Strategic Patience

[Proud Tiger 4,261]

It's there in your mind. Simple question, are ISIS, Al Qaeda, Taliban, etc.,growing in numbers and strength? Yes or no.

[AUUSN 823]

It's there in your mind. Simple question, are ISIS, Al Qaeda, Taliban, etc.,growing in numbers and strength? Yes or no.

It's not a simple question. It's stupid and only meant to bait me. What about al Shabab? What about Boko Haram? What about AQIM? What about the Houthi? What about the Haqqani? What about Hezbola? Each are in different stages and each require a different strategy. You need to spend some more time with your intel buddy. His mentorship is failing you.

[Proud Tiger 4,261]

It's only a "stupid" question because you can't give a simple answer. According to a lot of people with more credibility than you can show here the answer is a resounding YES.

[icanthearyou 4,462]

It's there in your mind. Simple question, are ISIS, Al Qaeda, Taliban, etc.,growing in numbers and strength? Yes or no.

ISIS - No, Al Qaeda - Yes, Taliban - Yes

Those are the simple answers. True understanding requires more information, more thought. You are foolish to argue with USN. I would suggest you engage in discussion rather than,,,,,whatever it is you are doing. Your conduct is out-of-line.

[AUUSN 823]

It's there in your mind. Simple question, are ISIS, Al Qaeda, Taliban, etc.,growing in numbers and strength? Yes or no.

ISIS - No, Al Qaeda - Yes, Taliban - Yes

Those are the simple answers. True understanding requires more information, more thought. You are foolish to argue with USN. I would suggest you engage in discussion rather than,,,,,whatever it is you are doing. Your conduct is out-of-line.

And to deal with each of those groups require what? Yep, STRATEGIC PATIENCE

[Proud Tiger 4,261]

Yep but the point remains that while we are being so patient the terrorists are growing in numbers and strength. That leads us right back to where the thread started. Is the strategy working? I guess time will tell.

And I note a post from your friend ICHY because you quote him. He is obviously to dense to realize I don't normally see his posts since he is on my ignore list. He isn't worth my time fooling with. Quite an ego the dude has, but I won't get down in the dirt by making a nasty response.

[icanthearyou 4,462]

Yep but the point remains that while we are being so patient the terrorists are growing in numbers and strength. That leads us right back to where the thread started. Is the strategy working? I guess time will tell.

And I note a post from your friend ICHY because you quote him. He is obviously to dense to realize I don't normally see his posts since he is on my ignore list. He isn't worth my time fooling with. Quite an ego the dude has, but I won't get down in the dirt by making a nasty response.

LOL! You still seem to respond to them! You seriously need to work on being a nicer person. You are a total failure in this forum.

[homersapien 11,354]

While we wait, here's a little bit of reading:

The Difference Between Terrorism and Insurgency

The Difference Between Terrorism and Insurgency

Analysis

By Scott Stewart

It is not uncommon for media reports to refer to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant as a terrorist group. While the group certainly does have cadres with advanced terrorist tradecraft skills, it is much more than a terrorist group. In addition to conducting terrorist attacks in its area of operations, the group has displayed the ability to fight a protracted insurgency across an expansive geography and has also engaged in conventional military battles against the Syrianand Iraqi militaries.

Because of this, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is much more accurately referred to as a militant group — a group that uses terrorism as one of its diverse military tools. We have taken some heat from readers who view our use of the term "militant group" to be some sort of politically correct euphemism for terrorism, but militant group is really a far more accurate description for groups like the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, al Shabaab and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which all have the capacity to do far more than conduct terrorist attacks.

Terrorism and Insurgency

First, it is important to recognize that terrorism is only one tool used by organizations that wage asymmetrical warfare against a superior foe. Terrorism is often used to conduct armed conflict against a militarily stronger enemy when the organization launching the armed struggle is not yet at a stage where insurgent or conventional warfare is viable. (Although there are also instances where state-sponsored terrorism can be used by one state against another in a Cold War-type struggle.)

Marxist, Maoist and focoist militant groups often use terrorism as the first step in an armed struggle. In some ways, al Qaeda also followed a type of focoist vanguard strategy. It used terrorism to shape public opinion and raise popular support for its cause, expecting to enhance its strength to a point where it could wage insurgent and then conventional warfare in order to establish an emirate and eventually a global caliphate.

Terrorism can also be used to supplement insurgency or conventional warfare. In such cases, it is employed to keep the enemy off balance and distracted, principally by conducting strikes against vulnerable targets at the enemy's rear. The Afghan Taliban employ terrorism in this manner, as does the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.

Once a group becomes more militarily capable, the group's leaders will often switch strategies, progressing from terrorist attacks to an insurgency. Insurgent warfare, often referred to as guerilla warfare, has been practiced for centuries by a number of different cultures. Historical commanders who employed insurgent tactics have ranged from the Prophet Mohammed to Mao Zedong to Geronimo.

Simply put, insurgent theory is based on the concept of declining battle when the enemy is superior and attacking after amassing sufficient forces to strike where the enemy is weak. The insurgents also take a long view of armed struggle, seeking to live to fight another day rather than allow themselves to be fixed and destroyed by their superior enemy. They may lose some battles, but if they remain alive to continue the insurgency while also forcing their enemy to expend men and resources disproportionately, they consider it a victory. Time is on the side of the insurgents in this asymmetrical style of battle, and they hope a long war will exhaust and demoralize their enemy.

This style of warfare is seen very plainly in the history of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. In 2004, when the group was called al Qaeda in Iraq, it attempted to progress from an insurgent force to a conventional military, seizing and holding territory, but it suffered terrible losses when facing the United States in clashes that included the first and second battles of Fallujah. In 2006, the group, known then as the Islamic State in Iraq, suffered significant losses in the battle of Ramadi, and the losses continued during the Anbar Awakening. However, the group persevered, abandoned its efforts to hold territory and reverted back to a lower-level insurgency, continuing its pursuit of a long war.

The group's persistence paid off. Now known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, the militants regained strength after the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and through their involvement in the Syrian civil war. Today, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is arguably the most powerful jihadist militant group in the world. The group has even been able to progress militarily to the point where it can engage in conventional military battles simultaneously against the Syrian and Iraqi armies. The group is clearly more than just a terrorist group; its military capabilities are superior to those of many small countries.

Constraints

All that said, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is also constrained as it employs its military power. Its first constraint is the projection of that power. Force projection is a challenge for even large national militaries. It requires advanced logistical capabilities to move men, equipment, munitions, petroleum and other supplies across expanses of land, and it becomes even more difficult when substantial bodies of water must be crossed. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is aided by the fact that it can operate along internal supply lines that cross the Iraq-Syria border, allowing them to move men and material to different areas of the battlefield as needed. Mostly this movement is achieved by means of trucks, buses and smaller, mobile technicals (pickup trucks) and motorcycles.

For the most part, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is practicing a mobile hit-and-run style of warfare aided by sympathetic Sunni forces, but in some places, such as Mosul, Ramadi and Baiji, they are conducting more conventional warfare along fixed battle lines. The militants have not shown the capability to project their conventional or even insurgent forces very far into the Kurdish and Shiite-controlled areas of Iraq, where they lack significant local support. In the past, they have been able to conduct terrorist operations in Kurdish and Shiite areas, including Arbil, Baghdad and Basra, but in recent years the group has not conducted terrorist attacks outside of its operational theater. Back in 2005, the group carried out bombing and rocket attacks in Jordan, including the Nov. 9, 2005 suicide bombing attacks against three hotels in Amman, but it has not conducted an attack in Jordan for many years now. Local supporters often facilitate the group's terrorist operations in Iraq, Syria and Jordan, even when foreign operatives conduct a suicide bombing or armed assault.

Historically, it has been fairly unusual for a militant group to develop the capability to project power transnationally. Developing such a capability without state sponsorship is even more unusual; transnational groups such as Hezbollah, Black September and the Abu Nidal Organization all received significant state sponsorship. It is far more common for militant groups to confine their military operations within a discreet theater of operations consisting of their country of origin and often the border areas of adjacent countries. In many cases, the militant group involved is a separatist organization fighting for independence or autonomy, and its concerns pertain to a localized area.

In other cases, militant organizations have more global ambitions, such as the jihadist or Marxist visions of global conquest. These groups will often try to accomplish their global goals via a progression that begins with establishing a local political entity and then expanding. This initial local focus requires a group to commit its military resources toward local targets rather than transnational targets. This is likely why, for example, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant has not yet attempted to conduct transnational terrorist operations directed against the United States and the West. The group has more pressing local and regional targets to hit.

Militant groups face another constraint on the projection of military power in the form of transnational terrorism: The tradecraft required to plan and orchestrate a terrorist attack undetected in a hostile environment is quite different from the skill set needed to operate as a guerilla fighter in an insurgency. In addition, the logistical networks needed to support terrorist operatives in such environments are quite different from those required to support insurgent operations. These constraints have shaped our assessment that the threat posed by foreign fighters returning to the West from Syria is real but limited.

Among the things that made the al Qaeda core organization so unique was its focus on the "far enemy" (the United States) first rather than the "near enemy" (local regimes). Al Qaeda also developed the capability to train people in advanced terrorist tradecraft in camps like Deronta and create the logistical network required to support terrorist operatives operating in hostile territory. Following the 9/11 attacks, al Qaeda lost its training camps and logistical networks. This has made it much more difficult for the group to conduct transnational attacks and explains why the long-awaited follow up attacks to the 9/11 operation did not materialize. Indeed, in 2010 the al Qaeda core group jumped on the bandwagon of encouraging individual jihadists living in the West to conduct simple attacks where they liverather than travel to other countries to fight.

Among the al Qaeda franchise groups, such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and al Shabaab, tensions have erupted between members of the organization who favor the al Qaeda-like focus on the far enemy and those who want to focus their military efforts on the near enemy. For the most part, the regional franchises are also under heavy pressure from the local authorities and are struggling to survive and continue their struggles. In such an environment, they have very little extra capacity to devote to transnational attacks.

Even a local franchise group like al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which has adopted more of a transnational ideology, can be constrained by such factors. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has not been able to launch an attack directed against the U.S. homeland since the November 2010 printer bomb attempt. Moreover, it is important to recognize that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula launched the attacks targeting the United States from its base of operations in Yemen rather than sending operatives to the United States to plan and execute attacks in a hostile environment. The group did not have operatives with the requisite tradecraft for such operations and also lacked the logistics network to support them. Therefore, the al Qaeda franchise was limited to executing only the transnational attacks it could plan and launch from Yemen.

So far, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant has not demonstrated a focus on conducting transnational attacks against the far enemy. It also has not shown that it has operatives capable of traveling to foreign countries to plan and conduct sophisticated terrorist operations there. However, the group retains a robust terrorist capability within its area of operation and has consistently been able to acquire weapons and explosives, fabricate viable explosive devices and recruit and indoctrinate suicide operatives.

The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is far more than a terrorist organization. It can launch complex insurgent campaigns and even conduct conventional military operations, govern areas of territory, administer social services and collect taxes. Labeling the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant solely as a terrorist organization underestimates the group's capabilities, giving it the element of surprise when it launches a major military operation like the one resulting in the capture of a significant portion of Iraq's Sunni-dominated areas.

The contrast between ISIS and Al Quaeda regarding the focus on the "far enemy" vs. the "near enemy" is intriguing.

If so, it seems to me the seeds of ISIS's defeat are contained in their policy.

[AUloggerhead 2,225]

From everything I read and hear, ISIS, Al Qaeda, the Taliban, etc., are growing larger and stronger as time goes on despite some setbacks (I see high level retired military officers expressing their concerns almost every day). I can't prove that. Can anyone disprove it?

http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/Michael-Flynn-ISIS-doubled-spread/2015/02/08/id/623473/

... Pointing to a map showing the spread of violent Islamic extremism stretching across the Middle East and northern Africa, Flynn said, "Ten years ago I was drawing that map and there's only two or three dots on it. Today, what you're seeing on a map like that is a doubling of the enemy … a doubling or more."

America's counter-terrorism strategy for the past decade is only one component of an overall strategy, he said.

"We need a much broader strategy that recognizes that we're facing not just this tactical problem of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, … but we're facing a growing and expanding threat around the world in some cases."

The current strategy, he said, has not been working.

"You can't defeat an enemy that you don't admit exists," he said.

--LTG Michael Flynn (former director of Defense Intelligence Agency & retired as of last summer)

[homersapien 11,354]

Strategic patience = wait, and do nothing.

As opposed to impetuous action?

You're right! It's downright unamerican.

[japantiger 4,051]

While we wait, here's a little bit of reading:

The Difference Between Terrorism and Insurgency

The Difference Between Terrorism and Insurgency

Analysis

By Scott Stewart

It is not uncommon for media reports to refer to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant as a terrorist group. While the group certainly does have cadres with advanced terrorist tradecraft skills, it is much more than a terrorist group. In addition to conducting terrorist attacks in its area of operations, the group has displayed the ability to fight a protracted insurgency across an expansive geography and has also engaged in conventional military battles against the Syrianand Iraqi militaries.

Because of this, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is much more accurately referred to as a militant group — a group that uses terrorism as one of its diverse military tools. We have taken some heat from readers who view our use of the term "militant group" to be some sort of politically correct euphemism for terrorism, but militant group is really a far more accurate description for groups like the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, al Shabaab and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which all have the capacity to do far more than conduct terrorist attacks.

Terrorism and Insurgency

First, it is important to recognize that terrorism is only one tool used by organizations that wage asymmetrical warfare against a superior foe. Terrorism is often used to conduct armed conflict against a militarily stronger enemy when the organization launching the armed struggle is not yet at a stage where insurgent or conventional warfare is viable. (Although there are also instances where state-sponsored terrorism can be used by one state against another in a Cold War-type struggle.)

Marxist, Maoist and focoist militant groups often use terrorism as the first step in an armed struggle. In some ways, al Qaeda also followed a type of focoist vanguard strategy. It used terrorism to shape public opinion and raise popular support for its cause, expecting to enhance its strength to a point where it could wage insurgent and then conventional warfare in order to establish an emirate and eventually a global caliphate.

Terrorism can also be used to supplement insurgency or conventional warfare. In such cases, it is employed to keep the enemy off balance and distracted, principally by conducting strikes against vulnerable targets at the enemy's rear. The Afghan Taliban employ terrorism in this manner, as does the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.

Once a group becomes more militarily capable, the group's leaders will often switch strategies, progressing from terrorist attacks to an insurgency. Insurgent warfare, often referred to as guerilla warfare, has been practiced for centuries by a number of different cultures. Historical commanders who employed insurgent tactics have ranged from the Prophet Mohammed to Mao Zedong to Geronimo.

Simply put, insurgent theory is based on the concept of declining battle when the enemy is superior and attacking after amassing sufficient forces to strike where the enemy is weak. The insurgents also take a long view of armed struggle, seeking to live to fight another day rather than allow themselves to be fixed and destroyed by their superior enemy. They may lose some battles, but if they remain alive to continue the insurgency while also forcing their enemy to expend men and resources disproportionately, they consider it a victory. Time is on the side of the insurgents in this asymmetrical style of battle, and they hope a long war will exhaust and demoralize their enemy.

This style of warfare is seen very plainly in the history of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. In 2004, when the group was called al Qaeda in Iraq, it attempted to progress from an insurgent force to a conventional military, seizing and holding territory, but it suffered terrible losses when facing the United States in clashes that included the first and second battles of Fallujah. In 2006, the group, known then as the Islamic State in Iraq, suffered significant losses in the battle of Ramadi, and the losses continued during the Anbar Awakening. However, the group persevered, abandoned its efforts to hold territory and reverted back to a lower-level insurgency, continuing its pursuit of a long war.

The group's persistence paid off. Now known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, the militants regained strength after the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and through their involvement in the Syrian civil war. Today, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is arguably the most powerful jihadist militant group in the world. The group has even been able to progress militarily to the point where it can engage in conventional military battles simultaneously against the Syrian and Iraqi armies. The group is clearly more than just a terrorist group; its military capabilities are superior to those of many small countries.

Constraints

All that said, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is also constrained as it employs its military power. Its first constraint is the projection of that power. Force projection is a challenge for even large national militaries. It requires advanced logistical capabilities to move men, equipment, munitions, petroleum and other supplies across expanses of land, and it becomes even more difficult when substantial bodies of water must be crossed. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is aided by the fact that it can operate along internal supply lines that cross the Iraq-Syria border, allowing them to move men and material to different areas of the battlefield as needed. Mostly this movement is achieved by means of trucks, buses and smaller, mobile technicals (pickup trucks) and motorcycles.

For the most part, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is practicing a mobile hit-and-run style of warfare aided by sympathetic Sunni forces, but in some places, such as Mosul, Ramadi and Baiji, they are conducting more conventional warfare along fixed battle lines. The militants have not shown the capability to project their conventional or even insurgent forces very far into the Kurdish and Shiite-controlled areas of Iraq, where they lack significant local support. In the past, they have been able to conduct terrorist operations in Kurdish and Shiite areas, including Arbil, Baghdad and Basra, but in recent years the group has not conducted terrorist attacks outside of its operational theater. Back in 2005, the group carried out bombing and rocket attacks in Jordan, including the Nov. 9, 2005 suicide bombing attacks against three hotels in Amman, but it has not conducted an attack in Jordan for many years now. Local supporters often facilitate the group's terrorist operations in Iraq, Syria and Jordan, even when foreign operatives conduct a suicide bombing or armed assault.

Historically, it has been fairly unusual for a militant group to develop the capability to project power transnationally. Developing such a capability without state sponsorship is even more unusual; transnational groups such as Hezbollah, Black September and the Abu Nidal Organization all received significant state sponsorship. It is far more common for militant groups to confine their military operations within a discreet theater of operations consisting of their country of origin and often the border areas of adjacent countries. In many cases, the militant group involved is a separatist organization fighting for independence or autonomy, and its concerns pertain to a localized area.

In other cases, militant organizations have more global ambitions, such as the jihadist or Marxist visions of global conquest. These groups will often try to accomplish their global goals via a progression that begins with establishing a local political entity and then expanding. This initial local focus requires a group to commit its military resources toward local targets rather than transnational targets. This is likely why, for example, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant has not yet attempted to conduct transnational terrorist operations directed against the United States and the West. The group has more pressing local and regional targets to hit.

Militant groups face another constraint on the projection of military power in the form of transnational terrorism: The tradecraft required to plan and orchestrate a terrorist attack undetected in a hostile environment is quite different from the skill set needed to operate as a guerilla fighter in an insurgency. In addition, the logistical networks needed to support terrorist operatives in such environments are quite different from those required to support insurgent operations. These constraints have shaped our assessment that the threat posed by foreign fighters returning to the West from Syria is real but limited.

Among the things that made the al Qaeda core organization so unique was its focus on the "far enemy" (the United States) first rather than the "near enemy" (local regimes). Al Qaeda also developed the capability to train people in advanced terrorist tradecraft in camps like Deronta and create the logistical network required to support terrorist operatives operating in hostile territory. Following the 9/11 attacks, al Qaeda lost its training camps and logistical networks. This has made it much more difficult for the group to conduct transnational attacks and explains why the long-awaited follow up attacks to the 9/11 operation did not materialize. Indeed, in 2010 the al Qaeda core group jumped on the bandwagon of encouraging individual jihadists living in the West to conduct simple attacks where they liverather than travel to other countries to fight.

Among the al Qaeda franchise groups, such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and al Shabaab, tensions have erupted between members of the organization who favor the al Qaeda-like focus on the far enemy and those who want to focus their military efforts on the near enemy. For the most part, the regional franchises are also under heavy pressure from the local authorities and are struggling to survive and continue their struggles. In such an environment, they have very little extra capacity to devote to transnational attacks.

Even a local franchise group like al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which has adopted more of a transnational ideology, can be constrained by such factors. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has not been able to launch an attack directed against the U.S. homeland since the November 2010 printer bomb attempt. Moreover, it is important to recognize that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula launched the attacks targeting the United States from its base of operations in Yemen rather than sending operatives to the United States to plan and execute attacks in a hostile environment. The group did not have operatives with the requisite tradecraft for such operations and also lacked the logistics network to support them. Therefore, the al Qaeda franchise was limited to executing only the transnational attacks it could plan and launch from Yemen.

So far, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant has not demonstrated a focus on conducting transnational attacks against the far enemy. It also has not shown that it has operatives capable of traveling to foreign countries to plan and conduct sophisticated terrorist operations there. However, the group retains a robust terrorist capability within its area of operation and has consistently been able to acquire weapons and explosives, fabricate viable explosive devices and recruit and indoctrinate suicide operatives.

The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is far more than a terrorist organization. It can launch complex insurgent campaigns and even conduct conventional military operations, govern areas of territory, administer social services and collect taxes. Labeling the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant solely as a terrorist organization underestimates the group's capabilities, giving it the element of surprise when it launches a major military operation like the one resulting in the capture of a significant portion of Iraq's Sunni-dominated areas.

USN, what point were you trying to make here? This article rightly paints ISIS as "not your fathers" terrorist group...but one that is much more dangerous (well funded, sophisticated, well armed) and capable of projecting sophisticated operations across distances. Was that the point you were trying to make?

What do you mean by sophisticated operations?

Combined arms operations, logistics, occupation, gov't, multiple simultaneous operations...and in the words of the author "The group is clearly more than just a terrorist group; its military capabilities are superior to those of many small countries."

What is an example of a "small country" you would equate their military capabilities to?

You would have to ask the author...I simply quoted him....but I would assume it would mean something like just about every country on the African continent except Egypt and South Africa.

[homersapien 11,354]

Strategic patience = wait, and do nothing.

Bombing is doing nothing?

Supplying and training the Kurds is doing nothing?

Supplying and training the Iraqis is doing nothing?

Supplying and training the Jordanians is doing nothing?

Providing intel is doing nothing?

We may not be doing everything you would like but clearly, to say we are doing nothing is a lie.

That's all well and good, but Jordan is making hype videos..... HYPE VIDEOS!!!

We're America, we're supposed to be releasing the cool videos with the bass and drums while showing our pilots gearing up for some badassery.

Not to change the subject, but this reminds me of a recent segment on NPR profiling an Egyptian-American who is making anti-radical propaganda videos to counter the propaganda videos ISIS are using to recruit young people.

It sounded as if they are an effective way to counter the allure that ISIS is presenting to young people. And this was a private effort.

More needs to be done in this regard and the US with our pervasive pop culture could certainly help.

I looked for that segment but so far haven't been able to find it.

[Proud Tiger 4,261]

AUloggerhead......re. your post #84 above. Quite a coincidence that I just heard Chris Wallace interview Lt. Gen. Mike Flynn. He stated almost verbatim the things you note in your post. Bottomline is he said we don't have an overall coherent strategy/plan that is working. He again made reference to the map you mention. He said we must put politics aside and do what is best for the country before it's too late. Everyone here need to see this interview if possible. I think you can see it on the Fox website

under Chris Wallace or watch a repeat of the interview later today (5pm CST I think).

Also interesting......Bob Woodward said almost all the top military people he talks to say they are being micro managed by people in the WH who are not competent to develop a strategy let alone execute one.

Could this be one of those:

http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/02/08/kerry-says-us-on-road-to-defeating-islamic-state/

All I can say is I will cast my lot with Gen. Flynn over Kerry any day.

[icanthearyou 4,462]

While we wait, here's a little bit of reading:

The Difference Between Terrorism and Insurgency

The Difference Between Terrorism and Insurgency

Analysis

By Scott Stewart

It is not uncommon for media reports to refer to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant as a terrorist group. While the group certainly does have cadres with advanced terrorist tradecraft skills, it is much more than a terrorist group. In addition to conducting terrorist attacks in its area of operations, the group has displayed the ability to fight a protracted insurgency across an expansive geography and has also engaged in conventional military battles against the Syrianand Iraqi militaries.

Because of this, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is much more accurately referred to as a militant group — a group that uses terrorism as one of its diverse military tools. We have taken some heat from readers who view our use of the term "militant group" to be some sort of politically correct euphemism for terrorism, but militant group is really a far more accurate description for groups like the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, al Shabaab and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which all have the capacity to do far more than conduct terrorist attacks.

Terrorism and Insurgency

First, it is important to recognize that terrorism is only one tool used by organizations that wage asymmetrical warfare against a superior foe. Terrorism is often used to conduct armed conflict against a militarily stronger enemy when the organization launching the armed struggle is not yet at a stage where insurgent or conventional warfare is viable. (Although there are also instances where state-sponsored terrorism can be used by one state against another in a Cold War-type struggle.)

Marxist, Maoist and focoist militant groups often use terrorism as the first step in an armed struggle. In some ways, al Qaeda also followed a type of focoist vanguard strategy. It used terrorism to shape public opinion and raise popular support for its cause, expecting to enhance its strength to a point where it could wage insurgent and then conventional warfare in order to establish an emirate and eventually a global caliphate.

Terrorism can also be used to supplement insurgency or conventional warfare. In such cases, it is employed to keep the enemy off balance and distracted, principally by conducting strikes against vulnerable targets at the enemy's rear. The Afghan Taliban employ terrorism in this manner, as does the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.

Once a group becomes more militarily capable, the group's leaders will often switch strategies, progressing from terrorist attacks to an insurgency. Insurgent warfare, often referred to as guerilla warfare, has been practiced for centuries by a number of different cultures. Historical commanders who employed insurgent tactics have ranged from the Prophet Mohammed to Mao Zedong to Geronimo.

Simply put, insurgent theory is based on the concept of declining battle when the enemy is superior and attacking after amassing sufficient forces to strike where the enemy is weak. The insurgents also take a long view of armed struggle, seeking to live to fight another day rather than allow themselves to be fixed and destroyed by their superior enemy. They may lose some battles, but if they remain alive to continue the insurgency while also forcing their enemy to expend men and resources disproportionately, they consider it a victory. Time is on the side of the insurgents in this asymmetrical style of battle, and they hope a long war will exhaust and demoralize their enemy.

This style of warfare is seen very plainly in the history of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. In 2004, when the group was called al Qaeda in Iraq, it attempted to progress from an insurgent force to a conventional military, seizing and holding territory, but it suffered terrible losses when facing the United States in clashes that included the first and second battles of Fallujah. In 2006, the group, known then as the Islamic State in Iraq, suffered significant losses in the battle of Ramadi, and the losses continued during the Anbar Awakening. However, the group persevered, abandoned its efforts to hold territory and reverted back to a lower-level insurgency, continuing its pursuit of a long war.

The group's persistence paid off. Now known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, the militants regained strength after the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and through their involvement in the Syrian civil war. Today, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is arguably the most powerful jihadist militant group in the world. The group has even been able to progress militarily to the point where it can engage in conventional military battles simultaneously against the Syrian and Iraqi armies. The group is clearly more than just a terrorist group; its military capabilities are superior to those of many small countries.

Constraints

All that said, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is also constrained as it employs its military power. Its first constraint is the projection of that power. Force projection is a challenge for even large national militaries. It requires advanced logistical capabilities to move men, equipment, munitions, petroleum and other supplies across expanses of land, and it becomes even more difficult when substantial bodies of water must be crossed. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is aided by the fact that it can operate along internal supply lines that cross the Iraq-Syria border, allowing them to move men and material to different areas of the battlefield as needed. Mostly this movement is achieved by means of trucks, buses and smaller, mobile technicals (pickup trucks) and motorcycles.

For the most part, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is practicing a mobile hit-and-run style of warfare aided by sympathetic Sunni forces, but in some places, such as Mosul, Ramadi and Baiji, they are conducting more conventional warfare along fixed battle lines. The militants have not shown the capability to project their conventional or even insurgent forces very far into the Kurdish and Shiite-controlled areas of Iraq, where they lack significant local support. In the past, they have been able to conduct terrorist operations in Kurdish and Shiite areas, including Arbil, Baghdad and Basra, but in recent years the group has not conducted terrorist attacks outside of its operational theater. Back in 2005, the group carried out bombing and rocket attacks in Jordan, including the Nov. 9, 2005 suicide bombing attacks against three hotels in Amman, but it has not conducted an attack in Jordan for many years now. Local supporters often facilitate the group's terrorist operations in Iraq, Syria and Jordan, even when foreign operatives conduct a suicide bombing or armed assault.

Historically, it has been fairly unusual for a militant group to develop the capability to project power transnationally. Developing such a capability without state sponsorship is even more unusual; transnational groups such as Hezbollah, Black September and the Abu Nidal Organization all received significant state sponsorship. It is far more common for militant groups to confine their military operations within a discreet theater of operations consisting of their country of origin and often the border areas of adjacent countries. In many cases, the militant group involved is a separatist organization fighting for independence or autonomy, and its concerns pertain to a localized area.

In other cases, militant organizations have more global ambitions, such as the jihadist or Marxist visions of global conquest. These groups will often try to accomplish their global goals via a progression that begins with establishing a local political entity and then expanding. This initial local focus requires a group to commit its military resources toward local targets rather than transnational targets. This is likely why, for example, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant has not yet attempted to conduct transnational terrorist operations directed against the United States and the West. The group has more pressing local and regional targets to hit.

Militant groups face another constraint on the projection of military power in the form of transnational terrorism: The tradecraft required to plan and orchestrate a terrorist attack undetected in a hostile environment is quite different from the skill set needed to operate as a guerilla fighter in an insurgency. In addition, the logistical networks needed to support terrorist operatives in such environments are quite different from those required to support insurgent operations. These constraints have shaped our assessment that the threat posed by foreign fighters returning to the West from Syria is real but limited.

Among the things that made the al Qaeda core organization so unique was its focus on the "far enemy" (the United States) first rather than the "near enemy" (local regimes). Al Qaeda also developed the capability to train people in advanced terrorist tradecraft in camps like Deronta and create the logistical network required to support terrorist operatives operating in hostile territory. Following the 9/11 attacks, al Qaeda lost its training camps and logistical networks. This has made it much more difficult for the group to conduct transnational attacks and explains why the long-awaited follow up attacks to the 9/11 operation did not materialize. Indeed, in 2010 the al Qaeda core group jumped on the bandwagon of encouraging individual jihadists living in the West to conduct simple attacks where they liverather than travel to other countries to fight.

Among the al Qaeda franchise groups, such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and al Shabaab, tensions have erupted between members of the organization who favor the al Qaeda-like focus on the far enemy and those who want to focus their military efforts on the near enemy. For the most part, the regional franchises are also under heavy pressure from the local authorities and are struggling to survive and continue their struggles. In such an environment, they have very little extra capacity to devote to transnational attacks.

Even a local franchise group like al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which has adopted more of a transnational ideology, can be constrained by such factors. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has not been able to launch an attack directed against the U.S. homeland since the November 2010 printer bomb attempt. Moreover, it is important to recognize that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula launched the attacks targeting the United States from its base of operations in Yemen rather than sending operatives to the United States to plan and execute attacks in a hostile environment. The group did not have operatives with the requisite tradecraft for such operations and also lacked the logistics network to support them. Therefore, the al Qaeda franchise was limited to executing only the transnational attacks it could plan and launch from Yemen.

So far, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant has not demonstrated a focus on conducting transnational attacks against the far enemy. It also has not shown that it has operatives capable of traveling to foreign countries to plan and conduct sophisticated terrorist operations there. However, the group retains a robust terrorist capability within its area of operation and has consistently been able to acquire weapons and explosives, fabricate viable explosive devices and recruit and indoctrinate suicide operatives.

The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is far more than a terrorist organization. It can launch complex insurgent campaigns and even conduct conventional military operations, govern areas of territory, administer social services and collect taxes. Labeling the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant solely as a terrorist organization underestimates the group's capabilities, giving it the element of surprise when it launches a major military operation like the one resulting in the capture of a significant portion of Iraq's Sunni-dominated areas.

USN, what point were you trying to make here? This article rightly paints ISIS as "not your fathers" terrorist group...but one that is much more dangerous (well funded, sophisticated, well armed) and capable of projecting sophisticated operations across distances. Was that the point you were trying to make?

What do you mean by sophisticated operations?

Combined arms operations, logistics, occupation, gov't, multiple simultaneous operations...and in the words of the author "The group is clearly more than just a terrorist group; its military capabilities are superior to those of many small countries."

What is an example of a "small country" you would equate their military capabilities to?

You would have to ask the author...I simply quoted him....but I would assume it would mean something like just about every country on the African continent except Egypt and South Africa.

That is what I was sort of thinking. I wouldn't call that type of capability, "sophisticated".

I think the biggest thing they have going for them is control over some oil fields. IMHO, we should provide whatever resources necessary in order to help the Kurds, Iraqis, and Jordanians take them back (even in Syria). I wouldn't want to see our own troops do it. Two things that unite Arabs/Muslims and turn moderates into radicals; the belief that western powers want to take their oil and, the belief that we want to spread Christianity in the region.

[homersapien 11,354]

You would have to ask the author...I simply quoted him....but I would assume it would mean something like just about every country on the African continent except Egypt and South Africa.

That is what I was sort of thinking. I wouldn't call that type of capability, "sophisticated".

I think the biggest thing they have going for them is control over some oil fields. IMHO, we should provide whatever resources necessary in order to help the Kurds, Iraqis, and Jordanians take them back (even in Syria). I wouldn't want to see our own troops do it. Two things that unite Arabs/Muslims and turn moderates into radicals; the belief that western powers want to take their oil and, the belief that we want to spread Christianity in the region.

Exactly. Which is exactly why their strategy of local operations will backfire on them by motivating the only ones who can really solve this problem to address it.

[AUloggerhead 2,225]

AUloggerhead......re. your post #84 above. Quite a coincidence that I just heard Chris Wallace interview Lt. Gen. Mike Flynn. He stated almost verbatim the things you note in your post. Bottomline is he said we don't have an overall coherent strategy/plan that is working. He again made reference to the map you mention. He said we must put politics aside and do what is best for the country before it's too late. Everyone here need to see this interview if possible. I think you can see it on the Fox website

under Chris Wallace or watch a repeat of the interview later today (5pm CST I think).

Also interesting......Bob Woodward said almost all the top military people he talks to say they are being micro managed by people in the WH who are not competent to develop a strategy let alone execute one.

Could this be one of those:

http://www.foxnews.c...-islamic-state/

All I can say is I will cast my lot with Gen. Flynn over Kerry any day.

What? You'd dare mention Fox News Channel on here? Why, you ... you ... neocon! I'd be interested in seeing in any other news outlet would interview LTG Flynn about his views. Won't hold my breath over it. It's a pity these flag officers have to hold their contrary views silent until they retire lest they ruin their careers. Obama has famously declared that we should change past strategies (e.g. Cuba) if they are not "working." It will be interesting to see if he applies the same treatment to his own failed policies.

[japantiger 4,051]

While we wait, here's a little bit of reading:

The Difference Between Terrorism and Insurgency

The Difference Between Terrorism and Insurgency

Analysis

By Scott Stewart

It is not uncommon for media reports to refer to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant as a terrorist group. While the group certainly does have cadres with advanced terrorist tradecraft skills, it is much more than a terrorist group. In addition to conducting terrorist attacks in its area of operations, the group has displayed the ability to fight a protracted insurgency across an expansive geography and has also engaged in conventional military battles against the Syrianand Iraqi militaries.

Because of this, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is much more accurately referred to as a militant group — a group that uses terrorism as one of its diverse military tools. We have taken some heat from readers who view our use of the term "militant group" to be some sort of politically correct euphemism for terrorism, but militant group is really a far more accurate description for groups like the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, al Shabaab and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which all have the capacity to do far more than conduct terrorist attacks.

Terrorism and Insurgency

First, it is important to recognize that terrorism is only one tool used by organizations that wage asymmetrical warfare against a superior foe. Terrorism is often used to conduct armed conflict against a militarily stronger enemy when the organization launching the armed struggle is not yet at a stage where insurgent or conventional warfare is viable. (Although there are also instances where state-sponsored terrorism can be used by one state against another in a Cold War-type struggle.)

Marxist, Maoist and focoist militant groups often use terrorism as the first step in an armed struggle. In some ways, al Qaeda also followed a type of focoist vanguard strategy. It used terrorism to shape public opinion and raise popular support for its cause, expecting to enhance its strength to a point where it could wage insurgent and then conventional warfare in order to establish an emirate and eventually a global caliphate.

Terrorism can also be used to supplement insurgency or conventional warfare. In such cases, it is employed to keep the enemy off balance and distracted, principally by conducting strikes against vulnerable targets at the enemy's rear. The Afghan Taliban employ terrorism in this manner, as does the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.

Once a group becomes more militarily capable, the group's leaders will often switch strategies, progressing from terrorist attacks to an insurgency. Insurgent warfare, often referred to as guerilla warfare, has been practiced for centuries by a number of different cultures. Historical commanders who employed insurgent tactics have ranged from the Prophet Mohammed to Mao Zedong to Geronimo.

Simply put, insurgent theory is based on the concept of declining battle when the enemy is superior and attacking after amassing sufficient forces to strike where the enemy is weak. The insurgents also take a long view of armed struggle, seeking to live to fight another day rather than allow themselves to be fixed and destroyed by their superior enemy. They may lose some battles, but if they remain alive to continue the insurgency while also forcing their enemy to expend men and resources disproportionately, they consider it a victory. Time is on the side of the insurgents in this asymmetrical style of battle, and they hope a long war will exhaust and demoralize their enemy.

This style of warfare is seen very plainly in the history of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. In 2004, when the group was called al Qaeda in Iraq, it attempted to progress from an insurgent force to a conventional military, seizing and holding territory, but it suffered terrible losses when facing the United States in clashes that included the first and second battles of Fallujah. In 2006, the group, known then as the Islamic State in Iraq, suffered significant losses in the battle of Ramadi, and the losses continued during the Anbar Awakening. However, the group persevered, abandoned its efforts to hold territory and reverted back to a lower-level insurgency, continuing its pursuit of a long war.

The group's persistence paid off. Now known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, the militants regained strength after the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and through their involvement in the Syrian civil war. Today, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is arguably the most powerful jihadist militant group in the world. The group has even been able to progress militarily to the point where it can engage in conventional military battles simultaneously against the Syrian and Iraqi armies. The group is clearly more than just a terrorist group; its military capabilities are superior to those of many small countries.

Constraints

All that said, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is also constrained as it employs its military power. Its first constraint is the projection of that power. Force projection is a challenge for even large national militaries. It requires advanced logistical capabilities to move men, equipment, munitions, petroleum and other supplies across expanses of land, and it becomes even more difficult when substantial bodies of water must be crossed. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is aided by the fact that it can operate along internal supply lines that cross the Iraq-Syria border, allowing them to move men and material to different areas of the battlefield as needed. Mostly this movement is achieved by means of trucks, buses and smaller, mobile technicals (pickup trucks) and motorcycles.

For the most part, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is practicing a mobile hit-and-run style of warfare aided by sympathetic Sunni forces, but in some places, such as Mosul, Ramadi and Baiji, they are conducting more conventional warfare along fixed battle lines. The militants have not shown the capability to project their conventional or even insurgent forces very far into the Kurdish and Shiite-controlled areas of Iraq, where they lack significant local support. In the past, they have been able to conduct terrorist operations in Kurdish and Shiite areas, including Arbil, Baghdad and Basra, but in recent years the group has not conducted terrorist attacks outside of its operational theater. Back in 2005, the group carried out bombing and rocket attacks in Jordan, including the Nov. 9, 2005 suicide bombing attacks against three hotels in Amman, but it has not conducted an attack in Jordan for many years now. Local supporters often facilitate the group's terrorist operations in Iraq, Syria and Jordan, even when foreign operatives conduct a suicide bombing or armed assault.

Historically, it has been fairly unusual for a militant group to develop the capability to project power transnationally. Developing such a capability without state sponsorship is even more unusual; transnational groups such as Hezbollah, Black September and the Abu Nidal Organization all received significant state sponsorship. It is far more common for militant groups to confine their military operations within a discreet theater of operations consisting of their country of origin and often the border areas of adjacent countries. In many cases, the militant group involved is a separatist organization fighting for independence or autonomy, and its concerns pertain to a localized area.

In other cases, militant organizations have more global ambitions, such as the jihadist or Marxist visions of global conquest. These groups will often try to accomplish their global goals via a progression that begins with establishing a local political entity and then expanding. This initial local focus requires a group to commit its military resources toward local targets rather than transnational targets. This is likely why, for example, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant has not yet attempted to conduct transnational terrorist operations directed against the United States and the West. The group has more pressing local and regional targets to hit.

Militant groups face another constraint on the projection of military power in the form of transnational terrorism: The tradecraft required to plan and orchestrate a terrorist attack undetected in a hostile environment is quite different from the skill set needed to operate as a guerilla fighter in an insurgency. In addition, the logistical networks needed to support terrorist operatives in such environments are quite different from those required to support insurgent operations. These constraints have shaped our assessment that the threat posed by foreign fighters returning to the West from Syria is real but limited.

Among the things that made the al Qaeda core organization so unique was its focus on the "far enemy" (the United States) first rather than the "near enemy" (local regimes). Al Qaeda also developed the capability to train people in advanced terrorist tradecraft in camps like Deronta and create the logistical network required to support terrorist operatives operating in hostile territory. Following the 9/11 attacks, al Qaeda lost its training camps and logistical networks. This has made it much more difficult for the group to conduct transnational attacks and explains why the long-awaited follow up attacks to the 9/11 operation did not materialize. Indeed, in 2010 the al Qaeda core group jumped on the bandwagon of encouraging individual jihadists living in the West to conduct simple attacks where they liverather than travel to other countries to fight.

Among the al Qaeda franchise groups, such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and al Shabaab, tensions have erupted between members of the organization who favor the al Qaeda-like focus on the far enemy and those who want to focus their military efforts on the near enemy. For the most part, the regional franchises are also under heavy pressure from the local authorities and are struggling to survive and continue their struggles. In such an environment, they have very little extra capacity to devote to transnational attacks.

Even a local franchise group like al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which has adopted more of a transnational ideology, can be constrained by such factors. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has not been able to launch an attack directed against the U.S. homeland since the November 2010 printer bomb attempt. Moreover, it is important to recognize that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula launched the attacks targeting the United States from its base of operations in Yemen rather than sending operatives to the United States to plan and execute attacks in a hostile environment. The group did not have operatives with the requisite tradecraft for such operations and also lacked the logistics network to support them. Therefore, the al Qaeda franchise was limited to executing only the transnational attacks it could plan and launch from Yemen.

So far, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant has not demonstrated a focus on conducting transnational attacks against the far enemy. It also has not shown that it has operatives capable of traveling to foreign countries to plan and conduct sophisticated terrorist operations there. However, the group retains a robust terrorist capability within its area of operation and has consistently been able to acquire weapons and explosives, fabricate viable explosive devices and recruit and indoctrinate suicide operatives.

The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is far more than a terrorist organization. It can launch complex insurgent campaigns and even conduct conventional military operations, govern areas of territory, administer social services and collect taxes. Labeling the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant solely as a terrorist organization underestimates the group's capabilities, giving it the element of surprise when it launches a major military operation like the one resulting in the capture of a significant portion of Iraq's Sunni-dominated areas.

USN, what point were you trying to make here? This article rightly paints ISIS as "not your fathers" terrorist group...but one that is much more dangerous (well funded, sophisticated, well armed) and capable of projecting sophisticated operations across distances. Was that the point you were trying to make?

What do you mean by sophisticated operations?

Combined arms operations, logistics, occupation, gov't, multiple simultaneous operations...and in the words of the author "The group is clearly more than just a terrorist group; its military capabilities are superior to those of many small countries."

What is an example of a "small country" you would equate their military capabilities to?

You would have to ask the author...I simply quoted him....but I would assume it would mean something like just about every country on the African continent except Egypt and South Africa.

That is what I was sort of thinking. I wouldn't call that type of capability, "sophisticated".

I think the biggest thing they have going for them is control over some oil fields. IMHO, we should provide whatever resources necessary in order to help the Kurds, Iraqis, and Jordanians take them back (even in Syria). I wouldn't want to see our own troops do it. Two things that unite Arabs/Muslims and turn moderates into radicals; the belief that western powers want to take their oil and, the belief that we want to spread Christianity in the region.

Not trying to insult you; but you probably wouldn't call the ability to project power across hundreds of miles with combined arms and multiple battles simultaneously "sophisticated" because you really don't know anything about the military and how complicated it is to pull that off...I assume your lack of understanding is driven by ignorance.

[homersapien 11,354]

That is what I was sort of thinking. I wouldn't call that type of capability, "sophisticated".

I think the biggest thing they have going for them is control over some oil fields. IMHO, we should provide whatever resources necessary in order to help the Kurds, Iraqis, and Jordanians take them back (even in Syria). I wouldn't want to see our own troops do it. Two things that unite Arabs/Muslims and turn moderates into radicals; the belief that western powers want to take their oil and, the belief that we want to spread Christianity in the region.

Not trying to insult you; but you probably wouldn't call the ability to project power across hundreds of miles with combined arms and multiple battles simultaneously "sophisticated" because you really don't know anything about the military and how complicated it is to pull that off...I assume your lack of understanding is driven by ignorance.

Oh BS. This is not a disciplined force.

Yeah, they've got weapons out the kazoo - including some heavy weapons - and plenty of cars and trucks to haul them. And let's face it, it's not a big deal to cover a couple of hundred miles over Iraq (for example).

They are capable of "projecting power" only to the extent they are not up against a truly organized force resisting them.

Regardless, its not a problem that can be solved by the US. We can help, but we can't solve it.

[japantiger 4,051]

That is what I was sort of thinking. I wouldn't call that type of capability, "sophisticated".

I think the biggest thing they have going for them is control over some oil fields. IMHO, we should provide whatever resources necessary in order to help the Kurds, Iraqis, and Jordanians take them back (even in Syria). I wouldn't want to see our own troops do it. Two things that unite Arabs/Muslims and turn moderates into radicals; the belief that western powers want to take their oil and, the belief that we want to spread Christianity in the region.

Not trying to insult you; but you probably wouldn't call the ability to project power across hundreds of miles with combined arms and multiple battles simultaneously "sophisticated" because you really don't know anything about the military and how complicated it is to pull that off...I assume your lack of understanding is driven by ignorance.

Oh BS. This is not a disciplined force.

Yeah, they've got weapons out the kazoo - including some heavy weapons - and plenty of cars and trucks to haul them. And let's face it, it's not a big deal to cover a couple of hundred miles over Iraq (for example).

They are capable of "projecting power" only to the extent they are not up against a truly organized force resisting them.

Regardless, its not a problem that can be solved by the US. We can help, but we can't solve it.

Please explain from your extensive experience in the field what you base your assessment on?

[homersapien 11,354]

That is what I was sort of thinking. I wouldn't call that type of capability, "sophisticated".

I think the biggest thing they have going for them is control over some oil fields. IMHO, we should provide whatever resources necessary in order to help the Kurds, Iraqis, and Jordanians take them back (even in Syria). I wouldn't want to see our own troops do it. Two things that unite Arabs/Muslims and turn moderates into radicals; the belief that western powers want to take their oil and, the belief that we want to spread Christianity in the region.

Not trying to insult you; but you probably wouldn't call the ability to project power across hundreds of miles with combined arms and multiple battles simultaneously "sophisticated" because you really don't know anything about the military and how complicated it is to pull that off...I assume your lack of understanding is driven by ignorance.

Oh BS. This is not a disciplined force.

Yeah, they've got weapons out the kazoo - including some heavy weapons - and plenty of cars and trucks to haul them. And let's face it, it's not a big deal to cover a couple of hundred miles over Iraq (for example).

They are capable of "projecting power" only to the extent they are not up against a truly organized force resisting them.

Regardless, its not a problem that can be solved by the US. We can help, but we can't solve it.

Please explain from your extensive experience in the field what you base your assessment on?

:-\ Soooooo predictable. You're reminding me of ___ (I can't say his name without getting a lecture from ICHY).

[icanthearyou 4,462]

While we wait, here's a little bit of reading:

The Difference Between Terrorism and Insurgency

The Difference Between Terrorism and Insurgency

Analysis

By Scott Stewart

It is not uncommon for media reports to refer to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant as a terrorist group. While the group certainly does have cadres with advanced terrorist tradecraft skills, it is much more than a terrorist group. In addition to conducting terrorist attacks in its area of operations, the group has displayed the ability to fight a protracted insurgency across an expansive geography and has also engaged in conventional military battles against the Syrianand Iraqi militaries.

Because of this, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is much more accurately referred to as a militant group — a group that uses terrorism as one of its diverse military tools. We have taken some heat from readers who view our use of the term "militant group" to be some sort of politically correct euphemism for terrorism, but militant group is really a far more accurate description for groups like the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, al Shabaab and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which all have the capacity to do far more than conduct terrorist attacks.

Terrorism and Insurgency

First, it is important to recognize that terrorism is only one tool used by organizations that wage asymmetrical warfare against a superior foe. Terrorism is often used to conduct armed conflict against a militarily stronger enemy when the organization launching the armed struggle is not yet at a stage where insurgent or conventional warfare is viable. (Although there are also instances where state-sponsored terrorism can be used by one state against another in a Cold War-type struggle.)

Marxist, Maoist and focoist militant groups often use terrorism as the first step in an armed struggle. In some ways, al Qaeda also followed a type of focoist vanguard strategy. It used terrorism to shape public opinion and raise popular support for its cause, expecting to enhance its strength to a point where it could wage insurgent and then conventional warfare in order to establish an emirate and eventually a global caliphate.

Terrorism can also be used to supplement insurgency or conventional warfare. In such cases, it is employed to keep the enemy off balance and distracted, principally by conducting strikes against vulnerable targets at the enemy's rear. The Afghan Taliban employ terrorism in this manner, as does the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.

Once a group becomes more militarily capable, the group's leaders will often switch strategies, progressing from terrorist attacks to an insurgency. Insurgent warfare, often referred to as guerilla warfare, has been practiced for centuries by a number of different cultures. Historical commanders who employed insurgent tactics have ranged from the Prophet Mohammed to Mao Zedong to Geronimo.

Simply put, insurgent theory is based on the concept of declining battle when the enemy is superior and attacking after amassing sufficient forces to strike where the enemy is weak. The insurgents also take a long view of armed struggle, seeking to live to fight another day rather than allow themselves to be fixed and destroyed by their superior enemy. They may lose some battles, but if they remain alive to continue the insurgency while also forcing their enemy to expend men and resources disproportionately, they consider it a victory. Time is on the side of the insurgents in this asymmetrical style of battle, and they hope a long war will exhaust and demoralize their enemy.

This style of warfare is seen very plainly in the history of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. In 2004, when the group was called al Qaeda in Iraq, it attempted to progress from an insurgent force to a conventional military, seizing and holding territory, but it suffered terrible losses when facing the United States in clashes that included the first and second battles of Fallujah. In 2006, the group, known then as the Islamic State in Iraq, suffered significant losses in the battle of Ramadi, and the losses continued during the Anbar Awakening. However, the group persevered, abandoned its efforts to hold territory and reverted back to a lower-level insurgency, continuing its pursuit of a long war.

The group's persistence paid off. Now known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, the militants regained strength after the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and through their involvement in the Syrian civil war. Today, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is arguably the most powerful jihadist militant group in the world. The group has even been able to progress militarily to the point where it can engage in conventional military battles simultaneously against the Syrian and Iraqi armies. The group is clearly more than just a terrorist group; its military capabilities are superior to those of many small countries.

Constraints

All that said, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is also constrained as it employs its military power. Its first constraint is the projection of that power. Force projection is a challenge for even large national militaries. It requires advanced logistical capabilities to move men, equipment, munitions, petroleum and other supplies across expanses of land, and it becomes even more difficult when substantial bodies of water must be crossed. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is aided by the fact that it can operate along internal supply lines that cross the Iraq-Syria border, allowing them to move men and material to different areas of the battlefield as needed. Mostly this movement is achieved by means of trucks, buses and smaller, mobile technicals (pickup trucks) and motorcycles.

For the most part, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is practicing a mobile hit-and-run style of warfare aided by sympathetic Sunni forces, but in some places, such as Mosul, Ramadi and Baiji, they are conducting more conventional warfare along fixed battle lines. The militants have not shown the capability to project their conventional or even insurgent forces very far into the Kurdish and Shiite-controlled areas of Iraq, where they lack significant local support. In the past, they have been able to conduct terrorist operations in Kurdish and Shiite areas, including Arbil, Baghdad and Basra, but in recent years the group has not conducted terrorist attacks outside of its operational theater. Back in 2005, the group carried out bombing and rocket attacks in Jordan, including the Nov. 9, 2005 suicide bombing attacks against three hotels in Amman, but it has not conducted an attack in Jordan for many years now. Local supporters often facilitate the group's terrorist operations in Iraq, Syria and Jordan, even when foreign operatives conduct a suicide bombing or armed assault.

Historically, it has been fairly unusual for a militant group to develop the capability to project power transnationally. Developing such a capability without state sponsorship is even more unusual; transnational groups such as Hezbollah, Black September and the Abu Nidal Organization all received significant state sponsorship. It is far more common for militant groups to confine their military operations within a discreet theater of operations consisting of their country of origin and often the border areas of adjacent countries. In many cases, the militant group involved is a separatist organization fighting for independence or autonomy, and its concerns pertain to a localized area.

In other cases, militant organizations have more global ambitions, such as the jihadist or Marxist visions of global conquest. These groups will often try to accomplish their global goals via a progression that begins with establishing a local political entity and then expanding. This initial local focus requires a group to commit its military resources toward local targets rather than transnational targets. This is likely why, for example, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant has not yet attempted to conduct transnational terrorist operations directed against the United States and the West. The group has more pressing local and regional targets to hit.

Militant groups face another constraint on the projection of military power in the form of transnational terrorism: The tradecraft required to plan and orchestrate a terrorist attack undetected in a hostile environment is quite different from the skill set needed to operate as a guerilla fighter in an insurgency. In addition, the logistical networks needed to support terrorist operatives in such environments are quite different from those required to support insurgent operations. These constraints have shaped our assessment that the threat posed by foreign fighters returning to the West from Syria is real but limited.

Among the things that made the al Qaeda core organization so unique was its focus on the "far enemy" (the United States) first rather than the "near enemy" (local regimes). Al Qaeda also developed the capability to train people in advanced terrorist tradecraft in camps like Deronta and create the logistical network required to support terrorist operatives operating in hostile territory. Following the 9/11 attacks, al Qaeda lost its training camps and logistical networks. This has made it much more difficult for the group to conduct transnational attacks and explains why the long-awaited follow up attacks to the 9/11 operation did not materialize. Indeed, in 2010 the al Qaeda core group jumped on the bandwagon of encouraging individual jihadists living in the West to conduct simple attacks where they liverather than travel to other countries to fight.

Among the al Qaeda franchise groups, such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and al Shabaab, tensions have erupted between members of the organization who favor the al Qaeda-like focus on the far enemy and those who want to focus their military efforts on the near enemy. For the most part, the regional franchises are also under heavy pressure from the local authorities and are struggling to survive and continue their struggles. In such an environment, they have very little extra capacity to devote to transnational attacks.

Even a local franchise group like al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which has adopted more of a transnational ideology, can be constrained by such factors. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has not been able to launch an attack directed against the U.S. homeland since the November 2010 printer bomb attempt. Moreover, it is important to recognize that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula launched the attacks targeting the United States from its base of operations in Yemen rather than sending operatives to the United States to plan and execute attacks in a hostile environment. The group did not have operatives with the requisite tradecraft for such operations and also lacked the logistics network to support them. Therefore, the al Qaeda franchise was limited to executing only the transnational attacks it could plan and launch from Yemen.

So far, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant has not demonstrated a focus on conducting transnational attacks against the far enemy. It also has not shown that it has operatives capable of traveling to foreign countries to plan and conduct sophisticated terrorist operations there. However, the group retains a robust terrorist capability within its area of operation and has consistently been able to acquire weapons and explosives, fabricate viable explosive devices and recruit and indoctrinate suicide operatives.

The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is far more than a terrorist organization. It can launch complex insurgent campaigns and even conduct conventional military operations, govern areas of territory, administer social services and collect taxes. Labeling the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant solely as a terrorist organization underestimates the group's capabilities, giving it the element of surprise when it launches a major military operation like the one resulting in the capture of a significant portion of Iraq's Sunni-dominated areas.

USN, what point were you trying to make here? This article rightly paints ISIS as "not your fathers" terrorist group...but one that is much more dangerous (well funded, sophisticated, well armed) and capable of projecting sophisticated operations across distances. Was that the point you were trying to make?

What do you mean by sophisticated operations?

Combined arms operations, logistics, occupation, gov't, multiple simultaneous operations...and in the words of the author "The group is clearly more than just a terrorist group; its military capabilities are superior to those of many small countries."

What is an example of a "small country" you would equate their military capabilities to?

You would have to ask the author...I simply quoted him....but I would assume it would mean something like just about every country on the African continent except Egypt and South Africa.

That is what I was sort of thinking. I wouldn't call that type of capability, "sophisticated".

I think the biggest thing they have going for them is control over some oil fields. IMHO, we should provide whatever resources necessary in order to help the Kurds, Iraqis, and Jordanians take them back (even in Syria). I wouldn't want to see our own troops do it. Two things that unite Arabs/Muslims and turn moderates into radicals; the belief that western powers want to take their oil and, the belief that we want to spread Christianity in the region.

Not trying to insult you; but you probably wouldn't call the ability to project power across hundreds of miles with combined arms and multiple battles simultaneously "sophisticated" because you really don't know anything about the military and how complicated it is to pull that off...I assume your lack of understanding is driven by ignorance.

Well, thank you very much! However, relatively speaking, when you consider the capability of doing that with air, land, and sea forces, across the globe, no, it does not seem very "sophisticated".

Honestly, is ISIS calling card brutality or, sophisticated weapons and tactics? Is the real trick, defeating them or, defeating them in a manner that will not give rise to another group just like them?

[icanthearyou 4,462]

That is what I was sort of thinking. I wouldn't call that type of capability, "sophisticated".

I think the biggest thing they have going for them is control over some oil fields. IMHO, we should provide whatever resources necessary in order to help the Kurds, Iraqis, and Jordanians take them back (even in Syria). I wouldn't want to see our own troops do it. Two things that unite Arabs/Muslims and turn moderates into radicals; the belief that western powers want to take their oil and, the belief that we want to spread Christianity in the region.

Not trying to insult you; but you probably wouldn't call the ability to project power across hundreds of miles with combined arms and multiple battles simultaneously "sophisticated" because you really don't know anything about the military and how complicated it is to pull that off...I assume your lack of understanding is driven by ignorance.

Oh BS. This is not a disciplined force.

Yeah, they've got weapons out the kazoo - including some heavy weapons - and plenty of cars and trucks to haul them. And let's face it, it's not a big deal to cover a couple of hundred miles over Iraq (for example).

They are capable of "projecting power" only to the extent they are not up against a truly organized force resisting them.

Regardless, its not a problem that can be solved by the US. We can help, but we can't solve it.

Please explain from your extensive experience in the field what you base your assessment on?

:-\ Soooooo predictable. You're reminding me of ___ (I can't say his name without getting a lecture from ICHY).

No more lectures.

[WarTim 3,456]

That is what I was sort of thinking. I wouldn't call that type of capability, "sophisticated".

I think the biggest thing they have going for them is control over some oil fields. IMHO, we should provide whatever resources necessary in order to help the Kurds, Iraqis, and Jordanians take them back (even in Syria). I wouldn't want to see our own troops do it. Two things that unite Arabs/Muslims and turn moderates into radicals; the belief that western powers want to take their oil and, the belief that we want to spread Christianity in the region.

Not trying to insult you; but you probably wouldn't call the ability to project power across hundreds of miles with combined arms and multiple battles simultaneously "sophisticated" because you really don't know anything about the military and how complicated it is to pull that off...I assume your lack of understanding is driven by ignorance.

Oh BS. This is not a disciplined force.

Yeah, they've got weapons out the kazoo - including some heavy weapons - and plenty of cars and trucks to haul them. And let's face it, it's not a big deal to cover a couple of hundred miles over Iraq (for example).

They are capable of "projecting power" only to the extent they are not up against a truly organized force resisting them.

Regardless, its not a problem that can be solved by the US. We can help, but we can't solve it.

Please explain from your extensive experience in the field what you base your assessment on?

:-\/> Soooooo predictable. You're reminding me of ___ (I can't say his name without getting a lecture from ICHY).

non sequitur...; - )

[japantiger 4,051]

If you are going to make statements/assertions, then you need to be able to back them up gents. Operating in Regimental sized units, across hundreds of miles, fighting in multiple locations, with combined arms is pretty sophisticated stuff. But hey, given your vast experience, I'm sure you can correct me...this type/size of unit in our military is usually lead by a Colonel. And when you put two or three of these together in a coordinated fashion, you usually get a Brig. General in charge....I guess we do that because it's so easy. As for the author who classified their operations as sophisticated; you might want to look at his resume. But I'm sure you two Momma's Boys know better.

[WarTim 3,456]

While we wait, here's a little bit of reading:

The Difference Between Terrorism and Insurgency

The Difference Between Terrorism and Insurgency

Analysis

By Scott Stewart

It is not uncommon for media reports to refer to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant as a terrorist group. While the group certainly does have cadres with advanced terrorist tradecraft skills, it is much more than a terrorist group. In addition to conducting terrorist attacks in its area of operations, the group has displayed the ability to fight a protracted insurgency across an expansive geography and has also engaged in conventional military battles against the Syrianand Iraqi militaries.

Because of this, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is much more accurately referred to as a militant group — a group that uses terrorism as one of its diverse military tools. We have taken some heat from readers who view our use of the term "militant group" to be some sort of politically correct euphemism for terrorism, but militant group is really a far more accurate description for groups like the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, al Shabaab and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which all have the capacity to do far more than conduct terrorist attacks.

Terrorism and Insurgency

First, it is important to recognize that terrorism is only one tool used by organizations that wage asymmetrical warfare against a superior foe. Terrorism is often used to conduct armed conflict against a militarily stronger enemy when the organization launching the armed struggle is not yet at a stage where insurgent or conventional warfare is viable. (Although there are also instances where state-sponsored terrorism can be used by one state against another in a Cold War-type struggle.)

Marxist, Maoist and focoist militant groups often use terrorism as the first step in an armed struggle. In some ways, al Qaeda also followed a type of focoist vanguard strategy. It used terrorism to shape public opinion and raise popular support for its cause, expecting to enhance its strength to a point where it could wage insurgent and then conventional warfare in order to establish an emirate and eventually a global caliphate.

Terrorism can also be used to supplement insurgency or conventional warfare. In such cases, it is employed to keep the enemy off balance and distracted, principally by conducting strikes against vulnerable targets at the enemy's rear. The Afghan Taliban employ terrorism in this manner, as does the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.

Once a group becomes more militarily capable, the group's leaders will often switch strategies, progressing from terrorist attacks to an insurgency. Insurgent warfare, often referred to as guerilla warfare, has been practiced for centuries by a number of different cultures. Historical commanders who employed insurgent tactics have ranged from the Prophet Mohammed to Mao Zedong to Geronimo.

Simply put, insurgent theory is based on the concept of declining battle when the enemy is superior and attacking after amassing sufficient forces to strike where the enemy is weak. The insurgents also take a long view of armed struggle, seeking to live to fight another day rather than allow themselves to be fixed and destroyed by their superior enemy. They may lose some battles, but if they remain alive to continue the insurgency while also forcing their enemy to expend men and resources disproportionately, they consider it a victory. Time is on the side of the insurgents in this asymmetrical style of battle, and they hope a long war will exhaust and demoralize their enemy.

This style of warfare is seen very plainly in the history of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. In 2004, when the group was called al Qaeda in Iraq, it attempted to progress from an insurgent force to a conventional military, seizing and holding territory, but it suffered terrible losses when facing the United States in clashes that included the first and second battles of Fallujah. In 2006, the group, known then as the Islamic State in Iraq, suffered significant losses in the battle of Ramadi, and the losses continued during the Anbar Awakening. However, the group persevered, abandoned its efforts to hold territory and reverted back to a lower-level insurgency, continuing its pursuit of a long war.

The group's persistence paid off. Now known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, the militants regained strength after the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and through their involvement in the Syrian civil war. Today, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is arguably the most powerful jihadist militant group in the world. The group has even been able to progress militarily to the point where it can engage in conventional military battles simultaneously against the Syrian and Iraqi armies. The group is clearly more than just a terrorist group; its military capabilities are superior to those of many small countries.

Constraints

All that said, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is also constrained as it employs its military power. Its first constraint is the projection of that power. Force projection is a challenge for even large national militaries. It requires advanced logistical capabilities to move men, equipment, munitions, petroleum and other supplies across expanses of land, and it becomes even more difficult when substantial bodies of water must be crossed. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is aided by the fact that it can operate along internal supply lines that cross the Iraq-Syria border, allowing them to move men and material to different areas of the battlefield as needed. Mostly this movement is achieved by means of trucks, buses and smaller, mobile technicals (pickup trucks) and motorcycles.

For the most part, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is practicing a mobile hit-and-run style of warfare aided by sympathetic Sunni forces, but in some places, such as Mosul, Ramadi and Baiji, they are conducting more conventional warfare along fixed battle lines. The militants have not shown the capability to project their conventional or even insurgent forces very far into the Kurdish and Shiite-controlled areas of Iraq, where they lack significant local support. In the past, they have been able to conduct terrorist operations in Kurdish and Shiite areas, including Arbil, Baghdad and Basra, but in recent years the group has not conducted terrorist attacks outside of its operational theater. Back in 2005, the group carried out bombing and rocket attacks in Jordan, including the Nov. 9, 2005 suicide bombing attacks against three hotels in Amman, but it has not conducted an attack in Jordan for many years now. Local supporters often facilitate the group's terrorist operations in Iraq, Syria and Jordan, even when foreign operatives conduct a suicide bombing or armed assault.

Historically, it has been fairly unusual for a militant group to develop the capability to project power transnationally. Developing such a capability without state sponsorship is even more unusual; transnational groups such as Hezbollah, Black September and the Abu Nidal Organization all received significant state sponsorship. It is far more common for militant groups to confine their military operations within a discreet theater of operations consisting of their country of origin and often the border areas of adjacent countries. In many cases, the militant group involved is a separatist organization fighting for independence or autonomy, and its concerns pertain to a localized area.

In other cases, militant organizations have more global ambitions, such as the jihadist or Marxist visions of global conquest. These groups will often try to accomplish their global goals via a progression that begins with establishing a local political entity and then expanding. This initial local focus requires a group to commit its military resources toward local targets rather than transnational targets. This is likely why, for example, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant has not yet attempted to conduct transnational terrorist operations directed against the United States and the West. The group has more pressing local and regional targets to hit.

Militant groups face another constraint on the projection of military power in the form of transnational terrorism: The tradecraft required to plan and orchestrate a terrorist attack undetected in a hostile environment is quite different from the skill set needed to operate as a guerilla fighter in an insurgency. In addition, the logistical networks needed to support terrorist operatives in such environments are quite different from those required to support insurgent operations. These constraints have shaped our assessment that the threat posed by foreign fighters returning to the West from Syria is real but limited.

Among the things that made the al Qaeda core organization so unique was its focus on the "far enemy" (the United States) first rather than the "near enemy" (local regimes). Al Qaeda also developed the capability to train people in advanced terrorist tradecraft in camps like Deronta and create the logistical network required to support terrorist operatives operating in hostile territory. Following the 9/11 attacks, al Qaeda lost its training camps and logistical networks. This has made it much more difficult for the group to conduct transnational attacks and explains why the long-awaited follow up attacks to the 9/11 operation did not materialize. Indeed, in 2010 the al Qaeda core group jumped on the bandwagon of encouraging individual jihadists living in the West to conduct simple attacks where they liverather than travel to other countries to fight.

Among the al Qaeda franchise groups, such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and al Shabaab, tensions have erupted between members of the organization who favor the al Qaeda-like focus on the far enemy and those who want to focus their military efforts on the near enemy. For the most part, the regional franchises are also under heavy pressure from the local authorities and are struggling to survive and continue their struggles. In such an environment, they have very little extra capacity to devote to transnational attacks.

Even a local franchise group like al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which has adopted more of a transnational ideology, can be constrained by such factors. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has not been able to launch an attack directed against the U.S. homeland since the November 2010 printer bomb attempt. Moreover, it is important to recognize that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula launched the attacks targeting the United States from its base of operations in Yemen rather than sending operatives to the United States to plan and execute attacks in a hostile environment. The group did not have operatives with the requisite tradecraft for such operations and also lacked the logistics network to support them. Therefore, the al Qaeda franchise was limited to executing only the transnational attacks it could plan and launch from Yemen.

So far, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant has not demonstrated a focus on conducting transnational attacks against the far enemy. It also has not shown that it has operatives capable of traveling to foreign countries to plan and conduct sophisticated terrorist operations there. However, the group retains a robust terrorist capability within its area of operation and has consistently been able to acquire weapons and explosives, fabricate viable explosive devices and recruit and indoctrinate suicide operatives.

The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is far more than a terrorist organization. It can launch complex insurgent campaigns and even conduct conventional military operations, govern areas of territory, administer social services and collect taxes. Labeling the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant solely as a terrorist organization underestimates the group's capabilities, giving it the element of surprise when it launches a major military operation like the one resulting in the capture of a significant portion of Iraq's Sunni-dominated areas.

USN, what point were you trying to make here? This article rightly paints ISIS as "not your fathers" terrorist group...but one that is much more dangerous (well funded, sophisticated, well armed) and capable of projecting sophisticated operations across distances. Was that the point you were trying to make?

What do you mean by sophisticated operations?

Combined arms operations, logistics, occupation, gov't, multiple simultaneous operations...and in the words of the author "The group is clearly more than just a terrorist group; its military capabilities are superior to those of many small countries."

What is an example of a "small country" you would equate their military capabilities to?

You would have to ask the author...I simply quoted him....but I would assume it would mean something like just about every country on the African continent except Egypt and South Africa.

That is what I was sort of thinking. I wouldn't call that type of capability, "sophisticated".

I think the biggest thing they have going for them is control over some oil fields. IMHO, we should provide whatever resources necessary in order to help the Kurds, Iraqis, and Jordanians take them back (even in Syria). I wouldn't want to see our own troops do it. Two things that unite Arabs/Muslims and turn moderates into radicals; the belief that western powers want to take their oil and, the belief that we want to spread Christianity in the region.

Not trying to insult you; but you probably wouldn't call the ability to project power across hundreds of miles with combined arms and multiple battles simultaneously "sophisticated" because you really don't know anything about the military and how complicated it is to pull that off...I assume your lack of understanding is driven by ignorance.

Well, thank you very much! However, relatively speaking, when you consider the capability of doing that with air, land, and sea forces, across the globe, no, it does not seem very "sophisticated".

Honestly, is ISIS calling card brutality or, sophisticated weapons and tactics? Is the real trick, defeating them or, defeating them in a manner that will not give rise to another group just like them?

Curious How would that be done successfully?