At Hiroshima’s 70th Anniversary, Japan Again Mourns Dawn of Atomic Age

[TitanTiger 20,498]

I also understand that nations we understood to be evil did lots of evil things. It's a big reason why we, the good guys here, went to war with them.

We were actually cool with being isolationists... by a good majority. Until Pearl Harbor happened.

We were. But there was a sizable contingent of people who felt we needed to get involved before then.

As I said, it was a "big reason", not the sole reason or even the #1 reason.

[Strychnine 1,802]

I also understand that nations we understood to be evil did lots of evil things. It's a big reason why we, the good guys here, went to war with them.

We were actually cool with being isolationists... by a good majority. Until Pearl Harbor happened.

We were. But there was a sizable contingent of people who felt we needed to get involved before then.

As I said, it was a "big reason", not the sole reason or even the #1 reason.

And Pearl Harbor was also not indiscriminate targeting of civilians by the Japanese.

[Mims44 1,872]

I also understand that nations we understood to be evil did lots of evil things. It's a big reason why we, the good guys here, went to war with them.

We were actually cool with being isolationists... by a good majority. Until Pearl Harbor happened.

We were. But there was a sizable contingent of people who felt we needed to get involved before then.

As I said, it was a "big reason", not the sole reason or even the #1 reason.

And Pearl Harbor was also not indiscriminate targeting of civilians by the Japanese.

Nope, it was the killing of peaceful men and women not involved in any formal conflict with Japan at all.

A surprise peacetime attack on an isolationist country...

[TitanTiger 20,498]

I also understand that nations we understood to be evil did lots of evil things. It's a big reason why we, the good guys here, went to war with them.

We were actually cool with being isolationists... by a good majority. Until Pearl Harbor happened.

We were. But there was a sizable contingent of people who felt we needed to get involved before then.

As I said, it was a "big reason", not the sole reason or even the #1 reason.

And Pearl Harbor was also not indiscriminate targeting of civilians by the Japanese.

Nope, it was the killing of peaceful men and women not involved in any formal conflict with Japan at all.

A surprise peacetime attack on an isolationist country...

No one is claiming it wasn't an evil act. But it is categorically different to attack a military installation and soldiers than it is to bomb a civilian population center. To even begin to truly equate the two, the Japanese would have had to instead have chosen to attack Honolulu, bombing hotels and resorts and such.

[AUloggerhead 2,238]

I also understand that nations we understood to be evil did lots of evil things. It's a big reason why we, the good guys here, went to war with them.

We were actually cool with being isolationists... by a good majority. Until Pearl Harbor happened.

We were. But there was a sizable contingent of people who felt we needed to get involved before then.

As I said, it was a "big reason", not the sole reason or even the #1 reason.

And Pearl Harbor was also not indiscriminate targeting of civilians by the Japanese.

Nope, it was the killing of peaceful men and women not involved in any formal conflict with Japan at all.

A surprise peacetime attack on an isolationist country...

No one is claiming it wasn't an evil act. But it is categorically different to attack a military installation and soldiers than it is to bomb a civilian population center. To even begin to truly equate the two, the Japanese would have had to instead have chosen to attack Honolulu, bombing hotels and resorts and such.

Hiroshima was home to the 2nd Army HQ which was responsible for the defense of all southern Japan, in addition to being a communications center & transportation hub. Nagasaki was a principle port with shipyards & docks, and contained military arms factories such as the Mitsubishi Steel & Arms Works and the Mitsubishi-Urakami Ordnance Works (torpedo factory.)

[TitanTiger 20,498]

I also understand that nations we understood to be evil did lots of evil things. It's a big reason why we, the good guys here, went to war with them.

We were actually cool with being isolationists... by a good majority. Until Pearl Harbor happened.

We were. But there was a sizable contingent of people who felt we needed to get involved before then.

As I said, it was a "big reason", not the sole reason or even the #1 reason.

And Pearl Harbor was also not indiscriminate targeting of civilians by the Japanese.

Nope, it was the killing of peaceful men and women not involved in any formal conflict with Japan at all.

A surprise peacetime attack on an isolationist country...

No one is claiming it wasn't an evil act. But it is categorically different to attack a military installation and soldiers than it is to bomb a civilian population center. To even begin to truly equate the two, the Japanese would have had to instead have chosen to attack Honolulu, bombing hotels and resorts and such.

Hiroshima was home to the 2nd Army HQ which was responsible for the defense of all southern Japan, in addition to being a communications center & transportation hub. Nagasaki was a principle port with shipyards & docks, and contained military arms factories such as the Mitsubishi Steel & Arms Works and the Mitsubishi-Urakami Ordnance Works (torpedo factory.)

Hiroshima and Nagasaki were primarily civilian population centers. Had we wanted to attack the 2nd Army HQ, transportation and comm hubs, shipyards, factories and docks, we could have done so in a more specific fashion. The dropping of these bombs was not about taking those out. It was designed to "shock and awe" by inflicting mass civilian casualties with the threat of many hundreds of thousands more if we dropped one on Tokyo.

[aujeff11 6,243]

I also understand that nations we understood to be evil did lots of evil things. It's a big reason why we, the good guys here, went to war with them.

We were actually cool with being isolationists... by a good majority. Until Pearl Harbor happened.

We were. But there was a sizable contingent of people who felt we needed to get involved before then.

As I said, it was a "big reason", not the sole reason or even the #1 reason.

And Pearl Harbor was also not indiscriminate targeting of civilians by the Japanese.

Nope, it was the killing of peaceful men and women not involved in any formal conflict with Japan at all.

A surprise peacetime attack on an isolationist country...

No one is claiming it wasn't an evil act. But it is categorically different to attack a military installation and soldiers than it is to bomb a civilian population center. To even begin to truly equate the two, the Japanese would have had to instead have chosen to attack Honolulu, bombing hotels and resorts and such.

Hiroshima was home to the 2nd Army HQ which was responsible for the defense of all southern Japan, in addition to being a communications center & transportation hub. Nagasaki was a principle port with shipyards & docks, and contained military arms factories such as the Mitsubishi Steel & Arms Works and the Mitsubishi-Urakami Ordnance Works (torpedo factory.)

Knock out the base, the docks, whatever other key infrastructures there are without annihilating a whole city then. Do you really have to kill all of Columbus Ga. just to attack Fort Benning?

[AUloggerhead 2,238]

Hiroshima and Nagasaki were primarily civilian population centers. Had we wanted to attack the 2nd Army HQ, transportation and comm hubs, shipyards, factories and docks, we could have done so in a more specific fashion. The dropping of these bombs was not about taking those out. It was designed to "shock and awe" by inflicting mass civilian casualties with the threat of many hundreds of thousands more if we dropped one on Tokyo.

I was just pointing out that legitimate military targets were within both of those cities. Aerial bombing during WWII was neither pinpoint nor precise -- we were still several decades away from being able to deliver a single conventional bomb to a specific target. Hence, the mass bombing techniques developed by the Brits & the US.

[Strychnine 1,802]

Hiroshima and Nagasaki were primarily civilian population centers. Had we wanted to attack the 2nd Army HQ, transportation and comm hubs, shipyards, factories and docks, we could have done so in a more specific fashion. The dropping of these bombs was not about taking those out. It was designed to "shock and awe" by inflicting mass civilian casualties with the threat of many hundreds of thousands more if we dropped one on Tokyo.

I was just pointing out that legitimate military targets were within both of those cities. Aerial bombing during WWII was neither pinpoint nor precise -- we were still several decades away from being able to deliver a single conventional bomb to a specific target. Hence, the mass bombing techniques developed by the Brits & the US.

While aerial bombing was indeed neither pinpoint nor precise, it was at least accurate enough that bombs could consistently be put within a few thousand feet of a target rather than engaging in random bombing of a city and hoping for the best. They were certainly far more precise than the blast radius of a nuclear weapon.

[Mikey 16,614]

....... I'll leave with this article written by a professor at Sandhurst: http://www.bbc.co.uk...uclear_01.shtml .......

Anyone commenting in this thread should take the time to read this link provided by AUloggerhead. Less than 15 minutes will get it done.

[AUDub 11,153]

....... I'll leave with this article written by a professor at Sandhurst: http://www.bbc.co.uk...uclear_01.shtml .......

Anyone commenting in this thread should take the time to read this link provided by AUloggerhead. Less than 15 minutes will get it done.

I agree. Excellent. I've been harping on this...

It has also been shown that the Japanese were demanding very much more than a guarantee of the emperor’s safety, for example a guarantee of no Allied occupation of Japan, before they would consider serious negotiations.

...since page #4.

The idea that things would have been hunky-dory if they were allowed to keep the emperor was bull****. They wanted to keep their empire. That's essentially asking to stop fighting in exchange for nothing. Asking to keep the empire is a hoax offer. Japan was a threat to the region and the allies would not abide anything remotely resembling the conclusion of WWI.

[AUloggerhead 2,238]

Hiroshima and Nagasaki were primarily civilian population centers. Had we wanted to attack the 2nd Army HQ, transportation and comm hubs, shipyards, factories and docks, we could have done so in a more specific fashion. The dropping of these bombs was not about taking those out. It was designed to "shock and awe" by inflicting mass civilian casualties with the threat of many hundreds of thousands more if we dropped one on Tokyo.

I was just pointing out that legitimate military targets were within both of those cities. Aerial bombing during WWII was neither pinpoint nor precise -- we were still several decades away from being able to deliver a single conventional bomb to a specific target. Hence, the mass bombing techniques developed by the Brits & the US.

While aerial bombing was indeed neither pinpoint nor precise, it was at least accurate enough that bombs could consistently be put within a few thousand feet of a target rather than engaging in random bombing of a city and hoping for the best. They were certainly far more precise than the blast radius of a nuclear weapon.

If by "consistently putting bombs within a 1,000-ft of the target area" you mean 20%, then I agree with you:

... For the U.S. Army Air Forces, daylight bombing was normal based upon box formations for defence from fighters. Bombing was coordinated through a lead aircraft but although still nominally precision bombing (as opposed to the area bombing carried out by RAF Bomber Command) the result of bombing from high level was still spread over an area. Before the war on practice ranges, some USAAF crews were able to produce very accurate results, but over Europe with weather and German fighters and anti-aircraft guns and the limited training for new crews this level of accuracy was impossible to reproduce. The US defined the target area as being a 1,000 ft (300 m) radius circle around the target point - for the majority of USAAF attacks only about 20% of the bombs dropped struck in this area. The U.S. daytime bombing raids were more effective in reducing German defences by engaging the German Luftwaffe than destruction of the means of aircraft production. ...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Precision_bombing

In WWII, massed bombers dropping enormous tonnage of bombs were the only way to ensure destruction of the target. "Precision day-light bombing" was an oxymoron.

[quietfan 233]

Hiroshima and Nagasaki were primarily civilian population centers. Had we wanted to attack the 2nd Army HQ, transportation and comm hubs, shipyards, factories and docks, we could have done so in a more specific fashion. The dropping of these bombs was not about taking those out. It was designed to "shock and awe" by inflicting mass civilian casualties with the threat of many hundreds of thousands more if we dropped one on Tokyo.

I was just pointing out that legitimate military targets were within both of those cities. Aerial bombing during WWII was neither pinpoint nor precise -- we were still several decades away from being able to deliver a single conventional bomb to a specific target. Hence, the mass bombing techniques developed by the Brits & the US.

While aerial bombing was indeed neither pinpoint nor precise, it was at least accurate enough that bombs could consistently be put within a few thousand feet of a target rather than engaging in random bombing of a city and hoping for the best. They were certainly far more precise than the blast radius of a nuclear weapon.

If by "consistently putting bombs within a 1,000-ft of the target area" you mean 20%, then I agree with you:

... For the U.S. Army Air Forces, daylight bombing was normal based upon box formations for defence from fighters. Bombing was coordinated through a lead aircraft but although still nominally precision bombing (as opposed to the area bombing carried out by RAF Bomber Command) the result of bombing from high level was still spread over an area. Before the war on practice ranges, some USAAF crews were able to produce very accurate results, but over Europe with weather and German fighters and anti-aircraft guns and the limited training for new crews this level of accuracy was impossible to reproduce. The US defined the target area as being a 1,000 ft (300 m) radius circle around the target point - for the majority of USAAF attacks only about 20% of the bombs dropped struck in this area. The U.S. daytime bombing raids were more effective in reducing German defences by engaging the German Luftwaffe than destruction of the means of aircraft production. ...

https://en.wikipedia...ecision_bombing

In WWII, massed bombers dropping enormous tonnage of bombs were the only way to ensure destruction of the target. "Precision day-light bombing" was an oxymoron.

Honest questions and not pronouncements on my part:

1. Was there any significant fighter or other anti-aircraft opposition remaining over Japan by summer of '45 to impede daylight bombing? (Or as a corollary: Could the B-29's have safely flown lower for better accuracy?)

2. Wouldn't military/industrial targets have been hit with high-explosive bombs rather than the incendiary bombs targeted against wooden residential structures?

[TitanTiger 20,498]

....... I'll leave with this article written by a professor at Sandhurst: http://www.bbc.co.uk...uclear_01.shtml .......

Anyone commenting in this thread should take the time to read this link provided by AUloggerhead. Less than 15 minutes will get it done.

I agree. Excellent. I've been harping on this...

It has also been shown that the Japanese were demanding very much more than a guarantee of the emperor’s safety, for example a guarantee of no Allied occupation of Japan, before they would consider serious negotiations.

...since page #4.

The idea that things would have been hunky-dory if they were allowed to keep the emperor was bull****. They wanted to keep their empire. That's essentially asking to stop fighting in exchange for nothing. Asking to keep the empire is a hoax offer. Japan was a threat to the region and the allies would not abide anything remotely resembling the conclusion of WWI.

The point is, they were reaching out to surrender. They were making the first move. It was a sign of weakness. Just because they ask for something doesn't mean you have to give it to them. You come back with your demands and make it clear that certain things (such as keeping the empire) are not up for negotiation.

This ridiculous demand is not proof that negotiations for surrender to avoid immolating 130,000+ people were futile. To the contrary, they are proof that the Japanese were beginning to see that they were going to lose.

[AUDub 11,153]

....... I'll leave with this article written by a professor at Sandhurst: http://www.bbc.co.uk...uclear_01.shtml .......

Anyone commenting in this thread should take the time to read this link provided by AUloggerhead. Less than 15 minutes will get it done.

I agree. Excellent. I've been harping on this...

It has also been shown that the Japanese were demanding very much more than a guarantee of the emperor’s safety, for example a guarantee of no Allied occupation of Japan, before they would consider serious negotiations.

...since page #4.

The idea that things would have been hunky-dory if they were allowed to keep the emperor was bull****. They wanted to keep their empire. That's essentially asking to stop fighting in exchange for nothing. Asking to keep the empire is a hoax offer. Japan was a threat to the region and the allies would not abide anything remotely resembling the conclusion of WWI.

The point is, they were reaching out to surrender. They were making the first move. It was a sign of weakness. Just because they ask for something doesn't mean you have to give it to them. You come back with your demands and make it clear that certain things (such as keeping the empire) are not up for negotiation.

This ridiculous demand is not proof that negotiations for surrender to avoid immolating 130,000+ people were futile. To the contrary, they are proof that the Japanese were beginning to see that they were going to lose.

No. Only Togo and Sato. Clandestinely and without the rest of the Supreme War Council's (most importantly, the military's) approval. These negotiations were essentially meaningless.

Japan never negotiated with us and never meant to.

This also shoots down MacArthur's thoughts that they would surrender if allowed to keep the emperor. Togo said, explicitly, that this was not the case.

[Strychnine 1,802]

Hiroshima and Nagasaki were primarily civilian population centers. Had we wanted to attack the 2nd Army HQ, transportation and comm hubs, shipyards, factories and docks, we could have done so in a more specific fashion. The dropping of these bombs was not about taking those out. It was designed to "shock and awe" by inflicting mass civilian casualties with the threat of many hundreds of thousands more if we dropped one on Tokyo.

I was just pointing out that legitimate military targets were within both of those cities. Aerial bombing during WWII was neither pinpoint nor precise -- we were still several decades away from being able to deliver a single conventional bomb to a specific target. Hence, the mass bombing techniques developed by the Brits & the US.

While aerial bombing was indeed neither pinpoint nor precise, it was at least accurate enough that bombs could consistently be put within a few thousand feet of a target rather than engaging in random bombing of a city and hoping for the best. They were certainly far more precise than the blast radius of a nuclear weapon.

If by "consistently putting bombs within a 1,000-ft of the target area" you mean 20%, then I agree with you:

I said "consistently put bombs within a few thousand feet", not within 1,000-ft. While the Norden bombsight was not a magical Paveway-esque precision delivery system, using it to attempt precision does at least constitute an effort to minimize civilian casualties. The deployment of nuclear weapons is the opposite of that.

[Strychnine 1,802]

....... I'll leave with this article written by a professor at Sandhurst: http://www.bbc.co.uk...uclear_01.shtml .......

Anyone commenting in this thread should take the time to read this link provided by AUloggerhead. Less than 15 minutes will get it done.

I agree. Excellent. I've been harping on this...

It has also been shown that the Japanese were demanding very much more than a guarantee of the emperor's safety, for example a guarantee of no Allied occupation of Japan, before they would consider serious negotiations.

...since page #4.

The idea that things would have been hunky-dory if they were allowed to keep the emperor was bull****. They wanted to keep their empire. That's essentially asking to stop fighting in exchange for nothing. Asking to keep the empire is a hoax offer. Japan was a threat to the region and the allies would not abide anything remotely resembling the conclusion of WWI.

The point is, they were reaching out to surrender. They were making the first move. It was a sign of weakness. Just because they ask for something doesn't mean you have to give it to them. You come back with your demands and make it clear that certain things (such as keeping the empire) are not up for negotiation.

This ridiculous demand is not proof that negotiations for surrender to avoid immolating 130,000+ people were futile. To the contrary, they are proof that the Japanese were beginning to see that they were going to lose.

No. Only Togo and Sato. Clandestinely and without the rest of the Supreme War Council's (most importantly, the military's) approval. These negotiations were essentially meaningless.

Japan never negotiated with us and never meant to.

This also shoots down MacArthur's thoughts that they would surrender if allowed to keep the emperor. Togo said, explicitly, that this was not the case.

And they would have held to that indefinitely despite an effective blockade of ships, mines, and aircraft (which was in place)? They had no means of mounting effective offensive operations any more, and no means to consistently obtain the imports they were reliant upon. We successfully did to Japan what Germany tried to do to Britain. Unlike Britain, Japan had no ally willing to expend considerable resources (and losses) to keep them supplied. There was no need to rush to invasion or obliterating cities.

[AUDub 11,153]

And they would have held to that indefinitely despite an effective blockade of ships, mines, and aircraft (which was in place)? They had no means of mounting effective offensive operations any more, and no means to consistently obtain the imports they were reliant upon. We successfully did to Japan what Germany tried to do to Britain. Unlike Britain, Japan had no ally willing to expend considerable resources (and losses) to keep them supplied. There was no need to rush to invasion or obliterating cities.

Try putting yourself in Truman's shoes. It was genuinely believed that Japan would not surrender and force us to take the nation by hand. Again, the Japanese were not known for their propensity for surrender. Remember the bloody island hopping strategy in which they fought to the last in pretty much every battle? The conventional wisdom of the day, which informed the decision which Truman made in close consultation with General Marshall, was that an invasion of the home islands would have been a blood bath. This was based upon the horrible slaughter they willingly endured on Saipan and Okinawa. On Saipan, women and children committed suicide by jumping from cliffs, and when they would not willingly do so, they were driven off the cliffs by soldiers weilding bayonets. Wounded soldiers would strap grenades to their bodies under their tunics with strings through the pins in the hope of taking as many Americans with them as possible. Just or not, the view was that the Japanese would rather die than surrender, and that they would kill as many Americans as possible when they did.

I often wonder why it's so popular to second guess Truman or to ascribe cynical motives to him. I see no reliable support for such positions. We had to be as convincing as possible.

Or, I suppose watching a million of them starve to death from afar while they threw whatever they had at our blockade would have been much more palatable to some.

[AUDub 11,153]

Or, I suppose watching a million of them starve to death from afar while they threw whatever they had at our blockade would have been much more palatable to some.

Just to add. Also letting Russia take pretty much all of the Japanese territory on the East Asian mainland.

[Strychnine 1,802]

And they would have held to that indefinitely despite an effective blockade of ships, mines, and aircraft (which was in place)? They had no means of mounting effective offensive operations any more, and no means to consistently obtain the imports they were reliant upon. We successfully did to Japan what Germany tried to do to Britain. Unlike Britain, Japan had no ally willing to expend considerable resources (and losses) to keep them supplied. There was no need to rush to invasion or obliterating cities.

Try putting yourself in Truman's shoes. It was genuinely believed that Japan would not surrender and force us to take the nation by hand. Again, the Japanese were not known for their propensity for surrender. Remember the bloody island hopping strategy in which they fought to the last in pretty much every battle? The conventional wisdom of the day, which informed the decision which Truman made in close consultation with General Marshall, was that an invasion of the home islands would have been a blood bath. This was based upon the horrible slaughter they willingly endured on Saipan and Okinawa. On Saipan, women and children committed suicide by jumping from cliffs, and when they would not willingly do so, they were driven off the cliffs by soldiers weilding bayonets. Wounded soldiers would strap grenades to their bodies under their tunics, with strings through the pins, in the hope of taking as many Americans with them as possible. Just or not, the view was that the Japanese would rather die than surrender, and that they would kill as many Americans as possible when they did. I often wonder why it's so popular to second guess Truman or to ascribe cynical motives to him. I see no reliable support for such positions.

We had to be as convincing as possible.

Or, I suppose watching a million of them starve to death from afar would have been much more palatable to some.

I ascribe no cynical motives to Truman, and I understand the reasons that he gave the orders. Why nuclear weapons were deployed is not in question, and nothing can now change the fact that they were deployed. However, I consider their deployment to be morally unjustifiable and a war crime. I think the same of the firebombing campaign that preceded them. I do not believe the ends can justify the means when the means involve the nearly instant death of over 100,000 civilians.

[AUloggerhead 2,238]

Honest questions and not pronouncements on my part:

1. Was there any significant fighter or other anti-aircraft opposition remaining over Japan by summer of '45 to impede daylight bombing? (Or as a corollary: Could the B-29's have safely flown lower for better accuracy?)

2. Wouldn't military/industrial targets have been hit with high-explosive bombs rather than the incendiary bombs targeted against wooden residential structures?

Here's a good summary of the bombing campaign:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_raids_on_Japan

The combat radius of a B-29 was 1600 miles, and the bases in the Marianas were 1,500 miles from Tokyo. Some daylight "precision" attacks with high-explosive bombs were successful against industrial targets but there wasn't enough sustained success to warrant continuing. Too slow and not enough results to show for it. The long flights, weather & cloud cover all combined to thwart many missions. The appointment of Curtis LeMay to command the bomber forces was significant. It was he who changed tactics to (relatively) low altitude, night-time firebombing missions to: avoid the day-time fighters & AA defenses, and to ensure destruction of manufacturing capability. Like the Germans had, the Japanese adopted dispersal of a lot of their manufacturing capability from large industrial plants to small workshops as a countermeasure to bombing. Area bombing countered the dispersal strategy.

[AUloggerhead 2,238]

I said "consistently put bombs within a few thousand feet", not within 1,000-ft. While the Norden bombsight was not a magical Paveway-esque precision delivery system, using it to attempt precision does at least constitute an effort to minimize civilian casualties. The deployment of nuclear weapons is the opposite of that.

a

A "few" thousand feet? How many is that ... 2 or 3? You do realize that a little over midway between 2-3,000 feet is 1/2 mile? Missing the target by 1/2 mile (or more) is generally considered ... missing the target. There's a reason the Army Air Corps decided to use 'within 1,000 feet' as a measure of conventional bombing accuracy and not 'within a few thousand feet.'

[AUDub 11,153]

I ascribe no cynical motives to Truman, and I understand the reasons that he gave the orders. Why nuclear weapons were deployed is not in question, and nothing can now change the fact that they were deployed. However, I consider their deployment to be morally unjustifiable and a war crime. I think the same of the firebombing campaign that preceded them. I do not believe the ends can justify the means when the means involve the nearly instant death of over 100,000 civilians.

That cynicism portion wasn't specifically directed at you, though you are second guessing his decision, and whether or not it was a war crime is immaterial. The incendiary pounding from the B29s would have continued. As you said before, we were already well past the point of waging a "proper" war.

A naval blockade is a gradual process. Remember, their Supreme War Council only deadlocked on continuing the war upon the realization that we had such power at our disposal. It would not have afforded a clear pretext for the Emperor to intervene for surrender. Up until then, they were all too willing to continue the fight, well aware that a bad harvest was on the horizon and their would be gross hardship amongst their populace.

A naval blockade with no Allied invasion of the mainland would have foiled Japanese plans. However, it would continued the stasis that gripped the Supreme War Council. That time as long as several months, possibly longer would have been costly in both Japanese and Allied lives, as we likely would have continued assaults on other islands that had yet to have been liberated in the meantime, blockades are costly to maintain, and it's a good bet they would have thrown everything remaining in their arsenal at us in desperation.

[Strychnine 1,802]

I said "consistently put bombs within a few thousand feet", not within 1,000-ft. While the Norden bombsight was not a magical Paveway-esque precision delivery system, using it to attempt precision does at least constitute an effort to minimize civilian casualties. The deployment of nuclear weapons is the opposite of that.

a

A "few" thousand feet? How many is that ... 2 or 3? You do realize that a little over midway between 2-3,000 feet is 1/2 mile? Missing the target by 1/2 mile (or more) is generally considered ... missing the target. There's a reason the Army Air Corps decided to use 'within 1,000 feet' as a measure of conventional bombing accuracy and not 'within a few thousand feet.'

You did not address my point. My point was that targeting and attempting to drop bombs within a few thousand feet of a military target (where the military target is the goal) constitutes a reasonable effort to avoid civilian casualties. Accuracy was at the limit of what was available at the time, but the important point is that an effort was made to minimize civilian casualties. That we failed to bomb with precision does not excuse us to simply fill the sky with bombers and hope something hits a legitimate military target with no regard for where the rest of those bombs go over the span of a city. We tried to bomb accurately to the limit of our ability, until that was abandoned. No such effort was made when deploying a nuclear weapon in the center of Hiroshima. In fact, we excluded Hiroshima from prior bomber attacks.

[Strychnine 1,802]

I ascribe no cynical motives to Truman, and I understand the reasons that he gave the orders. Why nuclear weapons were deployed is not in question, and nothing can now change the fact that they were deployed. However, I consider their deployment to be morally unjustifiable and a war crime. I think the same of the firebombing campaign that preceded them. I do not believe the ends can justify the means when the means involve the nearly instant death of over 100,000 civilians.

That cynicism portion wasn't specifically directed at you, though you are second guessing his decision, and whether or not it was a war crime is immaterial. The incendiary pounding from the B29s would have continued. As you said before, we were already well past the point of waging a "proper" war.

A naval blockade is a gradual process. Remember, their Supreme War Council only deadlocked on continuing the war upon the realization that we had such power at our disposal. It would not have afforded a clear pretext for the Emperor to intervene for surrender. Up until then, they were all too willing to continue the fight, well aware that a bad harvest was on the horizon and their would be gross hardship amongst their populace.

A naval blockade with no Allied invasion of the mainland would have foiled Japanese plans. However, it would continued the stasis that gripped the Supreme War Council. That time as long as several months, possibly longer would have been costly in both Japanese and Allied lives, as we likely would have continued assaults on other islands that had yet to have been liberated in the meantime, blockades are costly to maintain, and it's a good bet they would have thrown everything remaining in their arsenal at us in desperation.

Operation Starvation (and our success hopping across the Pacific) had already effectively cut them off, with nothing more than mines and the natural progression of battle. By the time nuclear weapons were deployed, the resources were available to effect an indefinite naval and aircraft blockade. They had no means to counter that blockade, and they had no allies willing or able to do so. Their navy was gutted, and all they had left to rely on for airstrikes were kamikaze attacks. They had already sent their greatest remaining naval asset on a one-way trip to Okinawa, and Yamato did not make it. Fuel and food were serious concerns, and that situation was not improving.

Ultimately, we have no way of knowing how other scenarios would have panned out, and we never will. All we can really do is agree to disagree.