At Hiroshima’s 70th Anniversary, Japan Again Mourns Dawn of Atomic Age

[aujeff11 6,243]

And they would have held to that indefinitely despite an effective blockade of ships, mines, and aircraft (which was in place)? They had no means of mounting effective offensive operations any more, and no means to consistently obtain the imports they were reliant upon. We successfully did to Japan what Germany tried to do to Britain. Unlike Britain, Japan had no ally willing to expend considerable resources (and losses) to keep them supplied. There was no need to rush to invasion or obliterating cities.

Try putting yourself in Truman's shoes. It was genuinely believed that Japan would not surrender and force us to take the nation by hand. Again, the Japanese were not known for their propensity for surrender. Remember the bloody island hopping strategy in which they fought to the last in pretty much every battle? The conventional wisdom of the day, which informed the decision which Truman made in close consultation with General Marshall, was that an invasion of the home islands would have been a blood bath. This was based upon the horrible slaughter they willingly endured on Saipan and Okinawa. On Saipan, women and children committed suicide by jumping from cliffs, and when they would not willingly do so, they were driven off the cliffs by soldiers weilding bayonets. Wounded soldiers would strap grenades to their bodies under their tunics with strings through the pins in the hope of taking as many Americans with them as possible. Just or not, the view was that the Japanese would rather die than surrender, and that they would kill as many Americans as possible when they did.

I often wonder why it's so popular to second guess Truman or to ascribe cynical motives to him. I see no reliable support for such positions. We had to be as convincing as possible.

Or, I suppose watching a million of them starve to death from afar while they threw whatever they had at our blockade would have been much more palatable to some.

The amount of civilians that died is the reason his war strategy is second guessed. We are talking hundreds of thousands of civilians that may have died unnecessarily.

[homersapien 11,385]

And they would have held to that indefinitely despite an effective blockade of ships, mines, and aircraft (which was in place)? They had no means of mounting effective offensive operations any more, and no means to consistently obtain the imports they were reliant upon. We successfully did to Japan what Germany tried to do to Britain. Unlike Britain, Japan had no ally willing to expend considerable resources (and losses) to keep them supplied. There was no need to rush to invasion or obliterating cities.

Try putting yourself in Truman's shoes. It was genuinely believed that Japan would not surrender and force us to take the nation by hand. Again, the Japanese were not known for their propensity for surrender. Remember the bloody island hopping strategy in which they fought to the last in pretty much every battle? The conventional wisdom of the day, which informed the decision which Truman made in close consultation with General Marshall, was that an invasion of the home islands would have been a blood bath. This was based upon the horrible slaughter they willingly endured on Saipan and Okinawa. On Saipan, women and children committed suicide by jumping from cliffs, and when they would not willingly do so, they were driven off the cliffs by soldiers weilding bayonets. Wounded soldiers would strap grenades to their bodies under their tunics with strings through the pins in the hope of taking as many Americans with them as possible. Just or not, the view was that the Japanese would rather die than surrender, and that they would kill as many Americans as possible when they did.

I often wonder why it's so popular to second guess Truman or to ascribe cynical motives to him. I see no reliable support for such positions. We had to be as convincing as possible.

Or, I suppose watching a million of them starve to death from afar while they threw whatever they had at our blockade would have been much more palatable to some.

The amount of civilians that died is the reason his war strategy is second guessed. We are talking hundreds of thousands of civilians that may have died unnecessarily.

But that decision had already been made. Even if Truman wanted to reverse it, he couldn't have politically.

Not to belittle Truman- who I respect - but this decision really had little to do with him. It was already a done deal. He just authorized a different weapon to accomplish the same purpose.

[homersapien 11,385]

And I might add that I am most certainly not denigrating the opinion that the A bomb was not necessary to end the war, because it wasn't. Furthermore, the morality of it is worth debate.

God help us if we get to the point where the morality isn't questioned.

[AUDub 11,153]

Operation Starvation (and our success hopping across the Pacific) had already effectively cut them off, with nothing more than mines and the natural progression of battle. By the time nuclear weapons were deployed, the resources were available to effect an indefinite naval and aircraft blockade. They had no means to counter that blockade, and they had no allies willing or able to do so. Their navy was gutted, and all they had left to rely on for airstrikes were kamikaze attacks. They had already sent their greatest remaining naval asset on a one-way trip to Okinawa, and Yamato did not make it. Fuel and food were serious concerns, and that situation was not improving.

Ultimately, we have no way of knowing how other scenarios would have panned out, and we never will. All we can really do is agree to disagree.

Even with all that, a blockade likely kills more people than the atomic bombing, while doing it slowly. How much of their populace has to die before they cave? If the war had lasted indefinitely while millions starved, would we be asking why we hadn't used the bombs today? We know, and knew at the time, that Japan was prepared to suffer tremendous losses in an effort to extend the war as long as possible. Note my earlier post on Ketsu-Go. Who cares as long as we weren't the ones pulling the trigger, I suppose.

And don't sell the kamikazes short. Japan still could have attacked American ships. The Kamikazes were quite effective, and it didn't take a lot of technology. Kamikaze planes weren't Zeros. They were made from what ever was available, could stay aloft for a few miles out to sea and required very little fuel. Didn't even have to make the return flight. They were very cheap to produce and were manufacturing lots of them in preparation for Downfall.

Regarding what assets they had remaining, here's that post on Ketsu-Go:

In fact, the Japanese Homeland Defense Plan, codenamed Ketsu-Go, had seen to the marshalling of over 12,700 serviceable aircraft, along with the construction of dozens of subterranean hangar facilities, scores of hidden, camoflaged airstrips, and the stockpiling of tens of thousands of gallons of fuel and hundreds of thousands of tons of munitions, from bombs and torpedoes to rockets, mortar rounds, and artillery projectiles, and a few thousand tons of military-grade explosives not encompassed with projectiles. Additionally, in "cottage shops" and under bridges, in basements and in mines and tunnels, military production was continuing at a feverish pace.

The Ketsu-Go plan was for four separate aerial campaigns against the invasion fleet. While 2000 fighters were to contest the skies over Kyushu, an initial 800 plane Kamikaze attack was to engage the fleet during its assembly about the islands over Kyushu. A second force of over 300 planes was to target specifically the aircraft carriers and other ground-fire-capable ships, attacking in waves from all points of the compass.

Over 800 more suicide planes were to target the transports and landing ships.

The Kyushu defense was allotted approximately 2000 additional planes, most of which which were to be used in suicide waves of from 50 to over 100, as the situation merited and circumstances permitted.

The Japanese thought they could stymie the invasion and inflict crippling losses on both the capital ships and escorts and the support ships. Relying not just on air power, they had 40 operational submarines, each fully manned, fueled, and armed. Some 20 destroyers and three cruisers remained operational as well, and were to be used variously to counterattack the invasion fleet and, beached, as fire support platforms.

Additionally, there was a force of some 400 suicide submarines. Little more than manned torpedoes, but deadly, nonetheless. The invasion fleet would come under devastating, unceasing assault from land, sea, and air, before the troops even got to the beaches.

Confident of inflicting staggering losses, though at horrendous cost to themselves, the Japanese anticipated the Americans would falter, back off and, shocked and demoralized, perhaps to offer at least face-saving, less-than-unconditional surrender terms.

Nothing if not meticulous in planning, the Japanese had a fallback plan, should the invasion succeed in lodging troops ashore, as they thought likely.

[AUDub 11,153]

And I might add that I am most certainly not denigrating the opinion that the A bomb was not necessary to end the war, because it wasn't. Furthermore, the morality of it is worth debate.

God help us if we get to the point where the morality isn't questioned.

Fair statement.

I've said in the past that Japan was a defeated nation soon as the first bombs fell on Hawaii. It was simply a matter of how many lives it would cost and how long it would take. I, for one, would want our asses out of there ASAP, and in war one goal among many is to not drag it out, and it had already been four grueling years. The folks in charge generally prefer to not go on prolonged, static attrition campaigns that will cause heavy casualties, military and civilian. That's not out of the goodness of their hearts, but because that's a damned inefficient way to go about war.

[aujeff11 6,243]

And they would have held to that indefinitely despite an effective blockade of ships, mines, and aircraft (which was in place)? They had no means of mounting effective offensive operations any more, and no means to consistently obtain the imports they were reliant upon. We successfully did to Japan what Germany tried to do to Britain. Unlike Britain, Japan had no ally willing to expend considerable resources (and losses) to keep them supplied. There was no need to rush to invasion or obliterating cities.

Try putting yourself in Truman's shoes. It was genuinely believed that Japan would not surrender and force us to take the nation by hand. Again, the Japanese were not known for their propensity for surrender. Remember the bloody island hopping strategy in which they fought to the last in pretty much every battle? The conventional wisdom of the day, which informed the decision which Truman made in close consultation with General Marshall, was that an invasion of the home islands would have been a blood bath. This was based upon the horrible slaughter they willingly endured on Saipan and Okinawa. On Saipan, women and children committed suicide by jumping from cliffs, and when they would not willingly do so, they were driven off the cliffs by soldiers weilding bayonets. Wounded soldiers would strap grenades to their bodies under their tunics with strings through the pins in the hope of taking as many Americans with them as possible. Just or not, the view was that the Japanese would rather die than surrender, and that they would kill as many Americans as possible when they did.

I often wonder why it's so popular to second guess Truman or to ascribe cynical motives to him. I see no reliable support for such positions. We had to be as convincing as possible.

Or, I suppose watching a million of them starve to death from afar while they threw whatever they had at our blockade would have been much more palatable to some.

The amount of civilians that died is the reason his war strategy is second guessed. We are talking hundreds of thousands of civilians that may have died unnecessarily.

But that decision had already been made. Even if Truman wanted to reverse it, he couldn't have politically.

Not to belittle Truman- who I respect - but this decision really had little to do with him. It was already a done deal. He just authorized a different weapon to accomplish the same purpose.

I agree that the decision was a done deal. IMO when the team of scientists worked on it for a couple of years and after all the tax dollars put into it, it wasn't a matter of if but when when were the bombs going to be deployed. I think using those bombs as a threat to the USSR was a factor as well. Overall, that created the security dilemma which counteracted and helped start the cold war. America bombs Japan after Truman was coy to Stalin about his new unique weapon, USSR builds its first atomic bomb, Truman announces orders a hydrogen bomb and tests it, the USSR does the same. All told, it will be very disappointing if uncovered that Truman did indeed use hundreds of thousands of lives for a chess match.

[Mikey 16,614]

Two bombs ended the war in six days. There is no other scenario that could have ended the war in six months, let alone six days. All those months would have had servicemen on both sides dying and thousands of prisoners that were held by the Japanese being tortured, starved and used for fun and games every day that the war dragged on.

We were not dealing with an enemy whose actions compared with the actions of other civilized nations. They thought differently and as such they had to be dealt with differently. Fortunately, we had an effective means to deal with their way of thinking and force a quick end of the hostilities. Using the A-bombs was the only solution that makes any sense. To have had the weapons that would end the war quickly and not use them would have been insanity on our part.

[AUDub 11,153]

And they would have held to that indefinitely despite an effective blockade of ships, mines, and aircraft (which was in place)? They had no means of mounting effective offensive operations any more, and no means to consistently obtain the imports they were reliant upon. We successfully did to Japan what Germany tried to do to Britain. Unlike Britain, Japan had no ally willing to expend considerable resources (and losses) to keep them supplied. There was no need to rush to invasion or obliterating cities.

Try putting yourself in Truman's shoes. It was genuinely believed that Japan would not surrender and force us to take the nation by hand. Again, the Japanese were not known for their propensity for surrender. Remember the bloody island hopping strategy in which they fought to the last in pretty much every battle? The conventional wisdom of the day, which informed the decision which Truman made in close consultation with General Marshall, was that an invasion of the home islands would have been a blood bath. This was based upon the horrible slaughter they willingly endured on Saipan and Okinawa. On Saipan, women and children committed suicide by jumping from cliffs, and when they would not willingly do so, they were driven off the cliffs by soldiers weilding bayonets. Wounded soldiers would strap grenades to their bodies under their tunics with strings through the pins in the hope of taking as many Americans with them as possible. Just or not, the view was that the Japanese would rather die than surrender, and that they would kill as many Americans as possible when they did.

I often wonder why it's so popular to second guess Truman or to ascribe cynical motives to him. I see no reliable support for such positions. We had to be as convincing as possible.

Or, I suppose watching a million of them starve to death from afar while they threw whatever they had at our blockade would have been much more palatable to some.

The amount of civilians that died is the reason his war strategy is second guessed. We are talking hundreds of thousands of civilians that may have died unnecessarily.

But that decision had already been made. Even if Truman wanted to reverse it, he couldn't have politically.

Not to belittle Truman- who I respect - but this decision really had little to do with him. It was already a done deal. He just authorized a different weapon to accomplish the same purpose.

I agree that the decision was a done deal. IMO when the team of scientists worked on it for a couple of years and after all the tax dollars put into it, it wasn't a matter of if but when when were bombs going to be deployed. I think using that bomb as a threat to the USSR was a factor as well. Overall, that created the security dilemma which counteracted and helped start the cold war. America bombs Japan after Truman was coy to Stalin about his new unique weapon, USSR builds its first atomic bomb, Truman announces orders a hydrogen bomb and tests it, the USSR does the same. All told, it will be very disappointing if Truman did indeed use hundreds of thousands lives for a chess match.

It was really only a matter of time before the nations that had access to the necessary materials got the bombs as well. We simply got there first.

[AUDub 11,153]

And I might add that I am most certainly not denigrating the opinion that the A bomb was not necessary to end the war, because it wasn't. Furthermore, the morality of it is worth debate.

God help us if we get to the point where the morality isn't questioned.

Total war in and of itself is inherently immoral, as it should be.

[quietfan 233]

Opinions on a fourth option, besides invasion, blockade, or immolating cities?:

What about demonstrating the effects of the Bomb in a remote/rural/wilderness area of Japan?

I know it is often argued that a failure/dud during such a demonstration would have been embarrassing and had the effect of emboldening the hawks in their government, but wouldn't a dud over Hiroshima or Nagasaki have been just as or more embarrassing or emboldening? In fact, unless we warned them in advance of our intentions, a dud might have gone unnoticed in a sufficiently remote region/forest.

- - - - -

Also, regarding the subsequent arms race in the Cold War:

Stalin was going to get nukes whether we used them against Japan or not. He was already stealing our secrets and had his own nuclear program. Is it just possible that the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki helped keep a tiny element of sanity or reason in the minds of those with their fingers on the button(s) during some of the greatest crises of the Cold War, like Korea or the Cuban missile crisis? Did the lives lost at Hiroshima and Nagasaki at least serve the purpose of preventing a much greater nuclear conflagration later?

[quietfan 233]

Speaking of Korea:

Depending on whether one wants to believe Truman, MacArthur, Whitney, or Nixon:

https://en.wikipedia...uglas_MacArthur

MacArthur did not advocate the use of nuclear weapons to recover the situation.[81][82] In his testimony before the Senate Inquiry, he said that he had never recommended their use.[83] In 1960, MacArthur challenged a statement by Truman that he had wanted to use nuclear weapons, and Truman issued a retraction, stating that he had no documentary evidence of this claim; it was merely his personal opinion. According to Major General Courtney Whitney, MacArthur did at one point consider a plan to use radioactive wastes to seal off North Korea, based upon a 1950 proposal by Louis Johnson, but never submitted this to the Joint Chiefs.[81] In 1985 Richard Nixon recalled discussing the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with MacArthur:

"MacArthur once spoke to me very eloquently about it, pacing the floor of his apartment in the Waldorf. He thought it a tragedy the bomb was ever exploded. MacArthur believed that the same restrictions ought to apply to atomic weapons as to conventional weapons, that the military objective should always be limited damage to noncombatants... MacArthur, you see, was a soldier. He believed in using force only against military targets, and that is why the nuclear thing turned him off, which I think speaks well of him."[84]

If we take Nixon's version, then MacArthur was against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But then, whom do you trust more of the four and why?

I think it was inappropriate for Truman to attack MacArthur in 1960 without documentary evidence, but that doesn't necessarily mean he didn't correctly perceive MacArthur's mindset during the war itself.

[TitanTiger 20,498]

Opinions on a fourth option, besides invasion, blockade, or immolating cities?:

What about demonstrating the effects of the Bomb in a remote/rural/wilderness area of Japan?

I know it is often argued that a failure/dud during such a demonstration would have been embarrassing and had the effect of emboldening the hawks in their government, but wouldn't a dud over Hiroshima or Nagasaki have been just as or more embarrassing or emboldening? In fact, unless we warned them in advance of our intentions, a dud might have gone unnoticed in a sufficiently remote region/forest.

- - - - -

Also, regarding the subsequent arms race in the Cold War:

Stalin was going to get nukes whether we used them against Japan or not. He was already stealing our secrets and had his own nuclear program. Is it just possible that the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki helped keep a tiny element of sanity or reason in the minds of those with their fingers on the button(s) during some of the greatest crises of the Cold War, like Korea or the Cuban missile crisis? Did the lives lost at Hiroshima and Nagasaki at least serve the purpose of preventing a much greater nuclear conflagration later?

I think you're right on both counts actually. I think a demonstration where we drop it somewhere they can verify the damage and see the cloud, but not suffer mass casualties could have been sufficient. It was at least worth a try and carried no more risks that actually dropping on a city had.

And yes, I think seeing how awful that thing was and the suffering it inflicted on people who didn't die from the initial blast made a lot of people think twice about ever unleashing such a thing on someone again.

Except Iran of course.

[Mikey 16,614]

Speaking of Korea:

Depending on whether one wants to believe Truman, MacArthur, Whitney, or Nixon:

https://en.wikipedia...uglas_MacArthur

MacArthur did not advocate the use of nuclear weapons to recover the situation.[81][82] In his testimony before the Senate Inquiry, he said that he had never recommended their use.[83] In 1960, MacArthur challenged a statement by Truman that he had wanted to use nuclear weapons, and Truman issued a retraction, stating that he had no documentary evidence of this claim; it was merely his personal opinion. According to Major General Courtney Whitney, MacArthur did at one point consider a plan to use radioactive wastes to seal off North Korea, based upon a 1950 proposal by Louis Johnson, but never submitted this to the Joint Chiefs.[81] In 1985 Richard Nixon recalled discussing the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with MacArthur:

"MacArthur once spoke to me very eloquently about it, pacing the floor of his apartment in the Waldorf. He thought it a tragedy the bomb was ever exploded. MacArthur believed that the same restrictions ought to apply to atomic weapons as to conventional weapons, that the military objective should always be limited damage to noncombatants... MacArthur, you see, was a soldier. He believed in using force only against military targets, and that is why the nuclear thing turned him off, which I think speaks well of him."[84]

If we take Nixon's version, then MacArthur was against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But then, whom do you trust more of the four and why?

I think it was inappropriate for Truman to attack MacArthur in 1960 without documentary evidence, but that doesn't necessarily mean he didn't correctly perceive MacArthur's mindset during the war itself.

I recall reading this quote from MacArthur. If not exact, the meaning is accurate: "The glory is gone. The outcome of future wars will be decided by an apparatus." In context, I didn't get that MacArthur despised the bomb's effects so much as he despised the idea that the bomb would remove opportunities for military men to practice their trade.

At the end of it, LeMay and the Air Corps wanted to fly thousands of missions with lots of shiny new airplanes, the Navy wanted to have a prolonged blockade with lots of shiny new ships, MacArthur wanted to preside over a land invasion with his greatly strengthened army and Stalin wanted time for his armies to seize lots of territory held by the Japanese.. It seems they all wanted to torture the weakened enemy like a cat playing with a crippled mouse. Truman may have been the only one in power that wanted a quick and merciful end to the war. Thank God for Truman.

[aujeff11 6,243]

Speaking of Korea:

Depending on whether one wants to believe Truman, MacArthur, Whitney, or Nixon:

https://en.wikipedia...uglas_MacArthur

MacArthur did not advocate the use of nuclear weapons to recover the situation.[81][82] In his testimony before the Senate Inquiry, he said that he had never recommended their use.[83] In 1960, MacArthur challenged a statement by Truman that he had wanted to use nuclear weapons, and Truman issued a retraction, stating that he had no documentary evidence of this claim; it was merely his personal opinion. According to Major General Courtney Whitney, MacArthur did at one point consider a plan to use radioactive wastes to seal off North Korea, based upon a 1950 proposal by Louis Johnson, but never submitted this to the Joint Chiefs.[81] In 1985 Richard Nixon recalled discussing the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with MacArthur:

"MacArthur once spoke to me very eloquently about it, pacing the floor of his apartment in the Waldorf. He thought it a tragedy the bomb was ever exploded. MacArthur believed that the same restrictions ought to apply to atomic weapons as to conventional weapons, that the military objective should always be limited damage to noncombatants... MacArthur, you see, was a soldier. He believed in using force only against military targets, and that is why the nuclear thing turned him off, which I think speaks well of him."[84]

If we take Nixon's version, then MacArthur was against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But then, whom do you trust more of the four and why?

I think it was inappropriate for Truman to attack MacArthur in 1960 without documentary evidence, but that doesn't necessarily mean he didn't correctly perceive MacArthur's mindset during the war itself.

I recall reading this quote from MacArthur. If not exact, the meaning is accurate: "The glory is gone. The outcome of future wars will be decided by an apparatus." In context, I didn't get that MacArthur despised the bomb's effects so much as he despised the idea that the bomb would remove opportunities for military men to practice their trade.

At the end of it, LeMay and the Air Corps wanted to fly thousands of missions with lots of shiny new airplanes, the Navy wanted to have a prolonged blockade with lots of shiny new ships, MacArthur wanted to preside over a land invasion with his greatly strengthened army and Stalin wanted time for his armies to seize lots of territory held by the Japanese.. It seems they all wanted to torture the weakened enemy like a cat playing with a crippled mouse. Truman may have been the only one in power that wanted a quick and merciful end to the war. Thank God for Truman.

Because there were other alternative courses of action that could have been utilized to minimize the CIVILIAN casualties of Japan, I will have to refrain from calling Truman "merciful." That just leaves a vulgar taste in my mouth...

[quietfan 233]

Speaking of Korea:

Depending on whether one wants to believe Truman, MacArthur, Whitney, or Nixon:

https://en.wikipedia...uglas_MacArthur

MacArthur did not advocate the use of nuclear weapons to recover the situation.[81][82] In his testimony before the Senate Inquiry, he said that he had never recommended their use.[83] In 1960, MacArthur challenged a statement by Truman that he had wanted to use nuclear weapons, and Truman issued a retraction, stating that he had no documentary evidence of this claim; it was merely his personal opinion. According to Major General Courtney Whitney, MacArthur did at one point consider a plan to use radioactive wastes to seal off North Korea, based upon a 1950 proposal by Louis Johnson, but never submitted this to the Joint Chiefs.[81] In 1985 Richard Nixon recalled discussing the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with MacArthur:

"MacArthur once spoke to me very eloquently about it, pacing the floor of his apartment in the Waldorf. He thought it a tragedy the bomb was ever exploded. MacArthur believed that the same restrictions ought to apply to atomic weapons as to conventional weapons, that the military objective should always be limited damage to noncombatants... MacArthur, you see, was a soldier. He believed in using force only against military targets, and that is why the nuclear thing turned him off, which I think speaks well of him."[84]

If we take Nixon's version, then MacArthur was against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But then, whom do you trust more of the four and why?

I think it was inappropriate for Truman to attack MacArthur in 1960 without documentary evidence, but that doesn't necessarily mean he didn't correctly perceive MacArthur's mindset during the war itself.

I recall reading this quote from MacArthur. If not exact, the meaning is accurate: "The glory is gone. The outcome of future wars will be decided by an apparatus." In context, I didn't get that MacArthur despised the bomb's effects so much as he despised the idea that the bomb would remove opportunities for military men to practice their trade.

At the end of it, LeMay and the Air Corps wanted to fly thousands of missions with lots of shiny new airplanes, the Navy wanted to have a prolonged blockade with lots of shiny new ships, MacArthur wanted to preside over a land invasion with his greatly strengthened army and Stalin wanted time for his armies to seize lots of territory held by the Japanese.. It seems they all wanted to torture the weakened enemy like a cat playing with a crippled mouse. Truman may have been the only one in power that wanted a quick and merciful end to the war. Thank God for Truman.

I realize you're only quoting MacArthur from memory or paraphrasing, but I personally reject the notion that there is glory in war. Necessity perhaps, bravery for sure, but not "glory". Or at least we should never look upon or admire war as glorious. [And I'm not suggesting you do, just that if MacArthur did I strongly disagree with him.]

And regarding your second paragraph, unfortunately there are also always at least some motivated by the profit to be had from war.

[homersapien 11,385]

Speaking of Korea:

Depending on whether one wants to believe Truman, MacArthur, Whitney, or Nixon:

https://en.wikipedia...uglas_MacArthur

MacArthur did not advocate the use of nuclear weapons to recover the situation.[81][82] In his testimony before the Senate Inquiry, he said that he had never recommended their use.[83] In 1960, MacArthur challenged a statement by Truman that he had wanted to use nuclear weapons, and Truman issued a retraction, stating that he had no documentary evidence of this claim; it was merely his personal opinion. According to Major General Courtney Whitney, MacArthur did at one point consider a plan to use radioactive wastes to seal off North Korea, based upon a 1950 proposal by Louis Johnson, but never submitted this to the Joint Chiefs.[81] In 1985 Richard Nixon recalled discussing the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with MacArthur:

"MacArthur once spoke to me very eloquently about it, pacing the floor of his apartment in the Waldorf. He thought it a tragedy the bomb was ever exploded. MacArthur believed that the same restrictions ought to apply to atomic weapons as to conventional weapons, that the military objective should always be limited damage to noncombatants... MacArthur, you see, was a soldier. He believed in using force only against military targets, and that is why the nuclear thing turned him off, which I think speaks well of him."[84]

If we take Nixon's version, then MacArthur was against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But then, whom do you trust more of the four and why?

I think it was inappropriate for Truman to attack MacArthur in 1960 without documentary evidence, but that doesn't necessarily mean he didn't correctly perceive MacArthur's mindset during the war itself.

I recall reading this quote from MacArthur. If not exact, the meaning is accurate: "The glory is gone. The outcome of future wars will be decided by an apparatus." In context, I didn't get that MacArthur despised the bomb's effects so much as he despised the idea that the bomb would remove opportunities for military men to practice their trade.

At the end of it, LeMay and the Air Corps wanted to fly thousands of missions with lots of shiny new airplanes, the Navy wanted to have a prolonged blockade with lots of shiny new ships, MacArthur wanted to preside over a land invasion with his greatly strengthened army and Stalin wanted time for his armies to seize lots of territory held by the Japanese.. It seems they all wanted to torture the weakened enemy like a cat playing with a crippled mouse. Truman may have been the only one in power that wanted a quick and merciful end to the war. Thank God for Truman.

I realize you're only quoting MacArthur from memory or paraphrasing, but I personally reject the notion that there is glory in war. Necessity perhaps, bravery for sure, but not "glory". Or at least we should never look upon or admire war as glorious. [And I'm not suggesting you do, just that if MacArthur did I strongly disagree with him.]

And regarding your second paragraph, unfortunately there are also always at least some motivated by the profit to be had from war.

I find it very easy to believe McArthur said that. Nor do I believe it was "inappropriate" for Truman to fire him for whatever reason he wanted.

Whatever his military skills, McArthur was an ego maniac.

[quietfan 233]

I find it very easy to believe McArthur said that. Nor do I believe it was "inappropriate" for Truman to fire him for whatever reason he wanted.

Whatever his military skills, McArthur was an ego maniac.

Absolutely, as Commander-in-Chief, Truman was empowered to fire MacArthur in 1951 for whatever reason. (And yes, MacArthur never suffered from a deficiency of ego.)

I only meant it was inappropriate for Truman to make statements nine years later in 1960, and long after both were retired, besmirching MacArthur without documentary evidence to back up his allegations.

[AUDub 11,153]

I realize you're only quoting MacArthur from memory or paraphrasing, but I personally reject the notion that there is glory in war. Necessity perhaps, bravery for sure, but not "glory". Or at least we should never look upon or admire war as glorious. [And I'm not suggesting you do, just that if MacArthur did I strongly disagree with him.]

And regarding your second paragraph, unfortunately there are also always at least some motivated by the profit to be had from war.

In our culture? Americans are, and always have been, an incredibly violent society.

To paraphrase Brockaway at Cracked:

When that a**hole in front of you in line at the movie theater starts shoving people around, do you imagine knocking his lights out, or rushing up to tend to the victims? Maybe you fantasize about both -- but what's the order? We're punchers first and healers second. Because, like it or not, that's our subconscious archetype of the word "hero": somebody who solves problems with righteous violence.

We glorify war. Ask anybody. Go down to Whole Foods and dive-tackle the most liberal-looking person you can find (Hint: Look for earplugs). Put that sucker in a headlock and only release him if he answers the following question truthfully: What do you think of the troops? Just before he passes out, he'll choke out one word: heroes.

Of course that's all true, and like hell am I going to say otherwise. But we as a society worship our soldiers as icons, the pinnacles of noble sacrifice.

This is the basic archetype: "Heroes hurt bad guys."

[quietfan 233]

I realize you're only quoting MacArthur from memory or paraphrasing, but I personally reject the notion that there is glory in war. Necessity perhaps, bravery for sure, but not "glory". Or at least we should never look upon or admire war as glorious. [And I'm not suggesting you do, just that if MacArthur did I strongly disagree with him.]

And regarding your second paragraph, unfortunately there are also always at least some motivated by the profit to be had from war.

In our culture? Americans are, and always have been, an incredibly violent society.

To paraphrase Brockaway at Cracked:

When that a**hole in front of you in line at the movie theater starts shoving people around, do you imagine knocking his lights out, or rushing up to tend to the victims? Maybe you fantasize about both -- but what's the order? We're punchers first and healers second. Because, like it or not, that's our subconscious archetype of the word "hero": somebody who solves problems with righteous violence.

We glorify war. Ask anybody. Go down to Whole Foods and dive-tackle the most liberal-looking person you can find (Hint: Look for earplugs). Put that sucker in a headlock and only release him if he answers the following question truthfully: What do you think of the troops? Just before he passes out, he'll choke out one word: heroes.

Of course that's all true, and like hell am I going to say otherwise. But we as a society worship our soldiers as icons, the pinnacles of noble sacrifice.

This is the basic archetype: "Heroes hurt bad guys."

I think you (or Brockaway?) describe the way things are very well. I just don't think it's the way things should be.

I don't think being violent automatically implies heroic or that heroism necessarily involves violence. The bravery required to put one's life on the line in combat is something to be respected, or heroic, as is the bravery required to crawl onto a building ledge to rescue an infant, the bravery to enter a hot zone of Ebola infection to treat others, or the courage to receive blows without returning violence as in the non-violent movements of Gandhi and M.L. King Jr.. But there is nothing inherently heroic about an act of violence itself. One of the more common but revolting statements I hear in our culture, when discussing someone who is rude or verbally disrespectful, is "If I had been there, I'd have kicked his ass!" The only place for violence in human society is as the absolute last resort in halting others' violence (if then). So while I recognize that humans have found war "glorious" in many times and cultures, I see nothing glorious about it.

[Mikey 16,614]

Because there were other alternative courses of action that could have been utilized to minimize the CIVILIAN casualties of Japan, I will have to refrain from calling Truman "merciful." That just leaves a vulgar taste in my mouth...

I'd like to know what the courses of action were that would have freed our POW's in a matter of days, not involved starving millions of Japanese civilians to death and / or firebombing millions of them, plus would have kept Stalin from seizing the better part of China.

Remember, the enemy we were dealing with had already shown a complete willingness to commit suicide, starve, do whatever instead of surrendering. That included their civilian population. So, what courses of action were available that would have accomplished the above positive results that the A-bombs accomplished?

[AUDub 11,153]

I realize you're only quoting MacArthur from memory or paraphrasing, but I personally reject the notion that there is glory in war. Necessity perhaps, bravery for sure, but not "glory". Or at least we should never look upon or admire war as glorious. [And I'm not suggesting you do, just that if MacArthur did I strongly disagree with him.]

And regarding your second paragraph, unfortunately there are also always at least some motivated by the profit to be had from war.

In our culture? Americans are, and always have been, an incredibly violent society.

To paraphrase Brockaway at Cracked:

When that a**hole in front of you in line at the movie theater starts shoving people around, do you imagine knocking his lights out, or rushing up to tend to the victims? Maybe you fantasize about both -- but what's the order? We're punchers first and healers second. Because, like it or not, that's our subconscious archetype of the word "hero": somebody who solves problems with righteous violence.

We glorify war. Ask anybody. Go down to Whole Foods and dive-tackle the most liberal-looking person you can find (Hint: Look for earplugs). Put that sucker in a headlock and only release him if he answers the following question truthfully: What do you think of the troops? Just before he passes out, he'll choke out one word: heroes.

Of course that's all true, and like hell am I going to say otherwise. But we as a society worship our soldiers as icons, the pinnacles of noble sacrifice.

This is the basic archetype: "Heroes hurt bad guys."

I think you (or Brockaway?) describe the way things are very well. I just don't think it's the way things should be.

I don't think being violent automatically implies heroic or that heroism necessarily involves violence. The bravery required to put one's life on the line in combat is something to be respected, or heroic, as is the bravery required to crawl onto a building ledge to rescue an infant, the bravery to enter a hot zone of Ebola infection to treat others, or the courage to receive blows without returning violence as in the non-violent movements of Gandhi and M.L. King Jr.. But there is nothing inherently heroic about an act of violence itself. One of the more common but revolting statements I hear in our culture, when discussing someone who is rude or verbally disrespectful, is "If I had been there, I'd have kicked his ass!" The only place for violence in human society is as the absolute last resort in halting others' violence (if then). So while I recognize that humans have found war "glorious" in many times and cultures, I see nothing glorious about it.

Agreed.

[AUloggerhead 2,238]

Opinions on a fourth option, besides invasion, blockade, or immolating cities?:

What about demonstrating the effects of the Bomb in a remote/rural/wilderness area of Japan?

I know it is often argued that a failure/dud during such a demonstration would have been embarrassing and had the effect of emboldening the hawks in their government, but wouldn't a dud over Hiroshima or Nagasaki have been just as or more embarrassing or emboldening? In fact, unless we warned them in advance of our intentions, a dud might have gone unnoticed in a sufficiently remote region/forest.

- - - - -

Also, regarding the subsequent arms race in the Cold War:

Stalin was going to get nukes whether we used them against Japan or not. He was already stealing our secrets and had his own nuclear program. Is it just possible that the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki helped keep a tiny element of sanity or reason in the minds of those with their fingers on the button(s) during some of the greatest crises of the Cold War, like Korea or the Cuban missile crisis? Did the lives lost at Hiroshima and Nagasaki at least serve the purpose of preventing a much greater nuclear conflagration later?

I think you're right on both counts actually. I think a demonstration where we drop it somewhere they can verify the damage and see the cloud, but not suffer mass casualties could have been sufficient. It was at least worth a try and carried no more risks that actually dropping on a city had.

And yes, I think seeing how awful that thing was and the suffering it inflicted on people who didn't die from the initial blast made a lot of people think twice about ever unleashing such a thing on someone again.

Except Iran of course. :)/>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interim_Committee

The Interim Committee was formed to advise on nuclear energy, and to advise the President on the use of the A-bomb. They considered a technical demonstration of the bomb but rejected that idea because they felt it wouldn't lead to the Japanese surrendering.

The most immediate of the committee's tasks, one that has been the focus of much subsequent controversy, was to make recommendations concerning the use of the atomic bomb against Japan. The committee's consensus, arrived at in a meeting held June 1, 1945, is described as follows in the meeting's log:

Mr. Byrnes recommended, and the Committee agreed, that the Secretary of War should be advised that, while recognizing that the final selection of the target was essentially a military decision, the present view of the Committee was that the bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible; that it be used on a war plant surrounded by workers’ homes; and that it be used without prior warning.[2]

One member, Bard, later dissented from this decision and in a memorandum to Stimson laid out a case for a warning to Japan before using the bomb.[3]

In arriving at its conclusion, the committee was advised by a Scientific Panel of four physicists from the Manhattan Project: Enrico Fermi and Arthur H. Compton of the Metallurgical Laboratory at the University of Chicago; Ernest O. Lawrence of the Radiation Laboratory at the University of California at Berkeley; and J. Robert Oppenheimer, who directed the bomb assembly program at Los Alamos. Reinforcing the decision arrived at on June 1, the scientists wrote in a formal report on June 16:

The opinions of our scientific colleagues on the initial use of these weapons are not unanimous: they range from the proposal of a purely technical demonstration to that of the military application best designed to induce surrender. Those who advocate a purely technical demonstration would wish to outlaw the use of atomic weapons, and have feared that if we use the weapons now our position in future negotiations will be prejudiced. Others emphasize the opportunity of saving American lives by immediate military use, and believe that such use will improve the international prospects, in that they are more concerned with the prevention of war than with the elimination of this specific weapon. We find ourselves closer to these latter views; we can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use.[4]

Although the committee's recommendation was addressed to Stimson, Byrnes went directly from the June 1 meeting to brief Truman, who reportedly concurred with the committee's opinion.[5] Reviewing the Scientific Panel's report on June 21, the committee reaffirmed its position

...that the weapon be used against Japan at the earliest opportunity, that it be used without warning, and that it be used on a dual target, namely, a military installation or war plant surrounded by or adjacent to homes or other buildings most susceptible to damage.

[TitanTiger 20,498]

They don't really say why dropping it over a remote and sparsely populated region (without warning) wouldn't bring an end to the war. You drop it, it makes a huge demonstration on their island and you threaten that various cities are on the target list next.

[Mikey 16,614]

They don't really say why dropping it over a remote and sparsely populated region (without warning) wouldn't bring an end to the war. You drop it, it makes a huge demonstration on their island and you threaten that various cities are on the target list next.

That's been addressed, above, by someone other than me. I'll add that there was nothing in the enemy's previous behavior to indicate that a harmless demonstration of anything would effect a surrender from them. The Japanese had solid intelligence that there were armies and ships aligned against them that were beyond their ability to defeat, yet they were arming and training every civilian capable of carrying a weapon for a suicidal fight to the death.

Had they known we had only a very limited supply of A-bombs they almost certainly wouldn't have surrendered when they did.

[TitanTiger 20,498]

They don't really say why dropping it over a remote and sparsely populated region (without warning) wouldn't bring an end to the war. You drop it, it makes a huge demonstration on their island and you threaten that various cities are on the target list next.

That's been addressed, above, by someone other than me.

No it hasn't. The only thing that was mentioned about it was the fear that 'dud' would undermine the bomb's use as a threat. But a 'dud' dropped over Hiroshima would have had the exact same effect. This is not an argument the rebuts the idea of detonating it over a more remote area instead of a major population center.

I'll add that there was nothing in the enemy's previous behavior to indicate that a harmless demonstration of anything would effect a surrender from them.

There's nothing to compare it to. The destructive capacity of this weapon was an exponential leap forward from any form of conventional warfare. But I think it's worth a shot to show off it's awesome force somewhere unpopulated that they can clearly see the effect of first before incinerating hundreds of thousands of civilians.

The Japanese had solid intelligence that there were armies and ships aligned against them that were beyond their ability to defeat, yet they were arming and training every civilian capable of carrying a weapon for a suicidal fight to the death.

Had they known we had only a very limited supply of A-bombs they almost certainly wouldn't have surrendered when they did.

They were willing to keep fighting a conventional war. Show them something that completely alters the landscape of what kind of power we have at our disposal and the calculus changes quite a bit.