake, it will appear as if Stidham is reading the end due to the position of his head (which the LB will be watching) and theoretically should be an additional fake. Back to the defense - as it turns out they are running what's known as a "man-zone" coverage, something that is used extensively by the Jacksonville Jaguars. The idea with this type of coverage is that the play is designed as a Zone, however shortly after the play is snapped, the defenders are taught to find and stay with a man. The idea behind this type of coverage is that it should make covering rub routes easier, though it also requires near perfect execution to avoid a coverage bust. As it shakes out, Washington will play man-to-man coverage with the corners using a Bail technique on the receivers. Meanwhile, they will blitz 5 and drop the MLB and Nickel Back into a "hook" zone. Post Snap After the snap, you can already see the corners bailing- their assignment here is to prevent the deep pass and let the LBs and Nickel handle everything underneath. You can also see some of the offensive "cleverness" I talked about earlier, where Stidham is reading the Safety while making it look like he's reading the corner. At this point, there is no indication whether this is a run or a pass play, which is exactly what Auburn wants. By the time Stidham pulls the ball, the OL and backs have given him a solid pocket to step into. For his end of the bargain, Stidham has kept his eyes downfield even though he's sensing pressure off of the edge. Once the Slot (Ryan Davis) made his cut to the boundary, the Safety committed and moved to cover him. The Post hasn't yet made his cut in this image, but Stidham already knows it will be open. Why? With the MLB and Nickel still frozen because of the fake, there is now a 5+ yard void in the middle of the field. The Corner that is covering the Post has his hips completely flipped and is running downfield full tilt The Corner that is covering the Post has Outside leverage, but is leaving the inside wide open All that's left to do is make an on-target throw If there was anything to nit-pick on this play, it's the pass protection from Boobee. He wasn't able to push the OLB wide enough, and allowed him to get pressure on Stidham, which forced an off-balance throw (Stidham had the room to make the pass, but felt the pressure and didn't fully follow through). Note- this blurry mess was the best image I could find. ESPN 60 FPS pls. The off-balance throw from Stidham was behind his receiver (Seth Williams) who did an excellent job of finding the open space in the defense. Even better, he was able to make an adjustment and catch the bad pass for a positive play. Takeaways The route concept used in this play is extremely similar to the concept used on the TD pass to Boobee Whitlow in the bowl game, but both the formation and point of attack are different. Everyone on offense, from the OL and H-Back in protection to the RB on the run fake and the WR's routes to the QB's read was great, and it led to a 19 yard gain and a first down. More than that, this play is a "setup" play for a read-option from the same formation, because it causes the defense to think twice when they see a similar play. Grades: OL: A+ HB: A+ RB: B WR: A QB: B+ Overall: A Play at 50% Speed
  7. Fixed the GIFs. Downloaded them and uploaded to GIPHY, so they should be permanent.
  8. Yes on the Williams catch (though that's assuming Stidham still throws it, he might take a checkdown if the DB has good coverage), but the Slayton TD was more athleticism than anything. He wasn't in danger of being tackled until after he got the 1st down. The only thing better coaching might do is make sure defenders get out to cover the screen quicker.
  9. I think it was a big part, but schematically we also did some clever things to take advantage of Brohm's aggressive play, especially with their defense. The offense was clicking on all cylinders, and that includes the play caller. Biggest example of that in the OP was the 3rd down wheel route- that was the perfect play call for the situation, and would've worked regardless of who was running it. I agree that we definitely executed better and that we clearly had a talent advantage, however playcalling was still a huge component of the win.
  10. You're absolutely right, I tried to focus more on the playside, but in the GIF you can see Kam Martin run out to the wide-side of the field with lead blockers Mike Horton and Jack Driscoll as well as Seth Williams blocking on the boundary. Stidham's read on the play is the DE to the strong side of the formation (in this case, the right side of the formation). You can see him watch the DE, and when the DE stops rushing to cover Kam, he turns and fires it to Slayton. Turned out to be the right decision because Seth Williams was unable to get a good block on the DB. Kam might have been able to out run him, but would've been a harder play to convert.
  11. It's been a while since I posted, but I've been getting more into film breakdown (Brett Kollman does a great job, but focuses more on the NFL) and thought this would be a good game to take a look at why our offense exploded against Purdue. Was it scheme? Execution? Playcalling? A mix? Let's find out. All of the screenshots and plays are taken directly from Auburn Football's highlights video on YouTube. Play #1 - Wheel Route TD to Boobee Whitlow This is the 3rd play of the game, and it's 3rd and 1. Purdue has clearly watched film of Auburn this year, and based on our offensive tendencies, they're selling out for the run, betting that we'll stick to our usual gameplan and run up the middle. To accomplish that, they're lined up in a 3-4 set, but have brought both safeties down 10 yards off the LOS and have their corners in press coverage. At this point, Auburn can be fairly confident that they are bringing pressure, which dictates that we should probably get the ball out quick to avoid a sack. Pre-snap, Chandler Cox is lined out wide to the right side of the offensive formation, but he is immediately motioned back into the backfield. This motion is designed to help identify whether the defense is running a man or zone look. The defender (Safety #27) follows Cox through the motion, which (along with the press coverage) indicates that this is a man blitz. With Cox in the backfield, it's a little easier to see the man coverage. Stidham knows that Purdue is probably bringing 5 blitzers, with 2 additional possible (LOLB and MLB). He also knows that his "hot" route is going to be the RB on the rub. Looking at the play design, first the rout concepts: Auburn is sending 4 players out in the formation, and the primary target on this play is Boobee. Both Seth Williams and Anthony Schwartz are running slant patterns, but notice that both receivers presnap are looking at the LBs- that is because their first objective here is to get in the way of the LB covering Boobee (in this case, the ROLB). With no safety help over the top, this "pick" or "rub" action is what causes Boobee to be so wide open on the play. On the other side of the formation, Darius Slayton is getting an outside release and running either a fly route or a comeback, but he's out of view so we can't tell. Meanwhile, looking at the blocking: This blocking setup is designed to cause the LBs to hesitate (giving the WRs more time to get in their way, which will free up the wheel route). We're blocking down towards the wide side of the field, but are pulling our strong side guard back to the left, which typically indicates a run to the left side of the formation (either QB on a Power or Read Option or RB on a counter). Meanwhile, the DL all gets washed down away from the playside, giving Stidham a "bailout" to the playside if he needs one. Notice the split between the DT and the DE on the left side of the offensive formation- this split makes it a lot easier for Tega to get leverage on the DT. Play at 50% speed: Seth Williams does a good job of "rubbing" the ROLB, which leaves Boobee wide open. Stidham hits Boobee in stride an lets his guy go make a play. Verdict: Scheme, Playcalling, and Execution made this play work. Play #2: Fly Route to Seth Williams Auburn comes out in 11 personnel (1 RB, 1 FB) with 2 WR to the wide side of the field, while Purdue again puts 5 guys on the LOS. This time, they have their corners at a 5-6 yard depth. Notice that all of the DBs are looking inside, not at the player in front of them. Also notice that S #27 is lined up on the opposite side of the formation from Boobee or Cox. Both of these are indicators that this is going to be a zone coverage, but it's not yet determined what type of zone it will be (cover 1,2,3,4). These "cover" monikers refer to the number of safeties that are the last line of defense, so in Cover 1, there's one man back who is responsible for the whole field, in Cover 2 there are 2 who are responsible for half, and so on. Each of these different "covers" dictates a different read on the play. There are lots of resources out there detailing how to attack zone coverages, so I'm not going to reinvent the wheel here. Offensively, after the snap, Seth Williams (top of the screen) runs a fly route and Ryan Davis (slot, right of the formation) runs a little "bubble" route. The goal of this play is to fake the bubble screen, have the corners bite on the fake, and hit Seth Williams over the top for a chunk play: Purdue ends up running a Cover 4 here (so 4 safeties over the top, each responsible for a quarter of the field, also called Quarters coverage), which should take away the fly route that Seth Williams runs. This shouldn't be a problem, because all of the defenders going so far back opens up underneath routes like Ryan Davis's will be wide open. After the snap, Stidham immediately looks towards Ryan Davis, who is 14+ yards from the nearest defender. In accordance with the called play, he gives Davis a pump fake and throws it up to Seth Williams. This was a very dangerous decision. To his credit, Williams did have a step on the defender, however he was incredibly fortunate that the CB and Safety were so preoccupied watching Seth Williams that they didn't look for the ball because the pass was also underthrown, causing Williams to have to come back for it rather than hitting him in stride. Given that the CB wasn't looking for the ball, I won't call this a terrible decision by Stidham, but it was a dangerous decision, especially on 1st and 10 where we didn't need to pick up chunk yardage like that. The safer decision would've been to hit Ryan Davis in the flat, gain 5-6 yards, and keep yourself in a good spot for 2nd down. This play worked against Purdue, but I can about guarantee it wouldn't have worked against Alabama, LSU, or Georgia. Full Play, Half Speed: Verdict: Playcalling was good, but the play worked due to poor defense and a good catch by Williams. Play #3: Screen pass to Darius Slayton Auburn is up big, but is in a bit of a hole on 2nd and 18, so we come out in a 2x2 set. This is a bit of a misnomer though, since one of the receivers at the top is Chandler Cox, who is seldom used in the pass game. Again, we're using motion to determine the defensive playcall, but this time we're doing it with Kam Martin. He motions into the backfield, nobody follows, so it's likely a zone. Presnap, Purdue is showing us a Cover 2 look from a 3-3 Nickel formation. Notice that they've got a LB covering Cox at the left side of the formation. Also notice that their corners are playing "off", not press. Offensively, Gus is betting that Purdue is going to be pinning their ears back and coming after the quarterback, and rather than try to stop them from doing so, he's going to use that to his advantage by calling a screen pass. In this case, he's going to utilize a "tunnel" screen, which will attempt to get WR Slayton (far left of the formation) the ball behind a wall of blockers. That wall will come from Cox and the OL, who will simply let the DL run by them. A couple things to notice: #1 - Tega (LT) is staying in to block. This is intentional, because it will help prevent the DE on the play side from either batting down or intercepting the ball. #2 - Cox is going to block the ROLB covering him, not the CB covering Slayton. Again, this is intentional, but this time it's because the DBs are in a "bail" technique, typical of off coverage. Their hips are already partially turned, and their goal is to force everything back inside where they have help over the top rather than trying to jam the receiver at the line. The playcall was a good one and Tega did a good job giving his QB time to throw. Additionally, Slayton's blocks set up nicely: Unfortunately, this play was not perfect. Even with ample room to throw, Stidham's pass was high, and Slayton had to jump to catch it, losing precious time. Additionally, Chandler Cox was unable to maintain his block on the ROLB, who executed a swim move to the inside. By the time Slayton recovered from his catch, here's what the picture looked like: Realistically, there are now 4 defenders who can possibly make this play: The ROLB that got away from Cox, the CB initially covering Slayton, and both Safeties. Even so, at this point Slayton has a lead blocker and is already back to the LOS with a blocker in front of him and room to run, so the play should be a success. Harrell takes care of the CB and Slayton out runs the ROLB, but now is without a lead blocker and has 2 safeties in pursuit. Both are still a ways away, so this should at least get Auburn back to 3rd and manageable. This picture is the reason Slayton scored on the play: Safety #27 messed up. He took a bad angle, and on top of that he left his hips wide open. See how Slayton is watching him? My guess is that #27 hoped to simply hit Slayton out of bounds, but before he can do so Slayton makes a great open-field move with a "hesitation" or "stutter step" move and a little jab step inside, which caused the #27 to hesitate. Once he did so, Slayton turned on the jets and beat him to the boundary. Full play, half speed: Verdict: Playcalling and execution made this play a success, but an individual effort by Slayton made it a TD.
  12. If you haven't yet, watch the Mic'd Up portion. He's young, but he clearly has an understanding of the nuances of being a Quarterback. He stresses fundamentals, execution, and stays on top of his players. One play in particular stuck out to me- on a triple-option play, the QB read "keep" for the handoff mesh, then read "pitch" for the 2nd read. After gaining ~10-15 yards, Kenny ran up to the WR, told him he had a good block, but if he held it 0.5 second longer, they would've scored. That's the kind of "keep pushing, always get better" mentality that exists at places like Alabama, Georgia, Ohio State, Clemson, etc. and is one of the reasons they haven't "fallen off", despite losing talent year after year.
  13. Maybe, but that's like saying "the right trades at the right times can do much better with penny stocks". Obviously that's exaggerated, but you're asking the guy to go from a very stable job where he's having success to a much more tumultuous position with a rabid fanbase where the expectations, his level of competition, and the ceiling are all higher. It's a High Risk - High Reward gamble for him, and some people are more risk averse than that. I'm guessing given his family history that he is going to opt for the safer route.
  14. 2 points with this: I don't think they're as competitive as you think, evidenced by Mike working under Bob for so long. Over the course of his career, Bob and Mike worked together for 13 years, and for 10 of those Bob was Mike's direct superior. The only "competition" they had were: a) from '92-'95 when they worked on the same defensive staff at K-State and b) when Mike took the HC job at Arizona for 7 years, after which he came back to work under Bob. That doesn't show a pattern of competition, it shows a pattern of family loyalty. More than a competitive family, they are a family that doesn't jump around. Looking at their tenures: Bob: Iowa - 4 years (GA and Assistant) Kent State - 1 year (Assistant), left for a better job at K-State Kansas State - 6 years (DBs, Co-DC), left for a better job in UF Florida - 2 years (AHC/DC), left to take the HC job at OU Oklahoma - 17 years (HC), retired Mike: Iowa - 3 years (GA, LB/DB), left to work with Bob at K-State Kansas State - 6 years (DE, co-DC, DB, AHC), left to work with Bob at OU Oklahoma - 4 years (AHC/co-DC/DB), left to take HC job at Arizona Arizona - 7 years (HC), fired, went back to OU to work with Bob Oklahoma - 6 years (AHD/DC/DB/OLB), fired by Bob's replacement, Lincoln Riley Mark: Iowa - 2 years (GA) - Left for the AD job at a HS High School - 3 years (AD/DB) - Left for a college coaching job USF - 1 year (DB) Wyoming - 3 years (DB) - Left to follow HC to Houston Houston - 1 year (Co-DC/S) - Left for a better job in Miami Miami - 3 years (DB) - Left to coach with his brother Mike Arizona - 5 years (DC/DB) - Left for a better job in Florida State Florida State - 2 years (DC/DB) - Left to take the HC job at Kentucky Kentucky - 5 years (HC) If you look at all of their career paths, you'll notice some similarities: all coached at Iowa to begin their careers, all bounced around a little as assistants, all eventually specialized in DBs, and all of them stayed with 1 school when getting the HC position until they were either fired, or retired. Mark saw what happened to Mike when he started losing, and he saw how Bob was able to maintain a level of success by building a program and staying at the same school. My guess is that he will follow the "build the program" model vs the "it's a better job" model.
  15. No, they aren't the only team, but (assuming we fire Gus) we will have fired our last 2 head coaches within 6 years, both of whom had success (Chizik won a natty in 2010, Malzahn won the SEC in 2013 and almost won a natty, won the SEC West in 2017). That's a lot of stability you're asking coaches like Franklin, Shaw, Peterson, Patterson, and Stoops to give up. Of that group, Shaw's been at Stanford for 11 years, HC for 7 Peterson's been at Washington for 3 years, previously was at Boise State for 7, and is a playoff contender. He's never had any ties to the southeast, much less Auburn, which means we'd have to throw serious bags of cash at him. Bags of cash we do not have. Patterson's been at TCU for 20 years, been HC for 18 (and built that program up from C-USA to Mountain West to Big 12). Patterson is as much a part of that TCU program as Bill Snyder is at K-State. Mark Stoops has been at Kentucky for 6 years and has found success in a place with lower expectations. He's been building that program year-by-year, and is just now rounding the corner into success. He's in a situation where he realistically has 1-2 challenges/year in the SEC East, and you think he's going to leave to come to the toughest division in CFB? At a school that in the short term has had a very short tolerance for losing? Franklin's been at Penn State for 4 years, but also built that program back from nothing to a top-10 contender year in and year out. He's also in a situation with a wealth of resources with less competition. He isn't leaving, and I doubt we could afford both his and Malzahn's buyouts. People need to get over Bob Stoops. He retired due to his health- hell his Dad died from a health condition during the middle of a game. He isn't coming back to coaching. That leaves Kiffin, Clark, Cristobal, and Strong. Strong had success at Louisville and is doing a decent job with USF, but he was clearly not the answer at Texas. Kiffin is a good offensive mind, but seems to have struggles as a HC. His FAU team is 3-3 currently with wins over Air Force, Bethune-Cookman, and Old Dominion. They're 5th in-conference. Cristobal is having a ton of success at Oregon, has the backing of one of the biggest names in sports worldwide (Nike), and benefits from a Pac-12 that isn't the toughest. The last coach to have success like that only left to go to the NFL. That leaves Bill Clark, who I've already voiced my support for.