A flawed U.N. cease-fire risks further fighting

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A flawed U.N. cease-fire risks further fighting

August 15, 2006

We hope United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 writes more than merely a temporary cease-fire in the Israel-Hezbollah war. But hope alone is rarely a reliable indicator in the Middle East. In truth, this is a weakly worded resolution that leaves major issues unresolved and a resumption of hostilities a distinct, if not likely, possibility.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice describes Resolution 1701 as the best that could be accomplished under the circumstances. She may be right. Drafting a resolution that can win unanimous 15-0 approval on the fractious Security Council isn't easy. The Bush administration deserves credit for deft diplomacy in crafting, together with France, a generally constructive cease-fire that could win unanimous approval. Unfortunately, it's weaker than the U.S.-France resolution that was originally proposed a week ago.

The current resolution's deficiencies are glaringly apparent.

A 2004 Security Council resolution, 1559, called for disarming the Hezbollah militia that has long been an armed state-within-a-state in southern Lebanon and a proxy force for Syria and Iran. Had Resolution 1559 been implemented and enforced, the fierce war this past month would never have occurred.

Yet, the U.N.'s current cease-fire resolution leaves the matter of disarming Hezbollah dangerously ambiguous. No one, not the weak Lebanese army nor a beefed-up U.N. peacekeeping force, is specifically charged with taking away Hezbollah's arsenals of arms, which include rockets and missiles capable of striking anywhere in northern Israel.

Ominously, a defiant Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah declared yesterday that talk of disarming his guerrilla army was “a big mistake.” That doesn't sound like Hezbollah, which is boasting that it won this war, will be voluntarily giving up its arms anytime soon.

The second grievous flaw in Resolution 1701 is denying the new U.N. peacekeeping force charged with enforcing the cease-fire full powers to use lethal force. The existing U.N. force in southern Lebanon, 2,000 armed observers, has been ineffective for two decades. Resolution 1701 calls for an additional 15,000 troops with limited powers to defend themselves but no mandate to take on Hezbollah if necessary.

That may be a fatal omission if Nasrallah and his sponsors in Damascus and Tehran decide on another round against Israel.

Meanwhile, the Israelis insist, understandably, that their forces won't withdraw from southern Lebanon until the new U.N. force arrives to take control together with the Lebanese army. Hezbollah says it will feel free to resist the Israeli presence on Lebanese soil. With the arrival of a new U.N. force weeks away, southern Lebanon will remain a volatile tinderbox that could erupt at any time.

The overriding strategic hope when this war began was that it would end with Hezbollah soundly defeated and Syria and Iran sharply checked in the process. Instead, Hezbollah has emerged battered but intact, while Syria and Iran have avoided any real setback to their regional ambitions.

To that, add a shaky cease-fire that fails to ensure Hezbollah's disarmament. Taken together, these are precisely the ingredients that risk renewed hostilities sooner or later.

http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20...lz1ed15top.html