At Hiroshima’s 70th Anniversary, Japan Again Mourns Dawn of Atomic Age

[AUDub 11,153]

That fact was known then. America easily could have allowed the USSR to jump into action against Japan, as they promised at Yalta or they could have performed various other tactics to finally provoke them into unconditional surrender.

You put a lot of faith in ever reliable (*snigger*) Russia, who declared war one hour before they would have been in violation of their agreement at Yalta, and a few hours before Fat Man detonated over Nagasaki.

And you also neglect that Japan was not talking to us directly, and we could see their supposedly secret communications, having broken their codes a few years prior. These communications only indicated a fierce battle for their homeland on the horizon.

I've brought up the sins of the firebombing many times today even though the very name of this thread dictates that we should be talking about atomic bombs. I explicitly said that the use of strategic firebombing weakens the idea that our military absolutely had to have the atomic bombs.

Because we firebombed over 65 cities, the Japanese were only figuratively speaking hanging on by a thread, making the bombs unnecessary.

Nonsense. As deadly as incendiary bombing was, its power of persuasion was, uh, limited compared to the atom bomb.

Have you read the transcript of Showa's speech informing the public of the surrender? Know how many times he mentioned Russia? Incendiary bombs? 0. But do you know what he did bring up?

...Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable...

And ... let's not forget the contribution to ending the war that LT Marcus McDilda (a captured P-51 pilot) provided by "confessing" (under torture) that the US had 100 atomic bombs and Tokyo & Kyoto were the next targets.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Remember/Marcus_McDilda

Nobody said that the A bombs weren't a reason for the Japanese surrender. I was just stating that the firebombs had just as much of a reason to surrender because of the incendiary bombs that decimated over 60 cities and killed over a million Japanese citizens.

The frog in the boiling pot is the perfect metaphor for this.

hmmm how so.

Given the belligerent language of the Japanese press and their supposedly secret communications, they gave no indications that the firebombing was affecting Japanese morale (heating the water up gradually). Compare that with the sheer shock of the atom bomb (dropping the frog into a pot of boiling water).

When firebombs kill over one million people and destroy many cities, it should be common sense that the morale would be affected.

All we saw was the belligerent posturing of their press, the apparent resolve to continue the fight per their communications and the obvious defensive preparations.

[aujeff11 6,243]

That fact was known then. America easily could have allowed the USSR to jump into action against Japan, as they promised at Yalta or they could have performed various other tactics to finally provoke them into unconditional surrender.

You put a lot of faith in ever reliable (*snigger*) Russia, who declared war one hour before they would have been in violation of their agreement at Yalta, and a few hours before Fat Man detonated over Nagasaki.

And you also neglect that Japan was not talking to us directly, and we could see their supposedly secret communications, having broken their codes a few years prior. These communications only indicated a fierce battle for their homeland on the horizon.

I've brought up the sins of the firebombing many times today even though the very name of this thread dictates that we should be talking about atomic bombs. I explicitly said that the use of strategic firebombing weakens the idea that our military absolutely had to have the atomic bombs.

Because we firebombed over 65 cities, the Japanese were only figuratively speaking hanging on by a thread, making the bombs unnecessary.

Nonsense. As deadly as incendiary bombing was, its power of persuasion was, uh, limited compared to the atom bomb.

Have you read the transcript of Showa's speech informing the public of the surrender? Know how many times he mentioned Russia? Incendiary bombs? 0. But do you know what he did bring up?

...Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable...

And ... let's not forget the contribution to ending the war that LT Marcus McDilda (a captured P-51 pilot) provided by "confessing" (under torture) that the US had 100 atomic bombs and Tokyo & Kyoto were the next targets.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Remember/Marcus_McDilda

Nobody said that the A bombs weren't a reason for the Japanese surrender. I was just stating that the firebombs had just as much of a reason to surrender because of the incendiary bombs that decimated over 60 cities and killed over a million Japanese citizens.

The frog in the boiling pot is the perfect metaphor for this.

hmmm how so.

Given the belligerent language of the Japanese press and their supposedly secret communications, they gave no indications that the firebombing was affecting Japanese morale (heating the water up gradually). Compare that with the sheer shock of the atom bomb (dropping the frog into a pot of boiling water).

When firebombs kill over one million people and destroy many cities, it should be common sense that the morale would be affected.

All we saw was the belligerent posturing of their press, the apparent resolve to continue the fight per their communications and the obvious defensive preparations.

Use your common sense, man.

[aujeff11 6,243]

I have always considered both sides of this debate, and have never felt strongly about it one way or the other. Ultimately, it is because there is no "right" answer for how we should have dealt with Japan at that point, just a list of bad options with no definitive way of knowing how any of them would have panned out. However, any argument about morality or atrocities is moot. We had already dispensed with that concept when we started firebombing cities. Once you have crossed the bridge into war crimes, you may as well continue. If you emerge victorious, they were not war crimes anyway.

What I can say for certain is that if it were my decision to make, I would not have deployed nuclear weapons. Personally, I consider nuclear weapons to be one of those things that sensible people should have recognized the world would be better off without. Then again, the world is clearly not populated by sensible people. World War II is fantastic evidence of that. I also would not have firebombed their cities, or rounded Japanese-Americans up and placed them in internment camps. My thought is that Japan had been reduced to only having the ability to wage war effectively on their home islands at that point. Their fuel supplies were such that they stopped bothering to intercept small groups of bombers, hence why Enola Gay dropped Little Boy unopposed. Food was a problem as well. We certainly had the resources present to effect a complete blockade basically indefinitely. Unlike Britain, Japan had no allies with the United States' resources willing to endure losses to break such a blockade. For that matter, they had no allies left at all. Ferocious zeal is eventually tempered by hunger. I do not think invading their home islands would have been necessary at all, unless time is a factor.

Then again, a blockade would have likely had a currently incalculable toll in Japanese civilian lives as well, just like an invasion would have, and just like nuclear weapons did. Like I said, it was just a list of bad options with no clearly defined and obvious "right" answer.

It really was a list of bad options. It is sad that nukes were among the options. Very good post

[AUDub 11,153]

Use your common sense, man.

I am. Use yours. Okinawa. Saipan. Iwo Jima. All battles that they were hopelessly outgunned and outmanned, yet they fought tooth and nail. Almost to the last in every battle.

They gave us every indication that an extremely tenacious and deadly defense of their homeland was on the horizon.

In fact, the Japanese Homeland Defense Plan, codenamed Ketsu-Go, had seen to the marshalling of over 12,700 serviceable aircraft, along with the construction of dozens of subterranean hangar facilities, scores of hidden, camoflaged airstrips, and the stockpiling of tens of thousands of gallons of fuel and hundreds of thousands of tons of munitions, from bombs and torpedoes to rockets, mortar rounds, and artillery projectiles, and a few thousand tons of military-grade explosives not encompassed with projectiles. Additionally, in "cottage shops" and under bridges, in basements and in mines and tunnels, military production was continuing at a feverish pace.

The Ketsu-Go plan was for four separate aerial campaigns against the invasion fleet. While 2000 fighters were to contest the skies over Kyushu, an initial 800 plane Kamikaze attack was to engage the fleet during its assembly about the islands over Kyushu. A second force of over 300 planes was to target specifically the aircraft carriers and other ground-fire-capable ships, attacking in waves from all points of the compass.

Over 800 more suicide planes were to target the transports and landing ships.

The Kyushu defense was allotted approximately 2000 additional planes, most of which which were to be used in suicide waves of from 50 to over 100, as the situation merited and circumstances permitted.

The Japanese thought they could stymie the invasion and inflict crippling losses on both the capital ships and escorts and the support ships. Relying not just on air power, they had 40 operational submarines, each fully manned, fueled, and armed. Some 20 destroyers and three cruisers remained operational as well, and were to be used variously to counterattack the invasion fleet and, beached, as fire support platforms.

Additionally, there was a force of some 400 suicide submarines. Little more than manned torpedoes, but deadly, nonetheless. The invasion fleet would come under devastating, unceasing assault from land, sea, and air, before the troops even got to the beaches.

Confident of inflicting staggering losses, though at horrendous cost to themselves, the Japanese anticipated the Americans would falter, back off and, shocked and demoralized, perhaps to offer at least face-saving, less-than-unconditional surrender terms.

Nothing if not meticulous in planning, the Japanese had a fallback plan, should the invasion succeed in lodging troops ashore, as they thought likely.

The most determined and fanatical defense of the war had been prepared. The Japanese High Command had correctly worked out not only when, but almost to the foot where the Americans would attack. They planned an experience very different from that which the island-hopping war had led the Americans to expect. To that point throughout the Pacific War, the Americans invariably had outnumbered their island-defending adversaries.

Broken codes, remember?

[AUloggerhead 2,238]

Interesting Atlantic article on the Japanese Emperor and his decision to end to the war.

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/08/emperor-hirohito-surrender-japan-hiroshima/400328/

"... The war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage. ..." LOL. That ranks right up there with "Houston, we have a problem" for Understatement of the Century.

[TitanTiger 20,498]

A blockade isolates a Power, but it does not kill it. Strategic bombing lays waste to cities, devastates populations, crippling industry and transport, but leaves entire Armies relatively unscathed.They gave us no indication that the blockade and continued firebombing would end the war. Remember, we could read their communications. Not that we had to. The Japanese Governmental News Agency, their state news organization, formally announced to the world that they were going to ignore all of the provisos of Potsdam and of their unwavering refusal to surrender.

In late July of 1945, intelligence intercepts revealed Japan had closed all schools, non-essential industry, and commerce, mobilizing and arming much of its civilian population. Aerial reconnaissance clearly showed massive fortification and underground facility construction underway throughout Japan. They armed and mobilized literally millions of citizens

MacArthur predicted at least a million casualties. General Charles Willoughby, MacArthur's Intelligence Chief, considered that a conservative estimate.

And yet MacArthur was one of the ones that did not believe the bomb was necessary to bring about Japan's surrender.

MacArthur biographer William Manchester has described MacArthur's reaction to the issuance by the Allies of the Potsdam Proclamation to Japan: "...the Potsdam declaration in July, demand[ed] that Japan surrender unconditionally or face 'prompt and utter destruction.' MacArthur was appalled. He knew that the Japanese would never renounce their emperor, and that without him an orderly transition to peace would be impossible anyhow, because his people would never submit to Allied occupation unless he ordered it. Ironically, when the surrender did come, it was conditional, and the condition was a continuation of the imperial reign. Had the General's advice been followed, the resort to atomic weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have been unnecessary."

William Manchester,

American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964

, pg. 512.

Norman Cousins was a consultant to General MacArthur during the American occupation of Japan. Cousins writes of his conversations with MacArthur, "MacArthur's views about the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were starkly different from what the general public supposed." He continues, "When I asked General MacArthur about the decision to drop the bomb, I was surprised to learn he had not even been consulted. What, I asked, would his advice have been? He replied that he saw no military justification for the dropping of the bomb. The war might have ended weeks earlier, he said, if the United States had agreed, as it later did anyway, to the retention of the institution of the emperor."

Norman Cousins,

The Pathology of Power

, pg. 65, 70-71.

And others at the time agreed with him:

Ralph Bard (Under Sec. of the Navy)

On June 28, 1945, a memorandum written by Bard the previous day was given to Sec. of War Henry Stimson. It stated, in part:

"Following the three-power [July 1945 Potsdam] conference emissaries from this country could contact representatives from Japan somewhere on the China Coast and make representations with regard to Russia's position [they were about to declare war on Japan] and at the same time give them some information regarding the proposed use of atomic power, together with whatever assurances the President might care to make with regard to the [retention of the] Emperor of Japan and the treatment of the Japanese nation following unconditional surrender. It seems quite possible to me that this presents the opportunity which the Japanese are looking for.

"I don't see that we have anything in particular to lose in following such a program." He concluded the memorandum by noting, "The only way to find out is to try it out."

Memorandum on the Use of S-1 Bomb, Manhattan Engineer District Records, Harrison-Bundy files, folder # 77, National Archives (also contained in: Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed, 1987 edition, pg. 307-308).

Later Bard related, "...it definitely seemed to me that the Japanese were becoming weaker and weaker. They were surrounded by the Navy. They couldn't get any imports and they couldn't export anything. Naturally, as time went on and the war developed in our favor it was quite logical to hope and expect that with the proper kind of a warning the Japanese would then be in a position to make peace, which would have made it unnecessary for us to drop the bomb and have had to bring Russia in...".

quoted in Len Giovannitti and Fred Freed, The Decision To Drop the Bomb, pg. 144-145, 324.

Bard also asserted, "I think that the Japanese were ready for peace, and they already had approached the Russians and, I think, the Swiss. And that suggestion of [giving] a warning [of the atomic bomb] was a face-saving proposition for them, and one that they could have readily accepted." He continued, "In my opinion, the Japanese war was really won before we ever used the atom bomb. Thus, it wouldn't have been necessary for us to disclose our nuclear position and stimulate the Russians to develop the same thing much more rapidly than they would have if we had not dropped the bomb."

War Was Really Won Before We Used A-Bomb, U.S. News and World Report, 8/15/60, pg. 73-75.

Paul Nitze, Vice Chairman, U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey:

In 1950 Nitze would recommend a massive military buildup, and in the 1980s he was an arms control negotiator in the Reagan administration. In July of 1945 he was assigned the task of writing a strategy for the air attack on Japan. Nitze later wrote:

"The plan I devised was essentially this: Japan was already isolated from the standpoint of ocean shipping. The only remaining means of transportation were the rail network and intercoastal shipping, though our submarines and mines were rapidly eliminating the latter as well. A concentrated air attack on the essential lines of transportation, including railroads and (through the use of the earliest accurately targetable glide bombs, then emerging from development) the Kammon tunnels which connected Honshu with Kyushu, would isolate the Japanese home islands from one another and fragment the enemy's base of operations. I believed that interdiction of the lines of transportation would be sufficiently effective so that additional bombing of urban industrial areas would not be necessary.

"While I was working on the new plan of air attack... concluded that even without the atomic bomb, Japan was likely to surrender in a matter of months. My own view was that Japan would capitulate by November 1945."

Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, pg. 36-37

The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey group, assigned by President Truman to study the air attacks on Japan, produced a report in July of 1946 that was primarily written by Nitze and reflected his reasoning:

"Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945 and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."

quoted in Barton Bernstein, The Atomic Bomb, pg. 52-56.

In his memoir, written in 1989, Nitze repeated, "Even without the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it seemed highly unlikely, given what we found to have been the mood of the Japanese government, that a U.S. invasion of the islands [scheduled for November 1, 1945] would have been necessary."

Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, pg. 44-45.

Brigadier General Carter Clarke (The military intelligence officer in charge of preparing intercepted Japanese cables - the MAGIC summaries - for Truman and his advisors)

"...when we didn't need to do it, and we knew we didn't need to do it, and they knew that we knew we didn't need to do it, we used them as an experiment for two atomic bombs."

Quoted in Gar Alperovitz, The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb, pg. 359.

These are not the musings of Monday morning QBs, or hesitant doves engaging in wishful thinking. And they are far from the only ones at the time to express this view. There were ways to bring about Japan's surrender that need not involve mass civilian annihilation nor a protracted ground invasion. But we were impatient and we wanted to show the world our new toy and that we were the first to get it. To sit back and pretend our real options were so limited as to necessitate such destruction and loss of non-combatant life is the ultimate in self-justification.

[aujeff11 6,243]

Use your common sense, man.

I am. Use yours. Okinawa. Saipan. Iwo Jima. All battles that they were hopelessly outgunned and outmanned, yet they fought tooth and nail. Almost to the last in every battle.

They gave us every indication that an extremely tenacious and deadly defense of their homeland was on the horizon.

In fact, the Japanese Homeland Defense Plan, codenamed Ketsu-Go, had seen to the marshalling of over 12,700 serviceable aircraft, along with the construction of dozens of subterranean hangar facilities, scores of hidden, camoflaged airstrips, and the stockpiling of tens of thousands of gallons of fuel and hundreds of thousands of tons of munitions, from bombs and torpedoes to rockets, mortar rounds, and artillery projectiles, and a few thousand tons of military-grade explosives not encompassed with projectiles. Additionally, in "cottage shops" and under bridges, in basements and in mines and tunnels, military production was continuing at a feverish pace.

The Ketsu-Go plan was for four separate aerial campaigns against the invasion fleet. While 2000 fighters were to contest the skies over Kyushu, an initial 800 plane Kamikaze attack was to engage the fleet during its assembly about the islands over Kyushu. A second force of over 300 planes was to target specifically the aircraft carriers and other ground-fire-capable ships, attacking in waves from all points of the compass.

Over 800 more suicide planes were to target the transports and landing ships.

The Kyushu defense was allotted approximately 2000 additional planes, most of which which were to be used in suicide waves of from 50 to over 100, as the situation merited and circumstances permitted.

The Japanese thought they could stymie the invasion and inflict crippling losses on both the capital ships and escorts and the support ships. Relying not just on air power, they had 40 operational submarines, each fully manned, fueled, and armed. Some 20 destroyers and three cruisers remained operational as well, and were to be used variously to counterattack the invasion fleet and, beached, as fire support platforms.

Additionally, there was a force of some 400 suicide submarines. Little more than manned torpedoes, but deadly, nonetheless. The invasion fleet would come under devastating, unceasing assault from land, sea, and air, before the troops even got to the beaches.

Confident of inflicting staggering losses, though at horrendous cost to themselves, the Japanese anticipated the Americans would falter, back off and, shocked and demoralized, perhaps to offer at least face-saving, less-than-unconditional surrender terms.

Nothing if not meticulous in planning, the Japanese had a fallback plan, should the invasion succeed in lodging troops ashore, as they thought likely.

The most determined and fanatical defense of the war had been prepared. The Japanese High Command had correctly worked out not only when, but almost to the foot where the Americans would attack. They planned an experience very different from that which the island-hopping war had led the Americans to expect. To that point throughout the Pacific War, the Americans invariably had outnumbered their island-defending adversaries.

Broken codes, remember?

You're so right Carl. Of course such an event wont hurt the morale of the people. I'm not even going to get into the discussion of the statistics that serves as an undeniable support to my argument. Statistics such as 87,000 citizens died, 40,000 injured, and over a million families were in displaced. And that was from one night!!

Hundreds of people gave up trying to escape and, with or without their precious bundles, crawled into the holes that served as shelters; their charred bodies were found after the raid. Whole families perished in holes they had dug under their wooden houses because shelter space was scarce in those overpopulated hives of the poor; the house would collapse and burn on top of them, braising them in their holes.

The fire front advanced so rapidly that police often did not have time to evacuate threatened blocks even if a way out were open. And the wind, carrying debris from far away, planted new sprouts of fire in unexpected places. Firemen from the other half of the city tried to move into the inferno or to contain it within its own periphery, but they could not approach it except by going around it into the wind, where their efforts were useless or where everything had already been incinerated. The same thing happened that had terrorized the city during the great fire of 1923: ...under the wind and the gigantic breath of the fire, immense, incandescent vortices rose in a number of places, swirling, flattening sucking whole blocks of houses into their maelstrom of fire.

Wherever there was a canal, people hurled themselves into the water; in shallow places, people waited, half sunk in noxious muck, mouths just above the surface of the water. Hundreds of them were later found dead; not drowned, but asphyxiated by the burning air and smoke. In other places, the water got so hot that the luckless bathers were simply boiled alive. Some of the canals ran directly into the Sumida; when the tide rose, people huddled in them drowned. In Asakusa and Honjo, people crowded onto the bridges, but the spans were made of steel that gradually heated; human clusters clinging to the white-hot railings finally let go, fell into the water and were carried off on the current. Thousands jammed the parks and gardens that lined both banks of the Sumida. As panic brought ever fresh waves of people pressing into the narrow strips of land, those in front were pushed irresistibly toward the river; whole walls of screaming humanity toppled over and disappeared in the deep water. Thousands of drowned bodies were later recovered from the Sumida estuary.

Sirens sounded the all-clear around 5 A.M. - those still working in the half of the city that had not been attacked; the other half burned for twelve hours more. I talked to someone who had inspected the scene an March 11. What was most awful, my witness told me, was having to get off his bicycle every couple of feet to pass over the countless bodies strewn through the streets. There was still a light wind blowing and some of the bodies, reduced to ashes, were simply scattering like sand. In many sectors, passage was blocked by whole incinerated crowds."

[AUDub 11,153]

You're so right Carl. Of course such an event wont hurt the morale of the people. I'm not even going to get into the discussion of the statistics that serves as an undeniable support to my argument. Statistics such as 87,000 citizens died, 40,000 injured, and over a million families were in displaced. And that was from one night!!

Oh, for heaven's sake. I didn't say Japanese morale wasn't affected or that the Japanese people didn't suffer horribly. Let me quote myself:

Given the belligerent language of the Japanese press and their supposedly secret communications, they gave no indications that the firebombing was affecting Japanese morale (heating the water up gradually). Compare that with the sheer shock of the atom bomb (dropping the frog into a pot of boiling water).

All we saw was the belligerent posturing of their press, the apparent resolve to continue the fight per their communications and the obvious defensive preparations.

Gulain's book, where you got that quote, wasn't even published until 1981! after the war

[aujeff11 6,243]

You're so right Carl. Of course such an event wont hurt the morale of the people. I'm not even going to get into the discussion of the statistics that serves as an undeniable support to my argument. Statistics such as 87,000 citizens died, 40,000 injured, and over a million families were in displaced. And that was from one night!!

Oh, for heaven's sake. I didn't say Japanese moral wasn't affected or that the Japanese people didn't suffer horribly. Let me quote myself:

Given the belligerent language of the Japanese press and their supposedly secret communications, they gave no indications that the firebombing was affecting Japanese morale (heating the water up gradually). Compare that with the sheer shock of the atom bomb (dropping the frog into a pot of boiling water).

All we saw was the belligerent posturing of their press, the apparent resolve to continue the fight per their communications and the obvious defensive preparations.

Gulain's book, where you got that quote, wasn't even published until 1981!

The quote was from a reporter that was in Japan at the time of the firebombings and you certainly qualified your answer enough to imply that Japanese morale wasn't down from the attacks but yet you created enough wiggle room to slither away once you are pinned down. Good job.

Robert Guillain was a French reporter assigned to Japan in 1938. He stayed on after war broke in Europe and was trapped in the country after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor. He returned to France in 1946 and published a book recounting his experiences. He was in Tokyo on the night of March 9, 1945 when the wet winter weather made a surprise change to mild temperatures and gusty winds. We join his story as the sound of air-raid sirens pierce the night and the first B-29s make their appearance:

[AUDub 11,153]

The quote was from a reporter that was in Japan at the time of the firebombings and you certainly qualified your answer enough to imply that Japanese morale wasn't down from the attacks but yet you created enough wiggle room to slither away once you are pinned down. Good job.

Horse hockey. Don't fault me for YOUR lack of reading comprehension.

[aujeff11 6,243]

The quote was from a reporter that was in Japan at the time of the firebombings and you certainly qualified your answer enough to imply that Japanese morale wasn't down from the attacks but yet you created enough wiggle room to slither away once you are pinned down. Good job.

Horse hockey. Don't fault me for YOUR lack of reading comprehension.

Oh Okay. So every time the morale is down, it has to be in print. You certainly have a rich career in the field of propaganda ahead of you, sir.

Japan had the emperor on a white horse for a reason.... To appear God like.

[AUDub 11,153]

Oh Okay. So every time the morale is down, it has to be in print. You certainly have a rich career in the field of propaganda ahead of you, sir.

Japan had the emperor on a white horse for a reason.... To appear God like.

[aujeff11 6,243]

Oh Okay. So every time the morale is down, it has to be in print. You certainly have a rich career in the field of propaganda ahead of you, sir.

Japan had the emperor on a white horse for a reason.... To appear God like.

Regardless of whether you mean to or not, you are implying that if there are no indicators, then their morale must be high.

[AUDub 11,153]

Regardless of whether you mean to or not, you are implying that if there are no indicators, then their morale must be high.

It just means it may not be low enough for them to throw in the towel.

[aujeff11 6,243]

Regardless of whether you mean to or not, you are implying that if there are no indicators, then their morale must be high.

It just means it may not be low enough for them to throw in the towel.

Oh okay. Well great chat today. As soon as I head to the football forum and bitch about Duke Williams some more, I will be racking out.

[AUDub 11,153]

Regardless of whether you mean to or not, you are implying that if there are no indicators, then their morale must be high.

It just means it may not be low enough for them to throw in the towel.

Oh okay. Well great chat today. As soon as I head to the football forum and bitch about Duke Williams some more, I will be racking out.

lol

Mea Culpa on the quotes, by the way. I've corrected them.

[AUDub 11,153]

And yet MacArthur was one of the ones that did not believe the bomb was necessary to bring about Japan's surrender.

MacArthur biographer William Manchester has described MacArthur's reaction to the issuance by the Allies of the Potsdam Proclamation to Japan: "...the Potsdam declaration in July, demand[ed] that Japan surrender unconditionally or face 'prompt and utter destruction.' MacArthur was appalled.

He knew that the Japanese would never renounce their emperor, and that without him an orderly transition to peace would be impossible anyhow, because his people would never submit to Allied occupation unless he ordered it. Ironically, when the surrender did come, it was conditional, and the condition was a continuation of the imperial reign. Had the General's advice been followed, the resort to atomic weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have been unnecessary."

William Manchester,

American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964

, pg. 512.

Norman Cousins was a consultant to General MacArthur during the American occupation of Japan. Cousins writes of his conversations with MacArthur, "MacArthur's views about the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were starkly different from what the general public supposed." He continues, "When I asked General MacArthur about the decision to drop the bomb, I was surprised to learn he had not even been consulted. What, I asked, would his advice have been? He replied that he saw no military justification for the dropping of the bomb.

The war might have ended weeks earlier, he said, if the United States had agreed, as it later did anyway, to the retention of the institution of the emperor."

Norman Cousins, The Pathology of Power, pg. 65, 70-71.

Emphasis mine.

Cool. Thanks again, Titan.

Remember my post on Togo and his fruitless overtures to the Russians yesterday?

Sato finally told his boss that the best Japan could get was "virtually the equivalent of unconditional surrender". Togo replied (July 17th) that they were not interested in getting the USSR to broker a deal that was "anything like unconditional surrender". Sato tried (July 18th) to clarify that when he said "unconditional surrender" he of course meant that the emperor would remain so. Togo's (July 21st) reply was not "Sure!" or even "That doesn't go far enough, but it's a step in the right direction", it was "we are unable to consent to it under any circumstances whatever," and Japan is totally going to fight to the death.

Primary sources here, here and here.

I included parentheses and dates this time so you could find them in the linked sources. Stick with the first one. I only included the other two in case you needed proof these MAGIC intercepts in the first link are legit.

So the member of the Big Six most interested in peace was explicitly told that that was the best offer (keeping the emperor) Japan could get and he rejected it out of hand. And not only do we know that now, Truman knew it at the time. We can read the same cracked messages that Truman did. If Togo wasn't even remotely interested, how could the far less dovish members of the War Council be convinced?

For some odd reason, I don't think the people pulling the strings were quite that sentimental.

I'll get to the rest tomorrow.

[Mikey 16,614]

I was seven weeks old when my father was killed in action fighting Japanese forces in the Pacific. Thus, I grew up knowing many, many people, both military and civilian, male and female that lived through the war. In my time at Auburn many of my professors were WW2 veterans.

Over all those years and knowing all those people that lived through the war I never met one that said dropping those bombs was a bad idea. I'm going to believe the opinions of those that were there at the time over the second-guessing of revisionist historians.

I think using the A-bombs was the correct move, dead is dead and the Japanese that died from atomic bombings are no more dead than those that flew suicide planes into American ships. On the other hand, the half-million plus that would have died in a land invasion lived on instead. Dropping those two bombs and ending the war quickly was the biggest favor we could have done for that particular enemy.

[aujeff11 6,243]

I was seven weeks old when my father was killed in action fighting Japanese forces in the Pacific. Thus, I grew up knowing many, many people, both military and civilian, male and female that lived through the war. In my time at Auburn many of my professors were WW2 veterans.

Over all those years and knowing all those people that lived through the war I never met one that said dropping those bombs was a bad idea. I'm going to believe the opinions of those that were there at the time over the second-guessing of revisionist historians.

I think using the A-bombs was the correct move, dead is dead and the Japanese that died from atomic bombings are no more dead than those that flew suicide planes into American ships. On the other hand, the half-million plus that would have died in a land invasion lived on instead. Dropping those two bombs and ending the war quickly was the biggest favor we could have done for that particular enemy.

Sorry to hear about your dad dieing over there. However, just because every American you have known supported the bombings doesn't mean that the bombings were justified. I figured you were old enough to realize that. Dead is dead. How powerful.

[TitanTiger 20,498]

I was seven weeks old when my father was killed in action fighting Japanese forces in the Pacific. Thus, I grew up knowing many, many people, both military and civilian, male and female that lived through the war. In my time at Auburn many of my professors were WW2 veterans.

Over all those years and knowing all those people that lived through the war I never met one that said dropping those bombs was a bad idea. I'm going to believe the opinions of those that were there at the time over the second-guessing of revisionist historians.

This is a strawman because no one is quoting revisionist historians. They are quoting people who were actually involved in the war at the time, people who were involved in putting together war strategy and intelligence gathering. Generals and admirals who were serving in WWII.

I think using the A-bombs was the correct move, dead is dead and the Japanese that died from atomic bombings are no more dead than those that flew suicide planes into American ships. On the other hand, the half-million plus that would have died in a land invasion lived on instead. Dropping those two bombs and ending the war quickly was the biggest favor we could have done for that particular enemy.

Another strawman, as it is very much in dispute that the only alternative to dropping those bombs was a land invasion.

You guys just keep tossing this line out there as if it's some stone-cold fact, when in reality it's far from that.

[augolf1716 21,200]

Interesting discussion

[AUDub 11,153]

Interesting discussion

It is.

[quietfan 233]

Having expressed my personal view of the Hiroshima/Nagasaki bombing already, I'm not taking sides in this extended discussion. I've enjoyed some of the links/sources posted by all. It is all very interesting. But WWII history isn't near the top of my curiosity ladder right now. (Although as a child/teenager, I couldn't read enough about it..)

But I want to make a point about the logic behind these last two points...not to say they are necessarily incorrect, and certainly not to denigrate the bravery or sacrifices of those who fought and/or died:

I was seven weeks old when my father was killed in action fighting Japanese forces in the Pacific. Thus, I grew up knowing many, many people, both military and civilian, male and female that lived through the war. In my time at Auburn many of my professors were WW2 veterans.

Over all those years and knowing all those people that lived through the war I never met one that said dropping those bombs was a bad idea. I'm going to believe the opinions of those that were there at the time over the second-guessing of revisionist historians.

This is a strawman because no one is quoting revisionist historians. They are quoting people who were actually involved in the war at the time, people who were involved in putting together war strategy and intelligence gathering. Generals and admirals who were serving in WWII.

I've known many WWII vets in my 61 year lifetime, including a father-in-law and four uncles among others. While I do not question the personal anecdotes of those who lived through it, I don't think merely having fought in the war makes one an expert in strategy, tactics, international diplomacy, or foreign policy. If anything, personal experience is more likely to lead to personal bias. Actually, for those not near the top of the national chain of command involved in the decision making process with full access to intelligence sources, their military training and personal experiences would tend to make them more likely to be biased or to accept the "company line" without question: Following orders and not questioning superiors is a valued trait in any successful military force.

I think using the A-bombs was the correct move, dead is dead and the Japanese that died from atomic bombings are no more dead than those that flew suicide planes into American ships. On the other hand, the half-million plus that would have died in a land invasion lived on instead. Dropping those two bombs and ending the war quickly was the biggest favor we could have done for that particular enemy.

Another strawman, as it is very much in dispute that the only alternative to dropping those bombs was a land invasion.

You guys just keep tossing this line out there as if it's some stone-cold fact, when in reality it's far from that.

Exactly. While the possibility of a fight to the death against a nation of crazed Samurai was a factor that Allied strategists certainly had to consider, it was by no means the ONLY factor to consider in their planning. There is no rational reason to accept it as certainty or "stone-cold" fact. Casualty projections in such an event, either our own or among the Japanese population, are certainly nothing but speculation. The only actually "fact" is that since an invasion never occurred, we can't know for sure what might have happened in such an invasion. And as I mentioned earlier, the fact that the Japanese leadership DID surrender in the end raises valid questions regarding their unyielding dedication to a supposed "death before dishonor" suicidal Samurai ideal.

And finally, regarding "revisionist" history:

Like most serious academic subjects, history (as the study or analysis of historical events) is always revisionist. If not, why bother to teach anything beyond what we believed years, decades, or centuries ago? "Revision" is not some sort of bad word or evil influence in academic pursuits. To the contrary, refusal to consider new ideas or to correct erroneous misconceptions is a detriment to critical thinking.

[Mikey 16,614]

Some of you here seem to think that Japan, invaded, would have behaved differently from Japan, in other places where they fought to the death. I don't. Why would the leopard change its spots?

To be repetitive, those I knew who lived through it have a near-unanimous opinion of the A-bombing. I tend to accept first hand experience over what's being kicked around decades later. Did they have personal bias? Almost certainly, and for good reason. It was their comrades in arms and family members who were dying every day at the hands of the Japanese.

One fact is irrefutable: Shortly after those bombs were dropped the war stopped. Any other possible scenario that goes "yes but this way might have..." is nothing but speculation or wishful thinking. Little Boy and Fat Man got the job done quickly and efficiently.

[japantiger 4,051]

Yep...I tend to favor the opinion of those most impacted by the decision (and most likely to die) vs someone who was going to be a long way off when it all went down. Fact is "Downfall" was already in motion...we were going to invade. My Dad was on Eniwetok training for the invasion along with most of what was formerly Patton's 3rd Army. This is not speculation...and casualties were going to be horrendous on both sides.