The Progress of the Surge in Iraq

[Tigermike 4,082]

The Progress of the Surge in Iraq

By Kyle Dabruzzi

August 9, 2007

For the most accurate assessment of the success of the “surge” and the changed military strategy in Iraq, we must wait for Gen. David Petraeus’s report to Congress in September. However, military commanders and analysts have already provided positive evaluations. The quotes below reveal how the surge is helping to improve the situation on the ground.

Change in Strategy

Note: Gen. Petraeus has not continued past strategies in Iraq. Rather, he has moved our military to a classic counterinsurgency campaign; within this shift in strategy, the surge is a tool to quickly stabilize important areas, and clear out both al-Qaeda and the Shia militias.

Michael O’Hanlon

The Brookings Institution

March 1, 2007

First, the new surge strategy being implemented by Gen. David Petraeus… is much more consonant with classic counterinsurgency doctrine than anything the coalition has tried to date.

David Kilcullen

Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor in Iraq

June 26, 2007

These operations are qualitatively different from what we have done before. Our concept is to knock over several insurgent safe havens simultaneously... Unlike on previous occasions, we don't plan to leave these areas once they're secured. These ops will run over months, and the key activity is to stand up viable local security forces in partnership with Iraqi Army and Police.

Major General Rick Lynch

Commander, U.S. 3rd Infantry Division

July 6, 2007

You know, if you look back over the last four years in Arab Jabour, there's been a coalition operation there, but it never stayed there. And what happens with the enemy forces is, they fill the void. As soon as the security forces leave, the enemy comes back… You have to go there and you have to stay with a sustained security presence, and that's what we're trying to do now… I see these aggressive offensive operations that deny the enemy the four sanctuaries we have taking us through July, August and into September. But by then, based on our calculations, we will have denied the enemy those sanctuaries and we can transition into the hold and retain phase in those sanctuaries.

Fredrick Kagan

American Enterprise Institute and Chief Architect of the Surge

July 9, 2007

Indeed, the current effort differs profoundly from anything US forces have tried before in Iraq... There is every reason to believe at this stage that the current operation and its likely successor will dramatically reduce the level of violence in Baghdad, and do so in a way that will prove sustainable.

Progress on the Ground

Note: The surge and change in strategy has yielded significant improvements in stability and security.

General David Petraeus

Commander, Multi-National Forces – Iraq

June 25, 2007

We’ve gone from a surge of forces to a surge of offensives. astonishing signs of normalcy. I’m talking about professional soccer leagues with real grass field stadiums, several amusement parks – big ones, markets that are very vibrant.

Major General Joseph Fil Jr.

Commanding General, MND Baghdad and 1st Cavalry Division

June 29, 2007

There’s no question here in Baghdad that, although we are still in a tough fight here… the overall trend lines are positive… The number of attacks, first of all, has come down. The effects of those attacks has come down significantly… Likewise the number of murders in the town has gone down very significantly… [The] trends are all in the right direction.

Lieutenant General Raymond T. Odierno

Commander, Multi-National Corps – Iraq

July 19, 2007

Baqubah joins a growing list of cities like al Qaim, Haditha, Hit, Ramadi, Habbaniya, Fallujah, Abu Ghraib, and Arab Jabour area that have been liberated from al Qaeda control over the past seven months. Additionally, . . . greater than 50 percent of Baghdad is currently in control of coalition or Iraqi security forces. With Baqubah's liberation, I can think of no major population center in Iraq that is an al Qaeda safe haven today.

Michael O’Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack

The Brookings Institution

July 30, 2007

Here is the most important thing Americans need to understand: We are finally getting somewhere in Iraq, at least in military terms. As two analysts who have harshly criticized the Bush administration's miserable handling of Iraq, we were surprised by the gains we saw and the potential to produce not necessarily “victory” but a sustainable stability that both we and the Iraqis could live with... Today, morale is high. The soldiers and marines told us they feel that they now have a superb commander in Gen. David Petraeus; they are confident in his strategy, they see real results, and they feel now they have the numbers needed to make a real difference.

John Burns

New York Times, Baghdad Correspondent

July 30, 2007

I think there’s no doubt that those extra 30,000 American troops are making a difference. They’re definitely making a difference in Baghdad. Some of the crucial indicators of the war, metrics as the American command calls them, have moved in a positive direction from the American, and dare I say the Iraqi point of view, fewer car bombs, fewer bombs in general, lower levels of civilian casualties, quite remarkably lower levels of civilian casualties… there’s no doubt that al Qaeda has taken something of a beating.

Gary Kurpius

Commander-in-Chief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S., and member of its recent mission to Iraq

August 6, 2007

Chief among those unreported stories is the fact that the new strategy is producing measurable results… Security brings hope, and that's what this country is experiencing right now… The nonstop security is making a positive impact on the safety and well-being of the civilian population, which in turn is giving them hope for better future — a future without sectarian violence or foreign extremists.

Iraqis Turning Against al-Qaeda

Note: Many Iraqis are becoming fed up with al-Qaeda’s brutality. As a result, Iraqi tribal chiefs and citizens are turning to U.S. and Iraqi forces, are providing them with actionable intelligence and other support.

Major General Joseph Fil Jr.

Commanding General, MND Baghdad and 1st Cavalry Division

June 29, 2007

Some of them [sunni tribes] who have previously been fighting us have come to us as we've spoken with them and they want to fight with us. They are tired of al Qaeda and the influence of al Qaeda in their tribes and in their neighborhoods and they want them cleaned out and they want to form an alliance in order to rid themselves of this blight.

Rear Admiral Mark Fox

Communications Division Chief for Strategic Effects, Multi-National Forces – Iraq

July 16, 2007

We’ve seen a significant drop in the number of Iraqi citizens murdered in Baghdad; the overall levels of sectarian violence have decreased; and a record number of weapons caches have been seized – largely because of tips and information received from Iraqi citizens – citizens who want their neighborhoods back and want to see an end to the terror and hatred fueled by al-Qaeda and other extremist groups.

Lieutenant General Raymond T. Odierno

Commander, Multi-National Corps – Iraq

July 19, 2007

We are witnessing an opportunity right now with shifting Sunni attitudes, specifically their rejection of al Qaeda. The Awakening movement born in Al Anbar many months ago is now spreading into more diverse provinces like Diyala, Salahuddin, Nineveh and North Babil. Ramadi, once the al Qaeda capital of Iraq, is averaging less than one attack per day now, compared to October 2006 with over 40 attacks a day and February 2007 with over 30 attacks today.

Major Web Wright

Spokesman, 2nd Brigade Combat Team

July 20, 2007

Over the last several weeks, the number of Iraqis who have been sharing tips with us is astounding… There has been a turning of the tides against al-Qaida in this area. The people are tired of them and are turning their backs on AQI [al-Qaeda in Iraq].

Need For More Time

Note: In contrast to the calls on both sides of the aisle for an immediate drawdown of troops, military commanders state that the new strategy and surge need more time, and that giving it more time will have a cognizable impact.

Major General Rick Lynch

Commander, 3rd Infantry Division

July 6, 2007

We need these surge forces. They came in for a reason. They're being used for the reason they came in. It's going to take some time to mature the situation. Over time we can turn the area over to Iraqi security forces, and then we'll be ready to do something that looks like a withdrawal. But that's not going to happen any time soon.

Major General Rick Lynch

Commander, 3rd Infantry Division

July 20, 2007

It's going to take through summer, into the fall, to defeat the extremists in my battle space, and it's going to take me into next spring and summer to generate this sustained security presence.

Shifting Views on the Surge

Note: The surge has already shown signs of success in bringing stability to various regions of Iraq. These changes on the ground are reflected in the shifting views of analysts, politicians, and the public.

Michael O’Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack

The Brookings Institution

July 30, 2007

Yet now the administration's critics . . . seem unaware of the significant changes taking place… But for now, things look much better than before. American advisers told us that many of the corrupt and sectarian Iraqi commanders who once infested the force have been removed… The additional American military formations brought in as part of the surge, General Petraeus's determination to hold areas until they are truly secure before redeploying units, and the increasing competence of the Iraqis has had another critical effect: no more whack-a-mole, with insurgents popping back up after the Americans leave… Today the Sunni sheiks there are close to crippling Al Qaeda and its Salafist allies. Just a few months ago, American marines were fighting for every yard of Ramadi; last week we strolled down its streets without body armor… [T]here is enough good happening on the battlefields of Iraq today that Congress should plan on sustaining the effort at least into 2008.

Representative Keith Ellison

Democratic Representative to Congress, Minnesota

July 30, 2007

The success in Ramadi is not just because of bombs and bullets, but because the U.S. and Iraqi military and the Iraqi police are partnering with the tribal leadership and the religious leadership… So they're not trying to just bomb people into submission. What they're doing is respecting the people, giving the people some control over their own lives.

USA Today Poll

August 6, 2007

In the latest USA TODAY/Gallup Poll, taken Friday through Sunday, the proportion of those who said the additional troops are "making the situation better" rose to 31% from 22% a month ago. Those who said it was "not making much difference" dropped to 41% from 51%.

http://www.defenddemocracy.org/publication...m?doc_id=515039

Which could explain this.

LIBERALS ON THE WARPATH

The Democrats Get Hawkish

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/...,499672,00.html

[RunInRed 19,289]

When you dig yourself into a hole the answer is not to keep digging, especially when your enemies are building castles in northwest Pakistan. Common sense and stuff.

[Tigermike 4,082]

Yeah you are right it's much better to give up and quit isn't it?

[AFTiger 282]

Unfortunately, counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare was abandoned after Vietnam as it was after WWII and a "Battleship" mentality resumed in the Pentagon and in Congress, ie. large force vs large force and war would be over.

Our Army was designed for mobility and lethality. It did that very well in Gulf War I and II. COIN is the opposite. We were not prepared for that after GWII.

COIN warfare is a time intensive form of fighting largley unviewable and difficult to measure or understand. It doesn't look good on television. It also doesn't attract large dollars for large machines built in Congressional districts. However, it is the correct strategy for this war. It takes a while to learn COIN and teach it to the grunts on the ground. Tactics had to be understood and learned. Training manuals needed to written and published. Training facilities had to be build or converted. Urban warfare had to be learned and taught.

This is a winnable war if "Battleship" leaders will adjust their thinking. I believe the Pentagon has adjusted but the leaders on the hill have not. The Democrats see no votes in victory.

I pray Congress will not surrender to Al Qaida but support our troops and win this war.

[otterinbham 0]

Unfortunately, counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare was abandoned after Vietnam as it was after WWII and a "Battleship" mentality resumed in the Pentagon and in Congress, ie. large force vs large force and war would be over.

Our Army was designed for mobility and lethality. It did that very well in Gulf War I and II. COIN is the opposite. We were not prepared for that after GWII.

COIN warfare is a time intensive form of fighting largley unviewable and difficult to measure or understand. It doesn't look good on television. It also doesn't attract large dollars for large machines built in Congressional districts. However, it is the correct strategy for this war. It takes a while to learn COIN and teach it to the grunts on the ground. Tactics had to be understood and learned. Training manuals needed to written and published. Training facilities had to be build or converted. Urban warfare had to be learned and taught.

This is a winnable war if "Battleship" leaders will adjust their thinking. I believe the Pentagon has adjusted but the leaders on the hill have not. The Democrats see no votes in victory.

I pray Congress will not surrender to Al Qaida but support our troops and win this war.

I have been working with the military on and off for four years now on Asymmmetrical Warfare. The problem is that even the military leadership did not get it, failing to note the failure of American doctrine in Vietnam or the British successes in Malaysia and American successes in the Phillipine Insurrection. The truth of the matter is that counterinsurgency was relegated to an unimportant place in American doctrine in the 20th Century.

General Petraus has, on the other hand, shown an active interest in this subject his entire career. The problem that has existed up until now is that the military planners have taken zero interest in the crucial political aspects to asymmetrical warfare, thinking in terms of body counts and captured objectives. Paul Bremer conducted himself like the Viceroy of Iraq, rather than take the common sense approach of reaching out to local leaders, etc. etc. This fundamental stupidity marked the first four years of the Iraq conflict. Now, FINALLY, there seems to be a fresh approach. Which leads us to ask, What took them so long?

[AFTiger 282]

Unfortunately, counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare was abandoned after Vietnam as it was after WWII and a "Battleship" mentality resumed in the Pentagon and in Congress, ie. large force vs large force and war would be over.

Our Army was designed for mobility and lethality. It did that very well in Gulf War I and II. COIN is the opposite. We were not prepared for that after GWII.

COIN warfare is a time intensive form of fighting largley unviewable and difficult to measure or understand. It doesn't look good on television. It also doesn't attract large dollars for large machines built in Congressional districts. However, it is the correct strategy for this war. It takes a while to learn COIN and teach it to the grunts on the ground. Tactics had to be understood and learned. Training manuals needed to written and published. Training facilities had to be build or converted. Urban warfare had to be learned and taught.

This is a winnable war if "Battleship" leaders will adjust their thinking. I believe the Pentagon has adjusted but the leaders on the hill have not. The Democrats see no votes in victory.

I pray Congress will not surrender to Al Qaida but support our troops and win this war.

I have been working with the military on and off for four years now on Asymmmetrical Warfare. The problem is that even the military leadership did not get it, failing to note the failure of American doctrine in Vietnam or the British successes in Malaysia and American successes in the Phillipine Insurrection. The truth of the matter is that counterinsurgency was relegated to an unimportant place in American doctrine in the 20th Century.

General Petraus has, on the other hand, shown an active interest in this subject his entire career. The problem that has existed up until now is that the military planners have taken zero interest in the crucial political aspects to asymmetrical warfare, thinking in terms of body counts and captured objectives. Paul Bremer conducted himself like the Viceroy of Iraq, rather than take the common sense approach of reaching out to local leaders, etc. etc. This fundamental stupidity marked the first four years of the Iraq conflict. Now, FINALLY, there seems to be a fresh approach. Which leads us to ask, What took them so long?

You have my attention. What do you do in this area?

[otterinbham 0]

Unfortunately, counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare was abandoned after Vietnam as it was after WWII and a "Battleship" mentality resumed in the Pentagon and in Congress, ie. large force vs large force and war would be over.

Our Army was designed for mobility and lethality. It did that very well in Gulf War I and II. COIN is the opposite. We were not prepared for that after GWII.

COIN warfare is a time intensive form of fighting largley unviewable and difficult to measure or understand. It doesn't look good on television. It also doesn't attract large dollars for large machines built in Congressional districts. However, it is the correct strategy for this war. It takes a while to learn COIN and teach it to the grunts on the ground. Tactics had to be understood and learned. Training manuals needed to written and published. Training facilities had to be build or converted. Urban warfare had to be learned and taught.

This is a winnable war if "Battleship" leaders will adjust their thinking. I believe the Pentagon has adjusted but the leaders on the hill have not. The Democrats see no votes in victory.

I pray Congress will not surrender to Al Qaida but support our troops and win this war.

I have been working with the military on and off for four years now on Asymmmetrical Warfare. The problem is that even the military leadership did not get it, failing to note the failure of American doctrine in Vietnam or the British successes in Malaysia and American successes in the Phillipine Insurrection. The truth of the matter is that counterinsurgency was relegated to an unimportant place in American doctrine in the 20th Century.

General Petraus has, on the other hand, shown an active interest in this subject his entire career. The problem that has existed up until now is that the military planners have taken zero interest in the crucial political aspects to asymmetrical warfare, thinking in terms of body counts and captured objectives. Paul Bremer conducted himself like the Viceroy of Iraq, rather than take the common sense approach of reaching out to local leaders, etc. etc. This fundamental stupidity marked the first four years of the Iraq conflict. Now, FINALLY, there seems to be a fresh approach. Which leads us to ask, What took them so long?

You have my attention. What do you do in this area?

A lot in recruiting, messaging, and governmental relations. Beyond that, I can't say.

[CCTAU 3,821]

Well. You could. But black helicopters and all that. I don't want to disappear, so keep it to yourself......