Slavoj Zizek (b. 1949)

[Bottomfeeder 244]

Just a bit of centrist reading I though may help us understand the political moves in Washington, D.C.

Zizek’s understanding of political belief is modelled on Lacan’s understanding of transference in psychoanalysis. The belief or “supposition” of the analysand in psychoanalysis is that the Other (his analyst) knows the meaning of his symptoms. This is obviously a false belief, at the start of the analytic process. But it is only through holding this false belief about the analyst that the work of analysis can proceed, and the transferential belief can become true (when the analyst does become able to interpret the symptoms). Zizek argues that this strange intersubjective or dialectical logic of belief in clinical psychoanalysis also characterises peoples’ political beliefs. Belief is always “belief through the Other”, Zizek argues. If subjects do not know the exact meaning of those “master signifiers” with which they political identify, this is because their political belief is mediated through their identifications with others. Although they each themselves “do not know what they do” (which is the title one of Zizek’s books [Zizek, 2002]), the deepest level of their belief is maintained through the belief that nevertheless there are Others who do know. A number of features of political life are cast into new relief given this psychoanalytic understanding, Zizek claims:

•First, Zizek contends that the key political function of holders of public office is to occupy the place of what he calls, after Lacan, “the Other supposed to know”. Zizek cites the example of priests reciting mass in Latin before an uncomprehending laity, who believe that the priests know the meaning of the words, and for whom this is sufficient to keep the faith. Far from presenting an exception to the way political authority works, for Zizek this scenario reveals the universal rule of how political consensus is formed.

•Second, and in connection with this, Zizek contends that political power is primarily “symbolic” in its nature. What he means by this further technical term is that the roles, masks, or mandates that public authorities bear is more important politically than the true “reality” of the individuals in question (whether they are unintelligent, unfaithful to their wives, good family women, etc.) According to Zizek, for example, fashionable liberal criticisms of George W. Bush the man are irrelevant to understanding or evaluating his political power. It is the office or place an individual occupies in their political system (or “Big Other”) that ensures the political force of their words, and the belief of subjects in their authority. This is why Zizek maintains that the resort of a political leader or regime to “the real of violence” (such as war or police action) amounts to a confession of its weakness as a political regime. Zizek sometimes puts this by thought saying that people believe through the big Other, or that the big Other believes for them, despite what they might inwardly think or cynically say.

http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/zizek/home.cfm

http://www.lacan.com/badiou_tilton.html

[AURaptor 1,122]

[otterinbham 0]

Just a bit of centrist reading I though may help us understand the political moves in Washington, D.C.

Zizek’s understanding of political belief is modelled on Lacan’s understanding of transference in psychoanalysis. The belief or “supposition” of the analysand in psychoanalysis is that the Other (his analyst) knows the meaning of his symptoms. This is obviously a false belief, at the start of the analytic process. But it is only through holding this false belief about the analyst that the work of analysis can proceed, and the transferential belief can become true (when the analyst does become able to interpret the symptoms). Zizek argues that this strange intersubjective or dialectical logic of belief in clinical psychoanalysis also characterises peoples’ political beliefs. Belief is always “belief through the Other”, Zizek argues. If subjects do not know the exact meaning of those “master signifiers” with which they political identify, this is because their political belief is mediated through their identifications with others. Although they each themselves “do not know what they do” (which is the title one of Zizek’s books [Zizek, 2002]), the deepest level of their belief is maintained through the belief that nevertheless there are Others who do know. A number of features of political life are cast into new relief given this psychoanalytic understanding, Zizek claims:

•First, Zizek contends that the key political function of holders of public office is to occupy the place of what he calls, after Lacan, “the Other supposed to know”. Zizek cites the example of priests reciting mass in Latin before an uncomprehending laity, who believe that the priests know the meaning of the words, and for whom this is sufficient to keep the faith. Far from presenting an exception to the way political authority works, for Zizek this scenario reveals the universal rule of how political consensus is formed.

•Second, and in connection with this, Zizek contends that political power is primarily “symbolic” in its nature. What he means by this further technical term is that the roles, masks, or mandates that public authorities bear is more important politically than the true “reality” of the individuals in question (whether they are unintelligent, unfaithful to their wives, good family women, etc.) According to Zizek, for example, fashionable liberal criticisms of George W. Bush the man are irrelevant to understanding or evaluating his political power. It is the office or place an individual occupies in their political system (or “Big Other”) that ensures the political force of their words, and the belief of subjects in their authority. This is why Zizek maintains that the resort of a political leader or regime to “the real of violence” (such as war or police action) amounts to a confession of its weakness as a political regime. Zizek sometimes puts this by thought saying that people believe through the big Other, or that the big Other believes for them, despite what they might inwardly think or cynically say.

http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/zizek/home.cfm

http://www.lacan.com/badiou_tilton.html

I'm sorry. But it's simply more tired, deconstructionist h_rsesh_t from an academic who cannot master the true mechanics of politics, therefore he must develop an alternative, interior reality of his own. I've seen these jokers operate in literary theory as well. It's essentially a smoke screen that the theorist uses to avoid saying anything of substance, while sounding profound at the same time. Further, deconstructionism is actually a dangerous and spurious approach because it substitutes alternative symbols for the reality on the page.

I cannot believe I'm having a discussion on deconstructionist politics on an Auburn football message board at 5:17 in the morning. I really meant to get up early to get some work done. I need to get a life. Bad.

[Bottomfeeder 244]

Just a bit of centrist reading I though may help us understand the political moves in Washington, D.C.

Zizek’s understanding of political belief is modelled on Lacan’s understanding of transference in psychoanalysis. The belief or “supposition” of the analysand in psychoanalysis is that the Other (his analyst) knows the meaning of his symptoms. This is obviously a false belief, at the start of the analytic process. But it is only through holding this false belief about the analyst that the work of analysis can proceed, and the transferential belief can become true (when the analyst does become able to interpret the symptoms). Zizek argues that this strange intersubjective or dialectical logic of belief in clinical psychoanalysis also characterises peoples’ political beliefs. Belief is always “belief through the Other”, Zizek argues. If subjects do not know the exact meaning of those “master signifiers” with which they political identify, this is because their political belief is mediated through their identifications with others. Although they each themselves “do not know what they do” (which is the title one of Zizek’s books [Zizek, 2002]), the deepest level of their belief is maintained through the belief that nevertheless there are Others who do know. A number of features of political life are cast into new relief given this psychoanalytic understanding, Zizek claims:

•First, Zizek contends that the key political function of holders of public office is to occupy the place of what he calls, after Lacan, “the Other supposed to know”. Zizek cites the example of priests reciting mass in Latin before an uncomprehending laity, who believe that the priests know the meaning of the words, and for whom this is sufficient to keep the faith. Far from presenting an exception to the way political authority works, for Zizek this scenario reveals the universal rule of how political consensus is formed.

•Second, and in connection with this, Zizek contends that political power is primarily “symbolic” in its nature. What he means by this further technical term is that the roles, masks, or mandates that public authorities bear is more important politically than the true “reality” of the individuals in question (whether they are unintelligent, unfaithful to their wives, good family women, etc.) According to Zizek, for example, fashionable liberal criticisms of George W. Bush the man are irrelevant to understanding or evaluating his political power. It is the office or place an individual occupies in their political system (or “Big Other”) that ensures the political force of their words, and the belief of subjects in their authority. This is why Zizek maintains that the resort of a political leader or regime to “the real of violence” (such as war or police action) amounts to a confession of its weakness as a political regime. Zizek sometimes puts this by thought saying that people believe through the big Other, or that the big Other believes for them, despite what they might inwardly think or cynically say.

http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/zizek/home.cfm

http://www.lacan.com/badiou_tilton.html

I'm sorry. But it's simply more tired, deconstructionist h_rsesh_t from an academic who cannot master the true mechanics of politics, therefore he must develop an alternative, interior reality of his own. I've seen these jokers operate in literary theory as well. It's essentially a smoke screen that the theorist uses to avoid saying anything of substance, while sounding profound at the same time. Further, deconstructionism is actually a dangerous and spurious approach because it substitutes alternative symbols for the reality on the page.

I cannot believe I'm having a discussion on deconstructionist politics on an Auburn football message board at 5:17 in the morning. I really meant to get up early to get some work done. I need to get a life. Bad.

LMAO! You are correct. Intellectuals are seemingly divorced from the reality that is today's political environment.