Hey GOPers

[Bottomfeeder 244]

Knowing it's a failed policy before it even leaves the ground. How do feel about what Dubya has done to the party that Reagan revived. I think it's funny as $#!*. The dogs are eating themselves alive if you ask me. Passing the point of diminishing returns, if you will, the pale-faced GOP has self-inflicted wounds that are gushing quarts of blood. It could be another twenty years before they recover from Dubya's misadventure in the Middle East.

Republican senators are now turning their rhetorical guns away from Democrats and toward one another. A few conservative Republican senators, whose votes usually cheer me up during bleak political times, are actually accusing Virginia’s senior senator, John Warner, of providing comfort to terrorists.

The White House even got involved in the name calling when Tony Snow suggested Warner’s actions could embolden the likes of Osama Bin Laden.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16942296/

"Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists."

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/20...20010920-8.html

[au9596 0]

WOW! That guys blog has so many inaccuracies it is unbelievable. No need to address them as they have been debated into the ground. Your tirade as a preface to the quotes from the article is ridiculous!

Anyway, I do and I don't agree with the troop surge. We do need more troops on the ground but along with that we need to change the rules of engagement that our soldiers deal with to win this war. Our troops are fighting with one hand tied behind their backs with the rules they have to deal with to satisfy political correctness.

[au9596 0]

I could not have stated any better than this editorial how I feel about what needs to happen for the surge to be successful:

Keys to a successful surge

Sending more troops to Iraq will work only if the U.S. changes its ways.

February 7, 2007

WHILE politicians debate whether more U.S. troops should be sent to Iraq, just as important is how those troops will be utilized. In the Boer War, a "surge" of soldiers helped. In the Vietnam War, it didn't. The difference is that the British had a sounder strategy.

In formulating the right strategy, there is no better guide than a slim 1964 volume, "Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice." Its author was a French officer named David Galula, who saw service not only in World War II but in postwar China, Greece, Hong Kong and Algeria. If there is a Clausewitz of counterinsurgency, Galula is it.

Although much has changed in recent decades, most of his admonitions still apply, which is why so many are echoed in the new Army-Marine counterinsurgency field manual. U.S. forces have gotten better at this demanding type of warfare in Iraq, but even now they're still falling short, often through no fault of their own, in carrying out many of Galula's key precepts:

"Which side gives the best protection, which one threatens the most, which one is most likely to win, these are the criteria governing the population's stand…. Political, social, economic and other reforms, however much they ought to be wanted and popular, are inoperative when offered while the insurgent still controls the population."

Too often the U.S. has gotten it backward, building infrastructure, holding elections and carrying out other civil reforms in an insecure environment. Expensive projects, such as electrical and water treatment plants, have been sabotaged. Any goodwill won has been ephemeral.

Our top priority must be to establish a modicum of security. Only then can reconstruction go forward.

"If insurgents, though identified and arrested by the police, take advantage of the many normal safeguards built into the judicial system and are released, the police can do little."

Captured Iraqi insurgents know they can remain silent and that most likely they will never be convicted because witnesses and judges can be bought or intimidated.

"Eight of 10 detainees are set free," write military analysts Bing West and Eliot Cohen. "One in 75 American males is in jail, compared to one in 450 Iraqi males." Since, as they note, "Iraq is not six times safer than the U.S.," the disparity is because of faults with the legal system that need to be fixed — perhaps by imposing martial law. Iraq will not become safer until more militants are behind bars, but they will never be convicted under peacetime rules of evidence.

"Clearly, more than any other kind of warfare, counterinsurgency must respect the principle of a single direction. A single boss must direct the operations from beginning until the end."

There has never been a single boss in Iraq. On the American side, responsibility has been split between the Defense and State departments, which have not always worked harmoniously together. On the Iraqi side, the split is between the Interior and Defense ministries, between the police and army. The situation is especially muddled in Baghdad because President Bush has promised that Iraqis will "lead" operations there. That makes Gen. David H. Petraeus' job much harder. One of his first tasks as the top U.S. general in Iraq will simply be figuring out command relationships.

"Expensive constructions for housing the troops should be prohibited…. If no construction other than what is strictly necessary is allowed, the counterinsurgent forces will be forced to live with the population, in shacks if necessary, and this will help to create common bonds."

THE U.S. HAS spent countless billions of dollars to build an elaborate network of forward operating bases in Iraq where troops are totally isolated from the population. A key part of the Baghdad security plan must be to get forces into smaller outposts where they can interact with locals, gather intelligence and provide security. This may increase casualties in the short term, but it will save American and Iraqi lives in the long run.

"Control of the population begins obviously with a thorough census. Every inhabitant must be registered and given a foolproof identity card."

Amazingly enough, the Iraqi and American governments have not issued biometric ID cards — something like our driver's licenses, with a fingerprint included — to the populace and have not equipped security forces with portable computer terminals linked to a central database.

The lack of such a setup — employed by pretty much every U.S. police department — makes it difficult to tell whether someone stopped at a checkpoint is a wanted terrorist.

These aren't insuperable problems. But they do need to be addressed if the reinforcements being sent to Iraq are to have any hope of success.

[Bottomfeeder 244]

I could not have stated any better than this editorial how I feel about what needs to happen for the surge to be successful:

Keys to a successful surge

Sending more troops to Iraq will work only if the U.S. changes its ways.

February 7, 2007

WHILE politicians debate whether more U.S. troops should be sent to Iraq, just as important is how those troops will be utilized. In the Boer War, a "surge" of soldiers helped. In the Vietnam War, it didn't. The difference is that the British had a sounder strategy.

In formulating the right strategy, there is no better guide than a slim 1964 volume, "Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice." Its author was a French officer named David Galula, who saw service not only in World War II but in postwar China, Greece, Hong Kong and Algeria. If there is a Clausewitz of counterinsurgency, Galula is it.

Although much has changed in recent decades, most of his admonitions still apply, which is why so many are echoed in the new Army-Marine counterinsurgency field manual. U.S. forces have gotten better at this demanding type of warfare in Iraq, but even now they're still falling short, often through no fault of their own, in carrying out many of Galula's key precepts:

"Which side gives the best protection, which one threatens the most, which one is most likely to win, these are the criteria governing the population's stand…. Political, social, economic and other reforms, however much they ought to be wanted and popular, are inoperative when offered while the insurgent still controls the population."

Too often the U.S. has gotten it backward, building infrastructure, holding elections and carrying out other civil reforms in an insecure environment. Expensive projects, such as electrical and water treatment plants, have been sabotaged. Any goodwill won has been ephemeral.

Our top priority must be to establish a modicum of security. Only then can reconstruction go forward.

"If insurgents, though identified and arrested by the police, take advantage of the many normal safeguards built into the judicial system and are released, the police can do little."

Captured Iraqi insurgents know they can remain silent and that most likely they will never be convicted because witnesses and judges can be bought or intimidated.

"Eight of 10 detainees are set free," write military analysts Bing West and Eliot Cohen. "One in 75 American males is in jail, compared to one in 450 Iraqi males." Since, as they note, "Iraq is not six times safer than the U.S.," the disparity is because of faults with the legal system that need to be fixed — perhaps by imposing martial law. Iraq will not become safer until more militants are behind bars, but they will never be convicted under peacetime rules of evidence.

"Clearly, more than any other kind of warfare, counterinsurgency must respect the principle of a single direction. A single boss must direct the operations from beginning until the end."

There has never been a single boss in Iraq. On the American side, responsibility has been split between the Defense and State departments, which have not always worked harmoniously together. On the Iraqi side, the split is between the Interior and Defense ministries, between the police and army. The situation is especially muddled in Baghdad because President Bush has promised that Iraqis will "lead" operations there. That makes Gen. David H. Petraeus' job much harder. One of his first tasks as the top U.S. general in Iraq will simply be figuring out command relationships.

"Expensive constructions for housing the troops should be prohibited…. If no construction other than what is strictly necessary is allowed, the counterinsurgent forces will be forced to live with the population, in shacks if necessary, and this will help to create common bonds."

THE U.S. HAS spent countless billions of dollars to build an elaborate network of forward operating bases in Iraq where troops are totally isolated from the population. A key part of the Baghdad security plan must be to get forces into smaller outposts where they can interact with locals, gather intelligence and provide security. This may increase casualties in the short term, but it will save American and Iraqi lives in the long run.

"Control of the population begins obviously with a thorough census. Every inhabitant must be registered and given a foolproof identity card."

Amazingly enough, the Iraqi and American governments have not issued biometric ID cards — something like our driver's licenses, with a fingerprint included — to the populace and have not equipped security forces with portable computer terminals linked to a central database.

The lack of such a setup — employed by pretty much every U.S. police department — makes it difficult to tell whether someone stopped at a checkpoint is a wanted terrorist.

These aren't insuperable problems. But they do need to be addressed if the reinforcements being sent to Iraq are to have any hope of success.

I hope it works for all of us. Let's hope they don't do it here.